Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-mp689 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-23T07:47:16.572Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Ownership Studies: The Data Source Does Matter

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Ronald C. Anderson  and
D. Scott Lee
Ronald C. Anderson
Affiliation:
Williams School of Commerce, Economics and Politics, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA 24450
D. Scott Lee
Affiliation:
Department of Finance, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843–4218
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We examine the fit between the ownership data provided by four surrogate databases and the data collected from proxy statements. We discover an unambiguous pecking order among the surrogates relative to the benchmark ownership statistics of corporate proxy statements. Corporate Text is first, followed in descending order by Compact Disclosure, Value Line, and Spectrum. Further tests show that reporting discrepancies in the Value Line and Spectrum databases could affect economic inferences drawn from regressions using their ownership data. A field guide describing each data source's reporting conventions, formats, and strategies for data aggregation may be downloaded from the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis' web site (http://webenu.washington.edu/~jfqa/hold/andeapdx.pdf).

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 32 , Issue 3 , September 1997 , pp. 311 - 329
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1997

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Agrawal, A., and Knoeber, C. R.. “Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31 (09 1996), 377–397.Google Scholar
Ang, J. S., and Beck, K. L.. “A Comparison of Marginal and Average Tobin's Q Ratios.” Unpubl. Manuscript, Florida State Univ. (1995).Google Scholar
Badrinath, S. G., and Lewellen, W.. “On the Measurement of Tobin's Q.” Unpubl. Manuscript, Purdue Univ. (1995).Google Scholar
Bagnani, E. S.; Milonas, N. T.; Saunders, A.; and Travlos, N. G.. “Managers, Owners, and the Pricing of Risky Debt: An Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Finance, 49 (06 1994), 453–477.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barnhart, S. W.; Marr, M. W.; and Rosenstein, S.. “Board Composition, Managerial Ownership, and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis.” Unpubl. Manuscript, Clemson Univ. (1994).Google Scholar
Bathala, C. T.; Moon, K. P.; and Rao, R. R.. “Managerial Ownership, Debt Policy, and the Impact of Institutional Holdings: An Agency Perspective.” Financial Management, 23 (Autumn 1994), 38–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bolster, P.; Chance, D.; and Rich, D.. “Equity Swaps and Corporate Insider Holdings.” Financial Management, 25 (Summer 1996), 14–24.Google Scholar
Caballero, R. J., and Leahy, J. V.. “Fixed Costs: The Demise of Marginal Q.” Working Paper 5508, NBER (1996).Google Scholar
Chauvin, K. W., and Hirshey, M.. “Ownership Structure and Capital Structure.” Unpubl. Manuscript, Univ. of Kansas (1995).Google Scholar
Chen, H.; Hexter, J. L.; and Hu, M. Y.. “Management Ownership and Corporate Value.” Managerial and Decision Economics, 14 (07/08. 1993), 335–346.Google Scholar
Chung, K. H., and Pruitt, S. W.. “A Simple Approximation of Tobin's Q” Financial Management, 23 (Autumn 1994), 70–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Faught, J. G.; Kale, J. R.; and Rebello, M. J.. “The Relative Efficacy of Tobin's Q and Other Firm Performance Measures.” Unpubl. Manuscript, Georgia State Univ. (1995).Google Scholar
Hall, B. “The Manufacturing Sector Master File: 1959–1987.” Working Paper 3366, NBER (1990).Google Scholar
Kole, S. R. “Measuring Managerial Equity Ownership: A Comparison of Sources of Ownership Data.” Journal of Corporate Finance, 1 (04 1995), 413–435.Google Scholar
Loderer, C., and Martin, K.. “Executive Stock Ownership and Performance: Tracking aint Traces.” Unpubl. Manuscript, New Mexico State Univ. (1995).Google Scholar
Malatesta, P. H., and Walkling, R. A.. “Poison Pill Securities: Stockholder Wealth, Profitability, and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics, 20 (01/03 1988), 347–376.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McConnell, J. J., and Servaes, H.. “Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value.” Journal of Financial Economics, 27 (10 1990), 595–612.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McConnell, J. J., and Servaes, H.. “Equity Ownership and the Two Faces of Debt.” Journal of Financial Economics, 39 (09 1995), 131–157.Google Scholar
Mehran, H. “Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership and Firm Performance.” Journal of Financial Economics, 38 (06 1995), 163–184.Google Scholar
Morck, R.; Shleifer, A.; and Vishny, R. W.. “Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Financial Economics, 20 (01/03 1988), 293–315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Neter, J.; Wasserman, W.; and Kutner, M. H.. “Applied Linear Statistical Models.” Homewood, IL: Irwin (1985).Google Scholar
Perfect, S. B., and Wiles, K. W.. “Alternative Constructions of Tobin's Q: An Empirical Comparison.” Journal of Empirical Finance, 1 (07 1994), 313–341.Google Scholar
Stulz, R. M. “Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control.” Journal of Financial Economics, 20 (01/03 1988), 25–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stulz, R. M.; Walkling, R. A.; and Song, M. H.. “The Distribution of Target Ownership and the Division of Gains in Successful Takeovers.” Journal of Finance, 45 (07 1990), 817–833.CrossRefGoogle Scholar