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Attendance at Parliamentary Sessions and The Quorum Rule*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 February 2016
Extract
Sec. 22 of the Knesset Regulations states as follows:
Knesset Members must participate as frequently as possible in the plenary sessions of the Knesset and in the meetings of the committees of which they are members.
There is, however, no formal sanction—statutory or in the regulations, for enforcing this rule. The lack of formal restrictions on the matter of compulsory attendance expresses itself not only in the absence of a statutory quorum, but in a positive fashion as well, in the rule embodied in sec. 24 of the Basic Law: The Knesset, whereby “The Knesset shall hold debates and pass decisions, whatever the numbers present“. Recently, this section was amended: on July 16, 1980, the Knesset approved the addition of the words, “if there is no contrary provision on this matter in another law” at the end of the section. The amendment was not designed to change the existing legal position, according to which a statutory quorum is not required, but only to open the symbolic door to a future change and to rectify the imprecisions in the law as it was formulated. In the body of the law in which we find exemptions from a compulsory quorum, there are three sections entrenched against amendment by a simple majority or an accidental majority, and they may only be amended by an absolute or special majority at the time of the vote.
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References
1 Informal sanctions are applied, by means of letters of warning and caution sent by the chairmen of the committees to Members of Knesset who do not attend committee meetings.
2 Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 6) S.H. 977, of 25.7.1980. The final version of the Amendment is totally different from the text published by the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee for the first reading. See the drafts of A. Rubinstein and R. Milo, Draft Laws 1399, 4.6.1979. For a discussion of the Bill, see Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 84, 823–6 (preliminary discussion) : vol. 86, 3295–3304 (first reading) : vol. 89, 3876–8 (second and third readings).
3 We are referring to sec. 4, which lays down the principles of the electoral system, an amendment of which—whether express or implied—requires an absolute majority (61 Members of Knesset). The same applies to sees. 44 and 45, which protect the Law from amendment by means of the Emergency Regulations. In order to remove such protection, a majority of 80 Members (qualified or special majority) is required for each of the legislative stages (except for discussion of a motion for the agenda) : this requirement, however, which appears in sec. 46 of the Basic Law: The Knesset, 1958 (12 L.S.I. 85) may be amended by a simple majority. For sec. 46 see Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 3) (13 L.S.I. 228).
4 Sec. 42 of the Basic Law: The Government, 1968 (22 L.S.I. 257) entrenches it from the Emergency Regulations: Amendment or abrogation requires an absolute majority (61 Members of Knesset). Similarly, the arrangements for appointing the President of the State or for removing him from office require an absolute and a special majority respectively, (see sec. 8 and sec. 20 (b) of the Basic Law: The President of the State, 1964 (18 L.S.I. 111)) and the same goes for the State Comptroller (see sec. 8 (a)(3) of the State Comptroller Law, 1958 (12 L.S.I. 107)).
5 The Draft Basic Law: Legislation, 1978, includes a section designed to change the present situation, whereby the Knesset can enact and amend Basic Laws by a regular majority. According to sec. 5(a) of this Bill, every new Basic Law and every law which amends or contradicts a previous Basic Law will require a special majority of two-thirds of the Members of Knesset, i.e. 80 votes. This means that when the Basic Law: Legislation is enacted, in its said formulation, all the existing Basic Laws will be entrenched against decisions of a majority of less than 2/3 of the Members, other than where the section provides otherwise.
As a result, we have selective entrenchment, and with respect to sec. 4 of the Basic Law: The Knesset, only a majority of 61 will be required. See: H.H. 1364, (1.8.1978) 329.
6 See e.g. Akzin, B., “Basic Laws and Entrenched Laws in Israel” (1961) 17 HaPraklit 230Google Scholar; Klein, C., “Special Majority and Implied Amendment” (1973) 28 HaPraklit 563.Google Scholar
7 Klein, C., “On the Basic Law: Legislation Bill” in Volume of Lectures at Study Sessions for Judges—1976 (Jerusalem, 1977)Google Scholar.
