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New Perspectives on Informational Asymmetry and Agency Relationships

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Robert A. Haugen  and
Lemma W. Senbet
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Extract

The two related problems of agency and informational asymmetry have received increasing attention in finance. In particular, prominent authors in this area (e.g., Jensen and Meckling [7], Ross [15, 16], Leland and Pyle [10], etc.) have demonstrably argued that the financial structure of the firm can be determined in the process of eliminating, or at least reducing, the costs associated with these problems.

Type
I. Incentive Signaling Models and Rational Expectations
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , November 1979 , pp. 671 - 694
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1979

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References

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