The issue of capital punishment is a very wide one; it has been discussed for centuries by philosophers, theologians, legal scholars, social scientists and reformers of all kinds. These discussions have involved a variety of types of reasoning: some are purely theoretical, some are highly technical, statistical or, at a further remove, methodological analyses. But they have always revolved around a simple, basic question: for or against? This is basically a moral question; because of its general character, because it has to do with moral considerations of a rather general nature for abolishing or retaining a legal institution, it also presents a problem for moral and legal philosophy.

A cursory examination of the Talmudic sources relating to circumvention of the law is sufficient to show that two approaches exist, one affirmative and permitting it and one negative and forbidding it. “A person may contrive to bring his produce in whilst still in its chaff so that his animal may eat it without its becoming liable to tithe”. “A person may contrivingly mix his grain with stubble in order to exempt it from tithe”. There are many similar dicta. On the other hand, for example, in the Tosefta Taharot we find in a number of matters “provided he does not act contrivedly for if he does they are impure”.

Can these sources be reconciled to give a more or less clear picture of the way in which the rabbis approached the question of circumvention of the law? Rosh (R. Asher b. Yehiel, Germany, Spain c. 1250–1327), for instance, conscious of the attendant difficulties, observed with regard to rules of rabbinical provenance: “Not every circumvention… is the same. Some are generally permitted… Others are permitted only to students of the law… Still others are entirely forbidden and the rabbis treat them more rigorously than deliberate acts… And then there are those over which opinion is divided”. Rosh thus sets out the problem but suggests no solution. In the view of the present writer the sources lend themselves to systematic explanation which rebuts the remark of Rashba (R. Solomon Ibn Abraham Adret, Spain c. 1235–1310) that no two cases of circumvention are alike.

The Companies Ordinance (Amendment) (No. 17) Law, 1980, (hereinafter referred to as Amendment no. 17) has fundamentally reformed the legal status of the objects clause of a company memorandum. It is no exaggeration to say that this amendment constitutes the greatest reform effected in company law in Israel up to the present day.

English Common Law regarded the objects clause as defining the capacity of the company, and not only the powers of those acting on its behalf. This approach, formulated at a time when it was impossible to alter the objects clause of the memorandum persisted even after the English legislature relented somewhat and permitted the objects to be altered, albeit with certain restrictions and according to a special procedure. This is still the approach in England today: the objects of the company are viewed as determining its capacity, and therefore, an act done in deviation from the objects is considered void, and cannot be ratified by the company, even if all the members wish to do so. At the same time, the European Communities Act 1972, affords protection to people transacting with the company in good faith, even in the case of a deviation from the objects (sec. 9(1)).

There is, however, no formal sanction—statutory or in the regulations, for enforcing this rule. The lack of formal restrictions on the matter of compulsory attendance expresses itself not only in the absence of a statutory quorum, but in a positive fashion as well, in the rule embodied in sec. 24 of the Basic Law: The Knesset, whereby “The Knesset shall hold debates and pass decisions, whatever the numbers present“. Recently, this section was amended: on July 16, 1980, the Knesset approved the addition of the words, “if there is no contrary provision on this matter in another law” at the end of the section. The amendment was not designed to change the existing legal position, according to which a statutory quorum is not required, but only to open the symbolic door to a future change and to rectify the imprecisions in the law as it was formulated. In the body of the law in which we find exemptions from a compulsory quorum, there are three sections entrenched against amendment by a simple majority or an accidental majority, and they may only be amended by an absolute or special majority at the time of the vote.