¹ de Roover, Raymond, “Early Accounting Problems of Foreign Exchange,” The Accounting Review, XIX (1944), 403Google Scholar. Richards, R. D., The Early History of Banking in England (London: P. S. King and Son, 1929), pp. 43–47. 236–37Google Scholar, mentions the development of inland bills but fails to stress the most important point, namely, that “inland” bills were discountable in seventeenth-century England, while “outland” bills were not. Richards also fails to explain of what “the business of exchange” really consisted.

² The principle that “an exchange transaction is not a straight loan” (cambium non est mutuum) was generally accepted by scholastic writers.

³ Cf. Sapori, Armando, Mercatores (German trans., Milan: Garzanti, 1942), chap, vGoogle Scholar, “Der Kaufmann und die Religion,” pp. 127–48, esp. pp. 144 ff.

⁴ The word prenditore may cause confusion because its meaning changed in the seventeenth century. From then onward the payee or beneficiary of a bill is called prendttore. Prior to the seventeenth century, however, prenditore referred to the person who received the value and made out the bill, that is, the drawer.

⁵ Even in the seventeenth century, the Dutch writer Phoonsen, J. pointed out that the uncertainty of gain was an essential feature of the exchange contract.—Les Loix et les coutumes du change des principals places de I'Europe (Amsterdam, 1715), p. 3Google Scholar. This contract was defined as follows: “Le change des raarchands est un nigoce d'argent que les marchands exercent d'une place sur une autre, ou d'une foire sur une autre, pour un gain incertain et casuel, et ce change est appelG par excellence change simple [italics mine].”— Buon-insegni, Tommaso, Dei cambi, trattato risolutissimo et ulilissimo (Florence, 1573), fol. 5Google Scholar.

⁶ An exposition of the theory of interest in exchange will be found in my study, “What is Dry Exchange? A Contribution to the Study of English Mercantilism,” The Journal of Political Economy, LII (1944), 250–66Google Scholar.

⁷ It is untrue “that bill-broking does not appear before the eighteenth century.”— Gutkind, Curt S., Cosimo de' Medici, Pater Patriae, 1380–1464 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1938), p. 281Google Scholar. The merchant manuals of the Middle Ages give the tariff of brokerage charges, and the account books of Medieval merchants often give the names of the brokers through whom bills were negotiated.

⁸ A detailed description of the mechanism of Nostro and Vostro accounts is given in my study, “Early Accounting Problems of Foreign Exchange,” The Accounting Review, XIX, 381–407Google Scholar.

⁹ Florence, Archivio di Stato, Mediceo avanti il Principato, filza 134, no. 2, Fragment of a ledger belonging to the Bruges branch, 1441, fols. 241, 250. (Hereafter cited as A.S.F., Ledger of Medici Bruges branch.)

¹⁰ Exchange rates were quoted in so many groats, Flemish currency, per Venetian ducat or per florin, both in Bruges and in Venice or Florence, respectively.

¹¹ The banker usually gained but he lost occasionally when the money market was not in equilibrium. This point is clearly stated by Lodovico Guicciardini in his famous description of exchange transactions on the Antwerp bourse, found in his Descritlione di tutti i Paesi Bassi (Antwerp, 1567)Google Scholar. In the better known French translation (by F. de Belleforest, 1582), the relevant passage is as follows: “…et toutefoys cest usage de change ordinairement est non seulement tolerable, mais commode et de grand prouffit, et ne peut (suyvant que disent les Théologiens), estant pratiqug deuement, porter nom de gain injuste: d'autant que le plus souvent on y gaigne peu et encor avec grand hasard et peril, et telle foys on y perd du fondz et principal de la chose.”— Tawney, R. H. and Power, Eileen, eds., Tudor Economic Documents (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1924), III, 160Google Scholar.

¹² Tightness in the money market usually corresponded to a rising exchange in Venice and Florence and to a falling exchange in Bruges. When the tension lessened, the exchange tended t o fall in Venice and Florence, but to rise in Bruges.

¹³ A fall in the price of bills corresponded to a rising exchange in Venice, since the taker promised to pay more in Flemish currency for each ducat received in Venice, and to a falling exchange in Bruges, since the taker there received less in Flemish currency for the promise to pay one ducat in Venice.

