Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-8zxtt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-13T23:32:51.911Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Reply to Thomas Ferguson and Peter Temin's “Comment on ‘The German Twin Crisis of 1931”’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2004

ISABEL SCHNABEL
Affiliation:
Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Straße 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany. E-mail: Schnabel@coll.mpg.de

Extract

Ferguson and Temin criticize my article for only paying lip service to the notion of a twin crisis while providing a story of a pure banking crisis. In fact, I have never claimed that the crisis was a pure banking crisis. The question is whether and to what extent banks contributed to the crisis. Ferguson and Temin take the position that the crisis was a pure currency crisis. I argue that weaknesses in the banking sector existed, which interacted with the currency problems in numerous ways. The focus of my article on banks reflects the nature of the question, rather than any view that currency problems were unimportant.

Type
NOTES AND DISCUSSION
Copyright
© 2004 The Economic History Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Born Karl Erich. 1967 Die deutsche Bankenkrise 1931. München: Piper,
Ferguson Thomas, and Peter Temin. “Made in Germany: the German Currency Crisis of July 1931.” Research in Economic History 21 (2003): 153.
Ferguson Thomas, and Peter Temin. “Comment on ‘The German Twin Crisis of 1931.” This JOURNAL 64, no. 3 (2004): 87276.
Schnabel Isabel. 2003The Great Banks' Depression—Deposit Withdrawals in the German Twin Crisis of 1931.” SFB 504 Working Paper No. 03-11, University of Mannheim,