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Health as a Basic Human Need: Would This Be Enough?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Thana Cristina de Campos
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Extract

Our society is obsessed with health. At every second, everywhere, we are surrounded and overwhelmed by distressing calls on how vital it is to adopt a healthy lifestyle. While incorporating a healthy diet and physical exercise into our routines are the foremost commandments, everything from tobacco to refined sugars, trans fat, excessive alcohol, caffeine, and even eggs are declared public evils. Yet there is hope: medicines will save us! And indeed medicines exist available for all kinds of human afflictions. There are pills to help you relax and forget about stress, while some others, on the contrary, can keep you miraculously alert. There are pills that heal your most unbearable pains, physical or emotional, wherever their location — the head, back, quadriceps, heart, or soul. Though they may cause your stomach to burn, that is easily remedied by taking a complementary pill that will neutralize your stomach acidity with only some minor and negligible side effects elsewhere. There are also magic pills that promise you happiness, by giving you the power to thrive and the endurance to conquer the world. They ignite your hunger for achievement, but also for extra sugar and saturated fat.

Type
Symposium
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , Summer 2012 , pp. 251 - 267
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2012

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