¹ For a discussion of Ssu-Ma Kuang's history of China, The Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government (Tzu Chih T'ung Chien), see Pulleyblank, Edwin G., “Chinese Historical Criticism: Liu Chih-chi and Ssu-ma Kuang,” in Beasley, W. G. and Pulleyblank, E. G., eds., Historians of China and Japan (London, 1961), pp. 151–159Google Scholar. See also Pulleyblank's comments in his “The Historiographical Tradition,” in Dawson, Raymond, ed., The Legacy of China (London, 1964), pp. 159–160Google Scholar. Critical views of Ssu-Ma as a politician abound. See for example Hsi, Niu, “Pei Sung tang cheng chih ching-kuo chi ch'i pei-ching” (The Northern Sang factional struggle and its background), Ch'ing-hua Chou-k'an, XXXVI, No. 7 (1931), 8Google Scholar and Ch'i-ch'ao, Liang, Wang Ching Kung (Wang An-shih) (Shanghai, 1936), pp. 159–160Google Scholar where he quotes Ch'en Ju-ch'i to the effect that Ssu-Ma was ultimately responsible for the downfall of the Northern Sung.

² See particularly Hsiao Kung-ch'üan, Chung-kuo cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih (A history of Chinese political thought) (2nd ed.; Taipei, 1954), IV, 483Google Scholar and Mote, Frederick W., “Confucian Eremitism in the Yüan Period,” in The Confucian Persuasion, ed. by Wright, Arthur F. (Stanford, 1960), p. 229.Google Scholar

³ For the best discussion of this theme see Levenson, Joseph R., Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy (Berkeley, 1968), pp. 25–73.Google Scholar

⁴ See Kung-ch'üan, Hsiao, IV, 484Google Scholar and Hsi-sheng, T'ao, Chung-kuo cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih (A history of Chinese political thought) ([Taipei?], 1954), IV, 69Google Scholar. For the influence of Taoism as a possible factor that led political conservatives to oppose assertive government see Liu, James T. C., Reform in Sung China: Wang An-shih (1021–1086) and His New Policies (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), P. 35CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Liu notes the merging of Taoism and Confucianism in the political thought of Ssu-Ma Kuang (citing Chung-fu, Ch'en, Liang Sung ssu-hsiang shu-p'ing [A critique of Sung thought] [Shanghai, 1933], pp. 9–19).Google Scholar

⁵ See Creel, Herrlee G., “On Two Aspects of Early Taoism,” in his What is Taoism (Chicago, 1970), pp. 37–47.Google Scholar

⁶ For the discussion see Herrlee G. Creel, “On the Origin of Wu-wei,” in his What is Taoism?, pp. 48–78.Google Scholar

⁷ Kuang, Ssu-Ma, Wen-kuo Wen-cheng Ssu-Ma Kung Chi (The collected papers of Ssu-Ma Kuang) Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an ed.), pp. 351–352Google Scholar. The collected papers hereafter cited as SMKC. See also SMKC, p. 230Google Scholar where, in addition to complaining about the uselessness of Taoist (and Buddhist) ideas for governing affairs, Ssu-Ma argues that the people suffer great harm at the hands of Taoists and Buddhists because their money is taken from them to build temples.

⁸ SMKC, p. 540.Google Scholar

⁹ Very clearly expressed in SMKC, pp. 488–489, p. 264.Google Scholar

¹⁰ SMKC, pp. 514–516.Google Scholar

¹¹ SMKC, p. 514.Google Scholar

¹² E.g., SMKC, pp. 288–289.Google Scholar

¹³ In fact, some of Ssu-Ma's views seem almost Legalist in character. He once had remarked that people were incapable of governing themselves and so it had been necessary to have a ruler bring order into their lives. (See Tzu-chih t'ung-chien [hereafter cited as TCTC], 69/Wei 1, Huang-ch'u 2.) Interestingly, one scholar has pointed to this same sentiment as characteristic of Wang An-shih's concept of active or assertative (yu-wei) government. See Ta-hua, Wang and Shih-chang, Wan, Chung-kuo cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih (A history of Chinese political thought) (Taipei, 1968), p. 256Google Scholar. For a general comment on the importance of regulatory institutions or law (fa), see Ssu-Ma's Chi ku lu (A record of research into ancient times) (Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an ed.), p. 43. Ssu-Ma often talks about his punishment and reward formula for achieving peace and stability in government. See, for example, his long essay appended to the Chi ku lu, pp. 113–115Google Scholar, parts of which had been presented in 1061 on his appointment to the Board of Policy Criticism (chien yuan). He again mentions the substance of this formula in SMKC, p. 298.Google Scholar

