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Critical Biological Agents: Disease Reporting as a Tool for Determining Bioterrorism Preparedness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Heather H. Horton ,
James J. Misrahi ,
Gene W. Matthews  and
Paula L. Kocher
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Extract

Before September 11, 2001, a mass-casualty terrorist attack on American soil was generally considered a remote possibility. Similarly, before October 4, 2001—the first confirmed case of anthrax caused by intentional release — widespread bioterrorism seemed implausible. Among the arguments that such a biological artack was unlikely included: the lack of a historical precedent; the technological and organizational challenges to acquiring and weaponizing a biological agent; and the almost universal moral opprobrium that would certainly accompany the use by terrorists of such a weapon. In the wake of September 11th and October 4th, however, many are reconsidering the likelihood of a large-scale bioterrorist attack against civilians.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) defines bioterrorism as the intentional release of viruses, bacteria, or toxins for the purpose of harming or killing civilian. One measurement of the public health system's level of bioterrorism preparedness is the quality and distribution of laws mandating the reporting of diseases caused by certain biological agents.

Type
Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 30 , Issue 2 , Summer 2002 , pp. 262 - 266
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2002

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