¹⁴ A.S.F., Ledger of Medici Bruges branch, fols. 231 (account of Antonio di Niccold del Conte) and 242 (account of Piero Horco of Venice).

¹⁵ In the case of three loans made to Antonio di Niccolo del Conte, the Medici just broke even in one instance and made a profit in the other two instances.— Roover, R. de, “What is Dry Exchange?” The Journal of Political Economy, LII, 263 fGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ The text of San Antonino is quoted by Fanfani, Amintore, Le Origini detto spirito capi-talistico in Italia (Milan, 1933), p. 112Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Lupus, Joannes Baptista, De usuris et commerciis illicitis (Venice, 1582), pp. 109 f.Google Scholar, gives the text of the decretal which is cited or referred to by a great many other authors.

¹⁸ Abbott Usher, Payson, The Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe (Harvard Economic Studies, No. LXXV, Cambridge, 1943), I, 76 fGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ This register, dated 1455, is described by Sieveking, Heinrich, Die Handlungsbiicher der Medici (Sitzungsberichte der Kais. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, No. CLI, Vienna, 1905), p. 23Google Scholar, who reads into the text that Ingherami, Benci, and Lapi were three messengers who rode from one city to another delivering bills of exchange! He comments on the inadequacy of the postal service. In reality, the text lists the names of the manager and assistant managers in Florence who had the power to make out bills of exchange and against whose “handwriting” foreign correspondents could validly pay. For example, the firm Piero and Giovanni de' Medici at Rome was expected to honor any bills issued by the bank in Florence and written in the hand of Giovanni Benci, Francesco Ingherami, or Tommaso Lapi (“A Roma, a Piero e Giovanni de' Medici e Compagnia di corte, scrivemo che per noi anno a dare compimento…. per mano di Giovanni Benci, per man o di Francesco Ingherami, per mano di Tomaso Lapi”).—Florence, Archivio di Stato, Mediceo avanti il Principato, filza 134, no. 3, fol. 42.

²⁰ The Italian text is per cut mano aremo a dare chonpimento.—Sieveking, Handlungs-biicher der Medici, p. 22. Sieveking believes that this passage also refers to messengers who came to Florence to present bills of exchange. The meaning of the text is entirely different.

²¹ Prato, Tuscany, Datini Archives, no. 854, Letter of the firm Giovanni Orlandini and Piero Benizi and Co. in Bruges to Francesco di Marco e Andrea di Bonanno in Genoa, dated September 3, 1400: “…voi no gli avete promessi perche la lettera non era di mano di chi suole fare quelle del chanbio.”

²² , Sieveking, Handlungsbiicher der Medici, p. 35Google Scholar.

²³ Roover, R. de, “Early Accounting Problems of Foreign Exchange,” The Accounting Review, XIX, pp. 383, 394–98Google Scholar.

²⁴ A.S.F., Ledger of Medici Bruges branch, fol. 245. Cf. Prims, Canon Floris, “Heer Ansel-mus Fabri, onze tiende deken (1415–1449),” Antwerpiensa (Antwerp, 1938), XI, 19–26Google Scholar.

²⁵ Gras, N. S. B., Business and Capitalism: An Introduction to Business History (New York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1939), p. 120Google Scholar.

²⁶ The English merchant adventurers later formed a regulated company called the “Company of Merchant Adventurers.” The term “merchant adventurers” does not apply only to the members of this company.

²⁷ Postelthwayt, Malachy, “Anonymous Partnerships,” The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce (2d ed.; London, 1757), I, 73Google Scholar. According to Postelthwayt, anonymous partnerships were temporary partnerships in which the partners traded visibly in their own names. The persons who dealt with one of the partners were presumably unaware of the existence of a partnership. After conclusion of the venture, the partners settled accounts with each other and the partnership was dissolved. Cf. , Gras, Business and Capitalism, p. 165Google Scholar.

²⁸ For example, the Bruges branch sold almonds belonging to the firm Piero del Fede and Co. of Valencia at the Easter fair of Bergen-op-Zoom in 1441. At the same fair, the Bruges branch sold other almonds in which Piero del Fede and the Medici had a joint interest.—A.S.F., Ledger of Medici Bruges branch, fol. 232 (account of Piero del Fede and Co.).