¹⁴ SMKC, p. 356.Google Scholar

¹⁵ I-chou, Huang et al. Hsu tzu-chih t'ung-chien shih-puGoogle Scholar (A reconstruction of the lost sections of Collected data for a continuation of “The comprehensive mirror for aid in government”) (hereafter cited as HCP:SP), 6/8b. This work is included in Li T'ao, Hsu tzti-chih t'ung-chien ch'ang-pien (Collected data for a continuation of The comprehensive mirror for aid in government (hereafter cited as HCP) (Taipei, 1964).

¹⁶ SMKC, p. 537.Google Scholar

¹⁷ SMKC, pp. 490–492.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See Hsiao, , IV, 482.Google Scholar

¹⁹ TCTC, 1/Chou 1, Wei-lieh 23. Ssu-Ma outlines a more elaborate hierarchy in his metaphysical treatise Ch'ien-hsu. It is true that his views on interpersonal relationships and political structure in general reflect his belief in the “natural” limitations placed on men and that filial piety and loyalty to one's sovereign both find a basis in the “natural order” (as Teraji Jun argues in “Ssu-Ma Kuang ni okeru shizenkan to sono haikei” [Ssu-Ma Kuang's view of nature and its background], Tōhōgaku, 32 [06, 1966], pp. 30–42Google Scholar). It would be wrong, however, to infer that such loyalty, as part of some natural order, was therefore conceived of in absolute terms. The interpretation of exactly what constituted loyalty remains the crucial question. On a number of occasions Ssu-Ma likens society to the human body, where the “body uses the shoulders, the shoulders the fingers,” etc. See, for example, SMKC, p. 218.Google Scholar

²⁰ There is, of course, a real problem here. It was obvious that in the past some of the men who had succeeded to the throne were eminently unfit for the position, and that because of them certain dynasties had suffered greatly. Two of the most infamous were the last rulers of the Hsia and Shang dynasties, Chieh Kuei and Chou Hsin respectively. In one case a more able relative (the older brother of Chou Hsin, whose mother had been a concubine at the time of his birth and who was thus not “legitimate”) was technically not eligible to rule (see Ch'ien, Ssu-Ma, Shih-chi [Records of the historian], 3Google Scholar), and the kingdom perished because of the cruel administration of the ruler. In another case, the youngest son of the King of Wu refused to comply with his father's wishes to ascend the throne. Later, after his older brother had died, he was again asked to take the throne but again he refused and this time fled from the kingdom, whereupon a power struggle ensued between his nephews for the crown that resulted in the destruction of the kingdom. In both cases cited here, men saw their country come to an end rather than break the sacred rules of imperial succession. Ssu-Ma uses these examples as evidence that “in propriety there is nothing greater than position.” Nevertheless, Ssu-Ma enters a very important caveat. To answer the implication that he approved of extreme cases—seemingly sanctioning the destruction of a state merely because a gross incompetent succeeds to the throne—Ssu-Ma allows that “unless it is a case of the cruelty of Chieh [Kuei] or Chou [Hsin] or the benevolence of T'ang [Ch'eng] [who deposed the tyrant Chieh Kuei] or Wu [Wang, who deposed the tyrant Chou Hsin] … then the separation between subject and sovereign should be observed until death.” (TCTC, 1/Chou 1, Weilieh 23.)

²¹ See Mote, Frederick W., “The Growth of Chinese Despotism,” Oriens Extremus, 8 (1961), 8–17Google Scholar. See also, Liu, James T. C., “An Administrative Cycle in Chinese History,” Journal of Asian Studies, XXI, No. 2 (02, 1962), 137–152CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This very important article deals with a number of other factors, particularly the notion of “opinion power,” that bear directly on our whole discussion of Ssu-Ma Kuang's political philosophy. On the corresponding loss of power by the Great Minister, see Mu, Ch'ien, “Lun Sung tai hsiang-ch'üan” (On the power of the Great Minister during the Sung dynasty), in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi (Studies in Sung history), ed. by Sung-shih T'an-tso-hui Taipei, 1958), I, 455–462.Google Scholar

²² Mote, Frederick W., “Confucian Eremitism in the Yuan Period,” p. 229.Google Scholar

²³ Ibid Cf. note 20. See also, Mote, Frederick W., “The Growth of Chinese Despotism,” pp. 13–15.Google Scholar

²⁴ Creel, Herrlee G., Confucius and the Chinese Way, Harper Torchbook (New York, 1960), p. 129Google Scholar. Originally published as Confucius: The Man and the Myth (1949).Google Scholar

²⁵ Ibid, p. 52.

