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Monetary Policy and Expectations: Market-Control Techniques and the Bank of England, 1925–1931

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2009

John R. Garrett
John R. Garrett
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, Chattanooga, TN 37403.
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Abstract

The Bank of England depleted its open-market portfolio by secretly sterilizing large gold inflows. Thereafter interest rates were influenced by manipulating reported gold flows. Expectations manipulation as a monetary policy channel is modeled and estimated. A gold flow falsification was over two-thirds as effective as an open-market operation. These results contradict accepted new classical models and suggest that credibility benefits from new classical policy are small, despite current popularity among central bankers. The episode supports Peter Temin’s view of interwar central bankers as nonstabilizers and enforcers of a dysfunctional classical orthodoxy.

Type
Articles
Information
The Journal of Economic History , Volume 55 , Issue 3 , September 1995 , pp. 612 - 636
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 1995

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