I am deeply appreciative of the honour you have done me in inviting me to deliver this lecture. It is an especial privilege to speak under the auspices of Dean Reuven Yaron, to whom I am tied by a friendship of many years and from whom, like many of you, I have learned a great deal. I am very grateful for his generous introduction: you will know him well enough to make the necessary allowances.

The subject of this evening is so wide that only a few selected items can be discussed; and inevitably some of you who would have preferred a different choice will be disappointed. Let me say at once that I shall not go into autopsy, however burning an issue it is at the moment in this country. The reason is simple: I have already written on it and do not wish to repeat myself. I shall open by some comments on a recent debate in Britain. Then I shall come to my principal topic, experimentation. This may be of interest to you at a moment when you are, happily, about to start a School of Pharmacology which will no doubt have to think about such matters. Finally I shall explore a much neglected, almost repressed aspect of the march of medicine—if you like, a variation on the old folk theme “out of sight, out of mind”.

It is not possible to give full expression, within the limited space allotted for this article to the many activities of this remarkable man; to speak of his innumerable arguments on behalf of public interest before the courts of law, Committees of Congress, State Legislative Committees, and the Interstate Commerce Commision, of his scattered writings and speeches on the problems of his time, or of his role in the Zionist movement in which he has been such a prominent figure; and above all to attempt to write a summary of his judicial opinions. I will only touch on his main interests, which I believe lead to the heart and kernel of the thinking of Justice Brandeis, to the best of his teachings and true values.

The Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 (“the November Resolution”) will obviously be a main focus of international attention in the diplomacy following the renewed Israel-Egypt Cease-Fire of August 8, 1970. And the writer has published a study of it in “The ‘November Resolution’ and Middle East Peace: Pitfall or Guidepost”? The present study, parallel to that one, is a stocktaking for the three years or so between the Cease-Fires of 1967 and 1970, of the conduct of Israel and the Arab States, as this bears upon their obligations under international law. The detailed aspects of conduct involved will be clear enough from the headings. All of them obviously pertain either to conduct affecting the regime of cease-fire, or to conduct affecting the regime of Israel's administration of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Sinai and the Golan Heights.

Egypt and Syria, with massive Soviet support, have more than restored their armaments virtually to pre-June 1967 levels. According to Washington Post figures of May 23, 1970, Egypt's front-line aircraft then numbered 600 (including 320 Mig 21's and Sukhai 7's) as compared with 450 immediately before, and only 100 immediately after, the Six Day War. To these, after the disclosure of actual Soviet air patrols in Egypt, it is clear that by July 1970 a further 100 Mig 21's with accompanying Soviet pilots have to be added; and the arrival of another 50 Soviet-piloted aircraft was reported to be then impending. Syria was reported by Aviation Week and Space Technology (at about the same date) to have 230 planes (including 100 Mig 21's and Sukhai 7's). That magazine estimated that the Arab States involved marshalled a total of 1230 fighter bombers (including the 100 Soviet-manned planes), and that this represented a four to one superiority over Israel's 330 aircraft which included 60 Mirage 3J's, 42 Phantoms, and 48 Skyhawks. (The London Institute of Strategic Studies estimated Israel's holdings in May as only 325, including 50 Phantoms).

In spite of the rising flood of literature on the resources of the sea, since adequate solutions for many pressing problems are still wanting, a further attempt to sketch a short survey of the main issues may still be useful. An overall classification of the types of resources and of the suggestions in legal discussion may lead to a better assessment of these problems.

The subject itself is, of course, one for scholars of many disciplines; oceanographic information is now being collected with unprecedented industry. The interest in hitherto hidden aspects of the ocean-depths—in many ways more hidden than the surface of the moon—is not merely one of military strategy. Without better awareness of the resources and whims of the “frail ocean” there is simply no strategy for human survival possible at all.

The distinction between an offer and an invitation to deal is clear and its consequences are well-known. Whilst the former bestows upon the offeree the power to accept and thus to conclude the contract, the latter is only intended to elicit an offer which the tenderer is then at liberty to accept or reject. It is, by contrast, less simple to determine when we are faced with an offer or an invitation to deal, or which of these might alone apply according to the rules of one or other legal system.

In this paper we do not intend to touch upon the questions involved in an overture to a specified individual or an announcement of a reward to the public for the performance of some act, i.e., to the person who carries out the required act (although, as happens in English law, such a case also falls under contract and is not regarded as a unilateral promise effective in itself). Instead we shall deal with overtures to the public indicating that a person has goods or services to supply, which take the form of displaying wares in a shop window or in the interior of a shop (sometimes by inviting customers to utilize self-service facilities) or of distributing catalogues, price lists, handbills, advertisements, posters and the like.

