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The Human Subjects Trade: Ethical and Legal Issues Surrounding Recruitment Incentives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Extract

Over the past 5 years, a series of articles in leading American newspapers has revealed the extent to which the conduct of clinical trials may be affected by inducements offered by corporate research sponsors and accepted by some unscrupulous physicians. The cases described were disturbing. They involved physicians engaged in excessive “enrollment activities” in exchange for money. Some of these physicians perpetrated fraud, falsifying their recruitment records in order to increase their profits. Others ignored exclusion criteria designed to ensure the safety of subjects and the validity of research results, referring their patients to research investigating treatments for conditions from which they did not suffer. One of the articles reports that physicians focusing exclusively on commercial research regularly divulge annual incomes upwards of $1,000,000 with profits in excess of $300,000. Two physicians accumulated well over $10,000,000 through clinical trials activities in less than a decade.

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Article
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Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2003

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