8 Weiss, S., The Knesset (Ahiasaff, Tel Aviv, 1977) 111.Google Scholar
9 Parliaments of the World, Inter-Parliamentary Union, (McMillan Press, 1976) 388.
10 An excellent and amusing description of the potential for obstructionism embodied in the quorum rule in the American Senate, and of the exaggerated abuse thereof during debates on liberal legislation may be found in Clark, J., Congress: The Sapless Branch (Harper & Row, 1964) 12–13.Google Scholar
11 Rubinstein, A., Constitutional Law (Shocken Press, 1969) 153.Google Scholar Nevertheless, the author does not disregard the existence of political-party sanctions, which limit the sovereignty of the Knesset (loc. cit., at 60). As Member of Knesset, Rubinstein agitated for the introduction of a quorum rule by introducing a private bill which managed to pass the first reading, but which was altered beyond recognition in committee. Compare committee version H.H. 1399 (4.6.1979) with the original version, Private Bill no. 71, MK A. Rubinstein, 1.8.1977 (Knesset Archives).
12 Likhovski, A., Israel's Parliament (Clarendon Press, 1971) 167.Google Scholar
13 Weiss, supra n 8, at 315.
14 See e.g. Ha'aretz, 20.1.1977: “Two Parliamentary Defeats for the Government” [in the Eighth and Ninth Knesset]; Ha'aretz, 2.2.1978: “The Government Yesterday Suffered its First Significant Parliamentary Failure”.
15 According to Prof. S. Weiss in his book, Politicians in Israel, parliamentary prominence is one of the less important factors in the selection of ministers. In the Governments that were in office from 1949 till 1974, only 5 were selected on this basis. But this typology, as formulated in Weiss's book, is not unequivocal (Ahiasaff Press, 1973) 97.
16 For criticism of the negative image created by an empty Knesset, see the speeches of the former Speaker, the late Israel Yeshayahu, Noah Moses, editor of Yediot Aharonot, MK. S. Arbeli-Almoslino, Yitzhak Shorr of Al Hamishmar, in a symposium held in the Knesset on the subject of “The Knesset, The Press and Electronic Media”, on January 20, 1976, and published in Sefer Reuven Barkát (Israel Association for Parliamentary Affairs, Jerusalem, 1979) 242, 257, 260, 261. On criticism from Members of Knesset concerning poor attendance at plenary sessions, see: Divrei HaKnesset vol. 23, 914; vol. 58, 2849; vol. 78, 861; vol. 75, 1260; vol. 77, 3497; vol. 84, 823. For a list of newspaper articles criticizing the level of attendance at Knesset debates, see Sefer Yisrael Yeshayahu (Israel Association for Parliamentary Affairs, Jerusalem, 1982).
17 In October, 1971, the Academic Committee for Promoting Change in the Electoral System was established, and inter alia, it worked towards enlisting a maximum of Members of Knesset to participate in the plenary sessions on the day on which the vote on the issue of changing the electoral system, which required a quorum of an absolute majority, was to be held (see Ha'aretz, 9.7.1972). In December 1974, the Knesset Speaker's Office was swamped with angry letters about the poor attendance in the hall during discussion of the terrorist attack on Beit Shean.
18 For data on the quorum requirement in 56 other parliaments, see below, n. 24.
19 For arguments against introducing a quorum rule for the deliberations of the Knesset committees, see Flexer, Y., The Knesset and its Committees (Ahiever Press, 1977) 46.Google Scholar
20 A special report on the problem of absence from committee meeting was compiled by the Israel Radio Knesset reporter, Zvi Yisraeli. The report was broadcast on the News Magazine. Information on average attendance in the committees from October 1975 till October 1976 was compiled by Benziman, Uzi (Ha'aretz, 12.12. 1976)Google Scholar and the Jerusalem Post Knesset reporter, A. Wallfish. (published on 20.4. 1979).