The State of Israel has always accepted the fact that freedom of the press is both a right and a freedom equal to other basic rights. Even in the absence of a written constitution, the Israel Declaration of Independence implied these rights when is stated that Israel “will be based on the principles of liberty, justice and peace as conceived by the Prophets of Israel; will uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens, without distinction of religion, race, or sex; will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, education and culture”. It was self-evident to the framers of the Declaration that each citizen in a democratic and free society has the right to know and only then can he participate in the system of public discussion and choose a course of action.

Can the registered owner of a trademark object to the use of his mark on goods on which the same trademark has been legally affixed abroad, but which have been imported into this country without his consent and against his wishes through what may be termed “irregular channels”, i.e., not through the agent, licensee or subsidiary of the trademark proprietor?

This question of apparently minor importance has lately come to the forefront of interest in professional circles. The intensification of international trade since the end of World War II, the lowering of tariffs, the creation of supra-national economic units such as EEC and EFTA, and the growing number of international firms and concerns with the consequent establishment of sales organizations abroad have brought this question in different sets of circumstances before the courts of many countries. Their decisions have been widely divergent, from country to country, and sometimes even within the same country; many of them have been attacked in textbooks and legal periodicals; their reasoning, even where the results have been accepted, has been criticized and new doctrines have been proposed. In 1967, the International Association for the Protection of Industrial Property (AIPPI), with a view to unifying trademark law, initiated an extensive study of this question, but has so far failed to arrive at a generally acceptable solution.

When Professor Ginossar invited me to address you, he very liberally left the choice of topic to me. “Talk about anything you want,” he said, “about Eshnunna, or about the Land of Israel Movement, or about anything else you consider proper.” This left me in somewhat of a quandary. I might have talked to you about ancient legal history, about Rome, or about the Jewish military colony at Elephantine, in southern Egypt, of the 5th century B.C., or else about the laws of Eshnunna, an Old-Babylonian kingdom of the 18th century B.C. But then one should beware of imposing one's specialties on a general audience, however intelligent, kind and tolerant. At the very best the interest of a few might be kindled, for others the likely result is boredom—albeit in after-lunch talks alleviated by a tendency to post-prandial somnolence.

I might have talked about politics. This—I feel quite certain—would have kept everyone wide awake. But while I do hope that some of you would have agreed with my views, a few might even have been persuaded, I have no doubt whatsoever that others would have disagreed quite strongly. In the end I did not think it proper to introduce that much controversy into this “happy dwelling together of brethren”. If I had been expressly asked to talk about politics, I should have complied without hesitation (and perhaps there may be some other occasion for it). But, since the matter was left to my discretion, I decided against it.

Property relations between spouses have for many years been a domain which did not receive the proper and direct attention it deserved from the hands of the legislature.

Ottoman and Mandatory Periods: Under the Ottoman regime these matters were dominated by personal or religious law, as the case happened to be, and there was no law in existence which was applicable to all the inhabitants of die territory known as Palestine, irrespective of people's religious beliefs or formal religious affiliations.

The Mandatory authorities did not wish to interfere with the existing pattern. The Palestine Orders-in-Council 1922–1947, under arts. 51–67, accorded a special status to the religious courts of the various religious communities within the judiciary of Palestine. Not all religious courts enjoyed the same extent of jurisdiction but all exercised, in matters of personal status either exclusive jurisdiction over the members of their communities or concurrent jurisdiction together with the civil courts in those cases where all the parties to the action consented to such jurisdiction. “Personal status” as defined by art. 51 covered a wide range of matters some of them concerning the person as such and others concerning proprietary rights to which a person is entitled by reason of his personal status such as alimony, maintenance, succession.

The lengthy report in Genesis 23 of the negotiations and subsequent purchase of the cave and field of Machpelah is problematic from the legal point of view. On the face of it, Abraham obstinately insists on paying for what the Bnei Heth and Ephron wish to give him free. If one is not to dismiss the bulk of the report as niceties of oriental bargaining, as do most non-legal commentators, then complex problems of relating the transaction to the provisions of a coherent legal system arise. For this reason it is impossible entirely to separate the question of the legal source of this passage from the problems of its content. Consequently the first section on material legal problems of the text includes a consideration of some of the possible sources, while those relating to aspects of form alone are treated separately.