²⁶ Analects, 2.19, 11.23, 12.22, 14.20 and 23; Mencius, 1.2.8 and 9, IV.1.20. (Pointed out by Creel.)

²⁷ Ssu-Ma approvingly quotes Confucius who reputedly would become weak in the legs and almost breathless when he passed the place where the king often stood. (Analects, 10.4.111.) He severely criticizes Mencius' smug and disdainful attitude toward the ruler (in Mencius, II.2.2 vi and vii). See SMKC, p. 531.Google Scholar

²⁸ See Gungwu, Wang, “Feng Tao: An Essay on Confucian Loyalty,” in Confucian Personalties, ed. by Wright, Arthur F. and Twitchett, Dennis (Stanford, 1962), pp. 123–145.Google Scholar

²⁹ SMKC, pp. 528–529.Google Scholar

³⁰ TCTC, 220/T'ang 36, Chih-te 2.

³¹ For examples, see TCTC, 94/Chin 16, Hsienho 4 (two examples), 291/Hou Chou 2, Hsien-te 1, 218/T'ang 34, Chih-te 1. The story of Han Kao-tsu and Duke Ting is particularly revealing. Having assumed the throne after finally defeating his rival, Hsiang Yü, Kao-tsu beheaded Duke Ting when the latter paid him an official visit. Duke Ting had been a general in the army of Hsiang Yü. During the struggle for the throne the Duke had once had occasion to meet Kao-tsu (then Liu Pang) on the field of battle. When Kao-tsu sent him a message saying, “How can two men of virtue put each other in difficulty?” Duke Ting, duly impressed, and perhaps with an eye to the future outcome of the entire struggle, broke off his attack. There were, then, some grounds for mutual respect and friendship between the two men. Later Duke Ting proved disloyal to his ruler, Hsiang Yü, and was the cause of Hsiang Yü's defeat at the hands of Kao-tsu. It seemed therefore somewhat contradictory for Kao-tsu to behead Duke Ting at the first convenient opportunity. He did this, Ssu-Ma explains, “so that everyone in the empire would know clearly that disloyal subjects have nowhere to hide and that because of [the principle of] righteousness one cannot stand in approval of those who accumlate grace with an eye to their own interests, even if it is a case of saving their own lives.” TCTC, 11/Han Kao-ti 5.

³² TCTC, 291/Hou Chou 2, Hsien-te 1.

³³ See TCTC, 87/Chin 9, Yung-chia 3; 11 /Han 3, Kao-ti 6; 28/Han 20, Ch'u-yuan 1. Along the same lines, see Ssu-Ma's criticism of Mencius for not telling the ruler all he needed to know. SMKC, p. 531.Google Scholar

³⁴ TCTC, 172/Ch'en 6, T'ai-chien 8.

³⁵ TCTC, 104/Chin 26, T'ai-yuan 5.

³⁶ SMKC, p. 512.Google Scholar

³⁷ TCTC, 28/Han 20, Yung-kuang 1.

³⁸ SMKC, p. 327.Google Scholar

³⁹ SMKC, p. 190.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Ibid

⁴¹ SMKC, p. 326.Google Scholar

⁴² SMKC, p. 372Google Scholar. The notion of the emperor as “grand arbiter” does not necessarily imply absolutism. An early Legalist philosopher, Shen Puhai, wrote that “in antiquity, the emperor was connot enthroned and honored in order to benefit him. [It was because] order could not be maintained if there were no honored person in the world.” Hsu Cho-yun goes on to comment that “the function of the ruler is to avert the chaos that may break out when several persons vie for the highest position.… The ruler exists to perform a function that is necessary for social order.” Ancient China in Transition (Stanford, 1965), pp. 148–149Google Scholar. We have seen above Ssu-Ma's belief that a ruler was necessary to prevent chaos in society (note 13; see also, SMKC, p. 326Google Scholar), but most impressive is his insistence on impartiality in government, particularly on the part of the emperor (SMKC, p. 255Google Scholar). The emperor does not control rewards and punishments as an individual but rather as a representative of the state, Ssu-Ma argued. Ordinary people were incapable of such objectivity (SMKC, p. 348Google Scholar). See also SMKC, p. 355 and p. 235Google Scholar. The final decision-making power of the emperor was tied to impartiality and, as we shall see immediately below, the notion of legitimacy. Absolutism pure and simple is clearly not the issue here.

