It is sometimes asserted that a laissez-faire policy toward financial intermediaries tends to deepen financial development and accelerate economic growth. The two decades preceding the American Civil War provide a challenging case for this proposition because they witnessed something approaching a natural experiment. During those years the Federal government withdrew from the regulation of banking, a policy that was the final outcome of Andrew Jackson's war with the Second Bank of the United States. A wide range of experiments concerning entry into commercial banking were tried, from “free” banking to “socialized” banking. Moreover, other kinds of legislation affecting banking varied from state to state as well. While the regions of the United States differed in terms of economic structure, a common language, a common legal tradition, and, to some extent, a common culture permeated all regions. Thus, the period provides excellent conditions for observing the effects of financial legislation on the extent of financial intermediation. In this paper I will assess the impact on financial development of the three most important forms of regulation: the commercial banking laws, the usury laws, and the mutual savings banking laws.

A reconsideration of regional economic development during the antebellum period is underway. Emphasis thus far has tended to center on economic aggregates, on one region (the South) or on a single sector (agriculture). While the results of this work have altered our understanding of the antebellum South's relative economic position—or at least have sharpened the debate on the issues—comprehension of the role and position of the period's industrial sector remains faulty, largely because it has been derived from indirect evidence.

The quantitative international comparison of financial structure and development involves three levels of problems: first, what is the purpose of such comparisons; second, given these objectives, what are the concrete features of the financial system to be compared; and, third, how are these comparisons to be carried out, that is, what data can be used and how should they be processed and arranged?

Wherever there are banks there are arguments about the macro-economic effects of banking policy. One of the best theoretical formulations of the effect of German banking on German development appears in Alexander Gerschenkron's “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective” and “Reflections on the Concept of Prerequisites of Modern Industrialization.” This problem is given an empirical treatment in “German Banks and German Growth, 1883–1913: An Empirical View,” by Hugh Neuburger and Houston H. Stokes. Our intention in this paper is to test further our previous findings and to contrast our findings for Germany with those for post-World War II Japan. While the two situations are not entirely comparable they are similar enough to make such a comparison worthwhile.