Assuming the legal background to be that of Jewish law, Melamed interprets the transaction as a gift-transaction, not by the Bnei Heth, but also by Abraham. The problem is that Abraham being a “stranger and sojourner”, as he declares in v. 4, he is unable to buy land for burial. In order to avoid this prohibition, the transaction takes the form of mutual gifts. But if all that is needed is a gift in order to make his acquisition possible, it seems strange that Abraham refuses Ephron's offer in v. 11 and insists on giving money in return, which looks suspiciously like an offer to purchase. Melamed proposes, therefore, that Abraham did not in fact want to receive a real gift, because he feared that the giver meant a matana 'al menat lěhahzir (gift made on condition that it be returned—cf. Succa 41b); he thus in v. 13 requests Ephron to take his money first, and only afterwards will he bury his dead. However, the Talmudic matana 'al menat lěhahzir is a subtle concept, the product of a well-developed legal system, and it is difficult to relate it to the presumably quite primitive legal system of the patriarchs.

In the last twenty-five years more than sixty new states have come into being. Most of these new states are burdened with the problems caused by economic underdevelopment, but are determined to solve those problems. The very fact of underdevelopment, however, has meant that these states are unable to marshall sufficient domestic capital to meet the goals of constant and rapid development. They have, consequently, had to turn to the developed, industrialized nations for aid in achieving those goals.

At first, the aid that was given to the developing countries was generally given on a government to government basis. The explanation for the absence of private enterprise in the business of reconstruction and development may be found in the facts of the economic reality of Europe in the late 1940's and of Africa, Asia and Latin America in the 50's and 60's. The problems that had to be solved were so complex and the means for solving them so limited that it seemed that if anything could be done, it would have to be done on the massive, centralized, planned basis which demanded governmental organization and control. Furthermore, in the short-run, at least, the private sector was totally uninterested in any investment which was risky and, so it seemed, not very profitable. Rational economic decisions were, however, in the case of the developing countries, buttressed by an ideological foundation which rejected private enterprise associated with former colonialist masters and emphasized the economic and social benefits of public control of the means of production. In the past ten years, however, ideology has begun to make way for a more pragmatic approach. The developing countries have come to understand that aid from foreign governments often comes in a package with undesirable political wrappings and that, more important, government to government aid simply could not provide enough of the capital that must be raised if ambitious development programmes are to be met.

In 1967 North American investors invested $11.1 million in approved Israeli investments which accounted for 48% of the total foreign investments made during that year. In 1969 North American investors invested a sum of $81 million in similar investments which accounted for 75% of all foreign investments made in Israel during that year. During the years 1967–69, 214 different North American investment projects were approved by the Israeli Investment Centre, with the year 1969 alone accounting for 88 such projects, many in economic fields considered to be most vital to the Israeli economy. In 1969 some 6,000 United States citizens immigrated to Israel. In 1970 this number is expected to rise to 10,000. Indeed, the achievements, often termed “miracles”, of the past twenty-two years would not have been possible without the continual assistance of United States citizens and corporations in both technical know-how and capital.

Security Council resolution 242 (1967), adopted on November 22, 1967, contains the following phrase:
“Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.”
In the other languages used by the Security Council (except Chinese), that phrase is framed as follows:
“Retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit.”
“Vyvod izrailskikh voruzhennykh sil s territorii, okkupirovannykh vo vremya n’edavn’ego konflikta.”
“Retiro de las fuerzas armadas israelís de los territorios que ocuparon durante el reciente conflicto.”

That phrase has produced considerable controversy inside Israel, but within that controversy a secondary issue has arisen, of some juridical interest, since some of the protagonists of one point of view or another have purported to see a fundamental difference between one or other of these language versions of this phrase. We have no intention of taking sides in that particular controversy. The aim of this note is more limited, namely, to indicate certain factors relevant to the interpretation of a multi-lingual resolution of an organ of the United Nations.

With citizenship and residence sufficient to sustain United States taxation of worldwide income, a United States citizen, resident or corporation, is liable for United States taxes on all income derived from Israeli sources. Such income, being Israeli-linked by virtue of the source rules described in the first part of this article, will normally be subject to Israeli taxation. In these circumstances the United States taxpayer would be in principle subject to both Israeli and United States taxes.

In reality, however, double taxation is the exception to the rule. The United States has adopted unilateral relief measures in the form of the exemption from its taxes of certain income derived from sources outside the United States, the deductibility of foreign taxes, and a foreign tax credit. Israel, for her part, grants numerous exemptions from Israeli taxes to receipts which would be otherwise taxable, and greatly reduces its taxes on certain income. We turn first to those measures of relief afforded by the United States Internal Revenue Code.

A fundamental problem in jurisprudence—the justification of subjection to law, the legitimation of the demand to account for one's deeds—is antecedent to the science of law. In furnishing a solution to this problem philosophy shapes qualitatively the nature of the legal order of a society which it underlies. In what follows we shall focus our attention on two outstanding achievements of European civilization in antiquity—attempt to state Aristotle's solution of the problem and point to its counterparts in Roman jurisprudence.