⁴³ SMKC, pp. 517–518.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ TCTC, 220/T'ang 36, Ch'ien-yuan 1.

⁴⁵ SMKC, p. 372.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ TCTC, 28/Han, Ch'u-yuan 2.

⁴⁷ TCTC, 106/Chin 28, T'ai-yuan 10.

⁴⁸ Creel, , Confucius and the Chinese Way, p. 77Google Scholar. Ssu-Ma specifically says on at least one occasion that if the sovereign is benevolent, his subjects will be loyal. This mutual relationship exists between father and son and brother and brother as well. See SMKC, p. 240.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ TCTC 192/pang 8, Wu-te 9.

⁵⁰ SMKC, p. 324.Google Scholar

⁵¹ TCTC, 235/T'ang 49, Chen-yuan 4.

⁵² Hsu, , pp. 140–174.Google Scholar

⁵³ With the end of the Ch'un Ch'iu “family state,” the way for unqualified absolutism was wide open, for now no one shared the religious charisma of the ruler.

⁵⁴ The historical trend was for the emperor to develop new organs of government that he felt would be more responsive to his desires. For the Han dynasty, see Yü-ch'üan, Wang, “An Outline of the Central Government of the Former Han Dynasty,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, XII (1949), 166–184Google Scholar. For the T'ang, Sung, and Ming dynasties, see Mu, Ch'ien, Chung-kuo li-tai cheng-chih te-shih (A critique of Chinese gov-ernmental institutions through the ages) (4th ed., rev. and enl., Hong Kong, 1966), pp. 34, 63, 88.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ SMKC, p. 513.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ SMKC, p. 488.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ SMKC, p. 513, 287, 271.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ SMKC, 255Google Scholar. This was an important time for consultation; SMKC, p. 248.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ SMKC, p. 250.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ SMKC, p. 364.Google Scholar

⁶¹ TCTC, 188/Chin 40, I-hsi 13.

⁶² TCTC, 100/Chin 22, Yung-ho 11.

⁶³ SMKC, p. 514, p. 191.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See particularly SMKC, p. 222.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ SMKC, p. 264.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ SMKC, p. 241.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ SMKC, p. 325Google Scholar. Ssu-Ma bitterly criticizes the trust placed in such special agents in SMKC, pp. 208–209Google Scholar. He complains elsewhere that eunuchs are being consulted on matters properly within the purview of other, regularly constituted, officials. See SMKC, pp. 307–308Google Scholar. There were, however, some limits to local discretion. In one instance Ssu-Ma argued that chou and hsien officials often concealed news of serious crimes from the central government and reported only minor offenses. He suggested that the government send agents to investigate the situation. See SMKC, p. 254.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ SMKC, p. 324.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ As part of their centralization policy, the early Sung monarchs drastically curtailed the influence of the senior local officials in the selection and movement of their subordinates (T'ao Hsi-sheng, IV, 17). With the constant coming and going of central government officials from one post to an other, administrative power tended to sink a step lower in the hierarchy. At the bottom of the ladder were the clerks (li). These men were from the local area and lacked the rigorous educational training that regular members of the civil service had. They were not really part of the bureaucracy at all, although they were definitely part of the governmental machinery. Because they were familiar with the local situation and had built up close friendships with the local inhabitants, they were indispensible to the bureaucrat from the central government serving in the area. Obviously, these clerks could “make or break” the officials sent out from the capital. (For a general discussion of the clerks, see Liu, James T. C., “The Sung Views on the Control of Government Clerks,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, X, parts II and III [December, 1967], 317–344.)Google Scholar The great difficulty lay in the egregious venality that characterized these clerks. Ssu-Ma complains about this in SMKC, p. 225Google Scholar. Elsewhere he notes disapprovingly the loss of power among senior officials to choose their own subordinates (SMKC, p. 434Google Scholar). In a governmental reorganization that he proposed, Ssu-Ma hoped that many of the central government clerks could be eliminated (SMKC, pp. 408–409Google Scholar). For Ssu-Ma's view on eunuchs, see TCTC, 263/T'ang 79, T'ien-fu 3. An interesting discussion of the development of power among the eunuchs during the Han dynasty is Wang Yü-ch'üan, “An Outline of the Central Government of the Former Han Dynasty,” pp. 171–173.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Liu, James T. C., “An Early Sung Reformer: Fan Chung-yen,” in Chinese Thought and Institutions, ed. by Fairbank, John K. (Chicago, 1957), p. 106.Google Scholar

⁷¹ TCTC, 12/Han 14, Hui-ti 4.

