Several years ago, in a general essay on Dominican politics, I wrote a few pages about the political role of the Dominican Armed Forces. I argued that “the history of the past few years in the Dominican Republic may best be viewed as a constant struggle among changing alliances, not in terms of confrontation between civilian authority and the military establishment” (Lowenthal, 1969: 40). I suggested that “far from being a professional institution dedicated to certain principles that impel its occasional entry into politics, the Dominican Armed Forces have never had any significant function beyond politics, except for plunder” (Lowenthal, 1969: 40). Painting a picture of constant struggle within the Dominican Armed Forces, for power and a chance at the spoils, I played down the importance, for understanding the political role of Dominican military officers, of institutional and ideological considerations.

The Argentines, especially the artists, have long tilted at that psychological phantom of any pluralistic society, the cultural identity crisis. The jousting of civilization with barbarism in Sarmiento's Facundo and of civilized barbarity with barbarous civility in Martín Fierro wove a tangled maze into Argentine consciousness. Was the “true Argentine” the outward-looking porteño of Buenos Aires or the introverted gaucho of the Pampas? Should the Argentines send out feelers toward European culture or roots into the indigenous heritage? Because of such cosmic soul-searching, the labyrinthine images of Julio Cortázar's Rayuelo fit naturally into his hero Oliveira's hopscotching toward “home,” first in Paris, then in Argentina. But the Argentines, like the Chileans and Venezuelans, have not generally had a lot to say about the central theme of the Mexican and Andean artists of the twentieth century, the interaction of European and Indian identities.

With these ringing words, Colonel Henry L. Kincaide, at the 1913 Convention of the American Manufacturers Export Association, urged his fellow manufacturers into battle. The adversaries were England and Germany; the prize, world trade (Faulkner, 1924; Beard, 1934; Williams, 1959; LaFeber, 1963).

The speech came at an opportune time, because just three months later Congress was to pass the Federal Reserve Act and thus sanction a trade aid for which exporters had been lobbying for many years-the legal establishment of American branch banks in foreign countries (Chandler, 1911; Holmes, 1912; Bankers Magazine, 1913; Ring, 1913).

The Colombian political system has been characterized by a duality. On the one hand, there are recurrent fears-and these perceptions are held even by outsiders—that the political system is on the verge of total collapse and disruption. On the other hand, when measured in terms of the continuity and survival of the traditional civilian elite and the actual challenge posed by counter-elites, the Colombia system has been relatively stable. In effect, since the turn of the century, Colombia's ruling group has been renovated by the cooptation of new elements by the ruling elite. The bulk of these new members has been young individuals fairly well integrated within the values and norms of the establishment. Although some social change has occurred and there has been some upward mobility (for the best general treatment of Colombian twentieth-century politics, see Dix, 1967), the resilience of the Colombian upper class can be illustrated with two cases.

Recognition of the economic power of multinational corporations has stimulated speculation about the development of international political structures to regulate this power. A major difficulty in assuming that corporate expansion throughout the world will give rise to political phenomena of similar scope lies in the difference between international power based on corporate growth and international power based on the cooperation of nation-states. Whereas the economic internationalism of corporations is in general an expansion of power which has well-defined historical foundations in ideology and organization, the task of developing international political associations with power to enforce policy within a number of states entails at least a partial redefinition of traditional bases of political sovereignty. The former is growth of existing power; the latter is creation of a new form of power. There is no obviously necessary development from one to the other.