It should be noted that Aristotle's views, including his theory of responsibility, underwent certain developments. We shall, however, discuss it in its mature shape in the Nicomachean Ethics. As for Roman law, from the Twelve Tables in the 5th century B.C. down to Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis in the 6th century A.D., and thereafter, it was never a static body of law. Yet the Corpus is its best known and most widely applied embodiment. It has exerted influence on later European legal thought long after the Roman Empire ceased to exist and inspired many systems of law throughout the world. We shall, therefore, discuss Roman law as it is reflected in that compilation.

The Torah contains two groupings of cyclical legislation, the Jubilee laws, based on a fifty-year cycle, and the Sabbatical laws, based on a seven-year cycle. Our enquiry is concerned with the former, the Jubilee legislation, but it is clear that an important part of the discussion will be the relationship between it and the Sabbatical legislation. The laws of these two groupings, which overlap considerably, consist of three main elements, fallow laws, release laws, and redemption laws. The latter are not cyclical laws, but are linked to the cyclical legislation in the text and are important for its understanding.

The material outlined above is found in three Pentateuchal codes; in Exodus, Leviticus and Deuteronomy. In Exodus 23:10ff there is a fallow-law: an entire cessation of all field work (verb š m ṭ) is ordered to take place in every seventh year. This is said to be dictated by a regard for the poor and the beasts of the field. From the context it would appear that the fallow is intended to be universal (the following regulation concerns the Sabbath), but this is by no means a necessary conclusion. Secondly, there are release-laws, concerning slaves only. In 21:2–6 it is laid down that a Hebrew slave can be kept in bondage only for six years. After this period he was automatically emancipated.

A.Brief Factual Background: It is not proposed here to unfold the entire history of the Arab-Israel conflict. Our purpose is rather to outline briefly the major, and by and large undisputed, events preceding the outburst of all-out hostilities on the morning of June 5, 1967.

In the aftermath of the first Arab-Israel war, in 1949, Israel and the surrounding Arab countries signed armistice agreements, according to which all hostile military activities between the signing parties were to cease. However, throughout the years following the signing of the agreements, innumerable border incidents, military or semi-military raids and reprisals, sabotage and mining operations, and other belligerent actions occurred, each side charging the other with aggression. In May 1948, Egypt closed the Suez Canal to passage by Israeli shipping and, at the end of 1949, installed guns at Sharm-el-Sheikh, overlooking the Straits of Tiran, thus blockading the Israeli port of Eilat. To justify her actions, Egypt persistently asserted the existence of a “state of war” or “state of belligerency” between Israel and herself, irrespective of the armistice agreement and her obligations under the United Nations Charter. In October 1956, the second Arab-Israel war, known as the Suez (or Sinai) Campaign, broke out. But even this violent confrontation and the arrangements which followed, including the stationing of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Gaza Strip and Sharm el-Sheikh, did not bring about stability and peace. Tension continued to mount in the area.

It is a feature of the English law of sentencing that the penalty laid down for an offence indicates the maximum which may be imposed for that offence, but that in lieu of such penalty a milder one may be imposed at the discretion of the court. Apart from the special case of murder where life imprisonment is mandatory, exceptions to this rule are rare.

In Israel this same principle was incorporated in section 42 of the Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936, and in the section which replaced it, section 1 of the Penal Law Revision (Modes of Punishment) Law, 1954, which states as follows: “A court which has convicted a person of an offence may impose on him any penalty not exceeding the penalty prescribed by law for that offence”. In lieu of the term of imprisonment specified by the law a court is thus empowered to impose a shorter period of imprisonment, a conditional term of imprisonment, or a fine; it may, alternatively, make a probation order.

The term of redemption, ge'ula, is widely used in the Bible. It basically denotes the rightful getting back of a person or object that had once belonged to one or to one's family but had been lost. In the laws this takes the form of avenging a relative's murder (“redemption of blood”), of buying back a relative from slavery, or a relative's land from an outsider. The term is also used of the commuting to money payments of offerings for sacrifice. In narrative, and in particular, prophetic texts the term is given a wider meaning. It denotes the saving òf a person from the clutches of his enemies by a powerful relative, usually God. The enemies may be foreign nations, creditors or even such abstract forces as sin or death. The idea of payment, which exists in some of the laws, retreats into the background. We must be careful, therefore, in examining the sources, to remember that the term ge'ula had not only several legal meanings but also had fairly general currency in the literature of Ancient Israel.