⁷² The danger, as Ssu-Ma saw it, was that the emperor might otherwise become insulated from public opinion. SMKC, p. 339, p. 354.Google Scholar

⁷³ TCTC, 11/Han 3, Kao-ti 6; 28/Han 20, Ch'u-yuan 1. See also SMKC, p. 300, p. 293Google Scholar, for general comments on the importance of the ruler knowing his errors. On the importance of frank criticism and advice in general see SMKC, p. 265, pp. 304–305, and p. 181.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ SMKC, p. 432.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ TCTC, 22/Han, Hou-yuan 2. Chi ku lu, p. 54.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ TCTC, 43/Han 35, Chien-wu 15. Also, SMKC, pp. 179–180.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ SMKC, pp. 470–471Google Scholar. On the importance of education in the transformation from worthihood to sagehood, see SMKC, p. 373Google Scholar, where Ssu-Ma argues that if a man did not study the Classics, then he could not know the Way. On the other hand, if he did apply himself, he would be able to reach the heights of Yao and Shun. The emperor's instruction was to be in the form of court conferences with his advisors. Ssu-Ma complained that the emperor was not asking questions during these conferences (SMKC, p. 292Google Scholar) and that they were being cut short (SMKC, p. 268).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ SMKC, pp. 457–458, p. 369.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ SMKC, p. 364Google Scholar, also see p. 366.

⁸⁰ SMKC, pp. 362–363Google Scholar. Ssu-Ma constantly urged the emperor to elicit criticism from all quarters, not just from officials. Perhaps his belief that the “will of the people” (min chih so yü) must be followed in changing any government policy (SMKC, pp. 366–367Google Scholar) was partially responsible for this position, for who could speak about the people's will better than the people themselves? In the past, many famous men had first come to prominence through their helpful criticism of government policy in times of disorder, when emperors sought advice regardless of its source (SMKC, p. 289Google Scholar). In ancient times, Ssu-Ma maintained, there never had been any restrictions on criticism (SMKC, p. 492Google Scholar). At one point he suggested to the emperor that the answers to the policy questions (ts'e) from the civil service examinations be given careful consideration. (SMKC. p. 202Google Scholar.) In all cases, it was the substance and truthfulness of the advice and criticism that was most important, not the source. SMKC, pp. 202–203, 287–288.Google Scholar

⁸¹ TCTC, 2/Chou 2, Hsien-wang 48.

⁸² It may be interesting to note that when Ssu-Ma himself attained power in 1085 as Great Minister of State, he oversaw the almost total abolition of the reform program of Wang An-shih in quite a different spirit. He tolerated no opposition, listened to no advice and all in all was conspicuous for his failure to heed the “straight words” of others. See Pi Yuan, Hsu tzu-chih t'ung-chien (A continuation of The comprehensive mirror for aid in government) (Chung-hua Shu-chü ed.), 79/Yuan-yu 1/2/hsin-i; Huang-ch'ao pien-nien kang-mu pei-yao (Abridged annals of the imperial [northern Sung] dynasty) (Ch'eng-wen ed), 22/3a. Ssu-Ma's attitude led Fan Ch'un-jen to lament, “This is another Wang Chieh-fu [Wang An-shih]!” (HCP, 367/19a).

⁸³ Especially later during the Ming dynasty. As Hucker notes, “Emperors regularly paid lip-service to the notion that remonstrators should not be punished for speaking their minds.… But Ming emperors usually acted on a different premise….” He goes on to quote the Veritable Records of emperor Hsi-tsung (r. 1621–1628): “The responsibility of speaking officials is to speak out; if what they say is not proper, then they fail their responsibility.” Punishment followed, (See Hucker, Charles O., The Censorial System of Ming China [Stanford, 1966], p. 255.)Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Analects, 14.3.