²⁹ Ibid., fol. 250.

³⁰ Grunzweig, Armand, Correspondance de la filiale de Bruges des Medici (Brussels, 1931), Part I, pp. 26Google Scholar, 28. This is henceforth cited with abbreviated title and page reference only, as Part II has not yet appeared.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 78 f.

³² In 1453, for example, the Medici bought tapestries for Astorre Manfredi, lord of Faenza. (They were not of the best design.)—Ibid., p. 26.

³³ A.S.F., Ledger of Medici Bruges branch, fol. 246.

³⁴ The rate of the consular fees was one sterling or one-third groat per I groat in 1441, according to the Medici records. This rate was raised to twelve mites or one-half groat per £ gr. in 1461 and to one groat per £ gr. in 1498. Grunzweig, Armand, “Le Fonds du consulat de la mer aux archives de l'Etat a Florence,” Bulletin de I'lnstitut Historique Beige de Rome, X (1930), in, 120Google Scholar.

³⁵ Borlandi, Franco, ed., El Libro di mercatantie et usanze de' paesi (Turin, 1936), p. 126.Google Scholar

³⁶ Cf. Lane, Frederic C., “Venture Accounting in Medieval Business Management,” Bulletin of the Business Historical Society, XIX (1945), 164–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁷ Andrea Barbarigo had considerable trouble with an agent in Syria named Dolceto, who gave him unsatisfactory service.—Lane, Frederic C., Andrea Barbarigo, Merchant of Venice, 1418–1440 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1944), p. 109Google Scholar.

³⁸ Cf. Renouard, Yves, Les Relations des Papes d'Avignon et des eompagnies commerciales et bancaires de 1316a 1378 (Bibliotheque des Ecoles Franchises d'Athenes et de Rome, Fasc. 151, Paris, 1941)Google Scholar, passim; Remy, F., Les grandes indulgences pontificates aux Pays-Bos a la fin du moyen age, 1300–1531 (Recueil de travaux publies par les membres des Conferences dilistoire et de Philologie, 2d series, XV, Louvain, 1928), passimGoogle Scholar.

³⁹ The Latin text of the acquittance and of Spini's power of attorney was published by Gottlob, Adolf, “Zwei 'Instrumenta Cambii' zur Uebermittelung von Ablassgeld (1468),” West-deutsche Zeilschrijt fiir Geschichte und Kunst, XXIX (1910), 208Google Scholar. The English translation of the acquittance was published by Lunt, William E., Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages (Records of Civilization, No. XIX, New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), II, 469–74Google Scholar. Luke de Tolentis was in the Low Countries to raise money for the Pope's crusade against the Turks. Contributors were promised plenary indulgence after confession and penance.

⁴⁰ Schneider, Georg, “Die finanziellen Beziehungen der florentinischen Bankiers zur Kirche von 1285 bis 1304,” Schmoller's stoats— und socialwissenschaftliche Forschungen, XVII (1900), 34Google Scholar; cf. , Lunt, Papal Revenues, I, 52–54Google Scholar.

⁴¹ , Grunzweig, Correspondence, pp. xxiii, 1–4, 13–15Google Scholar.

⁴² The firm Piero de' Medici and Co. in Bruges to the Cardinal of York, December 5, 1448 (ibid., pp. 13–15)— Cf. Tout, T. F., “John Kemp,” Dictionary of National Biography, XXX, 387Google Scholar.

⁴³ The Medici agents also concerned themselves with the hiring of tenors and the recruiting of choir boys for the Sistine Chapel and even participated in the hunt for lost classics. Grun-zweig, Correspondance, p. xxiii; Sieveking, Handlungsbucher der Medici, p. 28.