⁸⁵ Analects, 18.1.

Naturally, one had to be politic in his approach. Although one must meet the responsibility even in the face of danger, one of Confucius' disciples offered some reassuring advice when he pointed out that “one remonstrates after confidence [is established between prince and minister]. If confidence is not yet [established], then he [the prince] will take [the remonstrance] as a vilification of himself.” (Analects, 19.10.)

⁸⁶ SMKC, p. 440.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ SMKC, p. 492.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Su-shui chi-wen (The Su-shui records) (Sung Yuan jen shuo-pu ed.), I, 13/11a.

⁸⁹ Analects, 4.18.

⁹⁰ TCTC, 12/Han 4, Hui-ti 1.

⁹¹ TCTC, 51/Han 43, Yung-chien 2.

⁹² In the Mencius there is a story about a certain Ch'en Chung-tzu who refused to live at his elder brother's home and refused to accept any of his brother's money because he considered it ill gotten. When he found out he was eating a goose that his brother had received as a present, he straightaway went outside and vomited it up. Mencius comments on Ch'en: “To carry out the principles which he holds, one must become an earthworm, for only so can it be done.” He ends the story with the statement: “With such principles as Chung holds, a man must be an earth-worm before he can carry them out.” (III/2.10). The meaning of all this is clear: one who wishes to avoid all contact with people of whose principles he disapproves cannot live in human society. But Ssu-Ma wholeheartedly agreed with Ch'en Chung-tzu. That Ch'en refused to live at his brother's house and would not take his brother's money was actually his way of remonstrating with his brother Ch'en recognized that if he did eat and live by depending on his brother this would be the height of hyprocrisy. “This would be blaming him with my mouth and enjoying what he had to offer with my body,” Ssu-Ma wrote. True, Ch'en was certainly not following the middle path, but Ssu-Ma adds: “The cautious will keep themselves from doing what is wrong.” Ssu-Ma could not agree with Mencius' implication that one must bend his principles to reality. If one had to be an earthworm, so be it! SMKC, p. 531.Google Scholar

In another of the I Meng selections Ssu-Ma again disputes Mencius on the question of withdrawing from office and also on the conduct of a Superior Man among men of inferior quality. The overriding consideration for Ssu-Ma is the presence or absence of the Way. In the Mencius we read about two men whose examples the Superior Man is to avoid.

Mencius said: “Po I would not serve a prince whom he did not approve, not associate with a friend whom he did not esteem. He would not stand in a bad prince's court, nor speak with a bad man.… Therefore, although some of the princes made application to him with very proper messages, he would not receive their gifts—he would not receive their gifts, counting it inconsistent with his purity to go to them.

Hui of Liu-hsia was not ashamed to serve an impure prince, nor did he think it low to be an inferior officer.… When neglected and without office, he did not murmur. When straited by poverty, he did not grieve.… Therefore, self-possessed, he companied with men indifferently, at the same time not losing himself.” (II/1.9.)

Mencius concluded that “Po I was narrow-minded, and Hui of Liu-hsia was wanting in self-respect. The Superior Man will not manifest either narrowminedness or the want of self-respect.”

Ssu-Ma Kuang attacked Mencius' argument by citing the career of Confucius. Naturally no one surpassed Confucius with regard to the proper conduct of a Superior Man. Had not Confucius himself refused to serve many kingdoms because they were inconsistent with his principles? Had he not refused to see friends he did not esteem? Ssu-Ma's answer was “yes.” He goes on to point out that Confucius did indeed refuse to stand in the court of a bad prince (when Yang Hu came to power in his native state of Lu). As for committing the “errors” of Hui of Liu-hsia, Confucius did serve an impure prince when he served Ting Ai. He had also served in an inferior office, had been straited by poverty without grieving, had associated with men indifferently when in the rural areas, and, supported by the famous lines from Analects that a man of complete virtue, the Superior Man, “feels no discomposure though men may take no note of him,” Ssu-Ma pointed out that Confucius would not murmur when neglected and without office. “To serve the virtuous among one's superiors, and to be friends with those who are benevolent is not being narrow-minded. To differ peacefully or to escape from the world without melancholy is not lacking in self-respect,” Ssu-Ma concluded. SMKC, p. 530.Google Scholar

⁹³ SMKC, p. 440.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ See Liu, , Reform in Sung China, pp. 30–40.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 38.