⁴⁴ , Gottlob, “Zwei 'Instrumenta Cambii' zur Uebermittelung,” Westdeutsche Zeitschrift, XXIX, 205Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ , Lunt, Papal Revenues, I, 322–23Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Zippel, G., “L'AlIume di Tolfa e il suo commercio,” Archivio delta R. Societi Romana di Storia Palria, XXX (1907), 5–51, 389–461Google Scholar; Strieder, Jakob, Studien zur Ceschichte kapi-talislischtr Organisationsformen (Munich, 1925), pp. 168–83Google Scholar; Piotrowski, Roman, Cartels and Trusts: Their Origin and Historical Development from the Economic and Legal Aspects (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1933), pp. 153–59Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Strieder, Studien, p. 170. , Zippel, “L'Allume di Tolfa,” Arckivio della Societa Romano, XXX, 405Google Scholar, analyzes in detail the contract of 1466. The royalty was later reduced to one ducat per cantaro. The cantaro was a unit of weight of about 150 lbs. avoirdupois.

⁴⁸ , Strieder, Studien, p. 176Google Scholar; , Piotrowski, Cartels, pp. 155 fGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁹ , Piotrowski, Cartels, pp. 11–86Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Estey, James Arthur, Business Cycles; Their Nature, Cause, and Control (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1941), pp. 45–47Google Scholar, gives a characteristic formulation of this theory: business cycles do not antedate the Napoleonic Wars; prior to that time business fluctuations did not follow “a recognizable pattern” and were not caused by factors “inherent” in the economic system. Joseph A. Schumpeter is a notable exception among the theorists of business cycles. He stresses the importance of “external” factors and admits that business cycles have a long history.— Business Cycles; A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939), I, pp. 220 ffGoogle Scholar. The merchant manuals of the Middle Ages refer repeatedly and emphatically to seasonal variations in the money market which followed a definite and well-known pattern. Are seasonal variations not of a recurrent, cyclical, or rhythmic character? If they are seasonal, they must necessarily be recurrent.

⁵¹ Fanfani, A., Le Origini dello spirito capitalistico in Italia (Milan, 1933), pp. 109Google Scholar, no, 123, quotes San Antonino, Archbishop of Florence, San Bernardino of Siena, and Tommaso de Vio, better known as Cardinal Cajetan, who all condemn monopoly as a violation of commutative justice and of the just price. Cf. , Strieder, Studien, p. 162Google Scholar; , Piotrowski, Cartels, pp. 154fGoogle Scholar.

⁵² Cf. O'Brien, George, An Essay on Medieval Economic Teaching (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1920), p. 124Google Scholar.

⁵³ The canonists considered a monopoly privileged by the state as lawful. Moreover, they did not question the right of the state to levy tolls and to put indirect taxes on commodities. The papacy could justify its action on these grounds.

⁵⁴ , Zippel, “L'Allume di Tolfa,” Archivio della Societ A Romana, XXX, 47–49, 389–98Google Scholar; , Strieder, Studien, pp. 178–80Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ The same Bartolomeo Giorgio had been the farmer of the alum mines in Asia Minor up to 1463, when he had to leave Turkey because of the war. Heyd, W., Histoire du commerce du Levant (Leipzig, 1923), II, 328Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ , Grunzweig, Correspondence, pp. xxi fGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁷ Severen, L. Gilliodts-van, Cartulaire de I'Estaple (Bruges. 1905), II, 164Google Scholar, No. 1108; 229, No. 1189.

⁵⁸ Tommaso Portinari to Cosimo de' Medici, February 15, 1464 (n.s.).—, Grunzweig, Correspondence, pp. 106 fGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁹ Tommaso Portinari and Angelo Tani to Cosimo de' Medici, March 28, 1464.—Ibid., p. 112.

⁶⁰ One should not forget that the war between Venice and the Turks probably prevented the arrival of Turkish alum.

⁶¹ Tommaso Portinari and Angelo Tani to Cosimo de' Medici, April 29, 1464.—Ibid., pp. 118 f.

⁶² Tommaso Portinari to Cosimo de' Medici, May 14, 1464.—Ibid., p. 132. The letters after 1464 contain more about the alum business.—Ibid., p. xxii. Their publication as Volume II of the Correspondence has been delayed by the war.

⁶³ , Strieder, Studien, p. 180Google Scholar. The Medici were replaced by the Genoese firm Domenico Cen-turioni and Giovanni Doria and Co.

⁶⁴ , Zippel, “L'Allume di Tolfa,” Archivio delta Societa Romana, XXX, 415Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Gras, , Business and Capitalism, p. 123Google Scholar, remarks that this development should be made the object of further study.