21 The information is based on interviews with the secretaries of the Knesset committees and the secretaries of the Likud and Alignment factions in the Knesset.
22 The sanction of losing a seat is practised in five parliaments. Absence of 30 days in the Austrian Parliament, of two months in the Australian Parliament, and of a whole Parliamentary session without the permission of the Speaker in the South African Parliament, results in the “absentee” Member losing his seat. In ten states, there are statutory provisions whereby deductions must be made from a Member's salary for every day of absence not due to illness, but such provisions are usually not implemented.
23 For a partial list of the procedural reservations to applying the quorum rule, see Sager, S., On the Quorum and on Attendance of Members of Parliament (March, 1973) 5.Google Scholar
24 Parliaments of the World, Inter-Parliamentary Union, (McMillan Press, 1976) 412, Table 33.
25 After completion of this article, the Press reported, in October 1981, that the Minister of Justice tabled a Bill for discussion by the Government, whereby Ministers would not be Members of Knesset during their term of ministerial office, and they would be replaced by those appearing next on the party lists. We will not discuss the criticism of this Bill (known as the “Norwegian Law”): it has not even come up for debate in the Knesset. We shall only remark that one of the arguments mentioned in support of the Bill was that the Ministers find it difficult to attend properly to their duties in the Knesset because of their many activities. At the same time, it must be stressed that the Bill, in the draft reported by the press, does not conform to the Norwegian Constitution, on which it was based. According to the Norwegian custom, in every electoral district in which a delegate is elected to the House of Representatives (Storting), a permanent replacement for him is also elected. In this, the Norwegian system resembles those of Sweden and Denmark, in which all members of the House of Representatives have deputies—those next in line on the party lists. While the institution of “deputies” is common to all three Scandinavian States, Sweden and Norway amended their Constitutions, whereby if a Member of Parliament is appointed to the Government or for a diplomatic function, he will resign from the Parliament, and he will be replaced by his deputy. If the delegate completes his term of office, he resumes his place as a regular delegate.
26 See Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 23, 914.
27 The words of the late MK Moshe Sneh, who supported conferring rigidity on all the sections of Basic Laws by requiring a “qualified” or special majority as a condition for their amendment in order to set them apart from other types of legislation, effectively underline the interesting problematics involved in the quorum issue; in his speech in the plenary, he spoke of the many difficulties in “rounding up” votes in support of a quorum, and that he obtained them from overseas and even from a sick-bed; thus arises the question of the co-incidental nature of creating the required majority—an argument which may work against Sneh's own proposal.
28 See: Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 58, 2849–50.
29 Ibid., 2823–4.
30 Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 77, 3497.
31 Ibid., 3500.
32 Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 78, 861. (The text of the Bill is in the Appendices, 913). MK Milo removed his signature from the Bill.
33 The original draft of the Private Member's Bill of MK A. Rubinstein was submitted to the Chairman of the Knesset Committee on August 1, 1977 (see Knesset Archives, Bill 71). The Bill was brought for preliminary discussion in the plenary session on January 3, 1979. See Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 84, 823. The Bill was returned from the Committee for a first reading; it was discussed on July 2, 1979 and approved on its first reading on July 17, 1979. See Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 86, 3295, and 3586. The draft of the Bill published for first reading by the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee appeared in Reshumot, H.H. 1399 (4.6.1979) 176. The Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 6) Bill was approved on its second and third reading on 15.7.1980.
34 Zidon, A., House of Representatives (Ahiasaff Press, Tel Aviv, 1971) 151.Google Scholar
35 Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 75, 1260–1297.
36 See e.g. Brichta, A., The Social, Political and Cultural Background of Members of Knesset in Israel (Doctoral Thesis, December 1979)Google Scholar chap. 4: “The Political Ramifications of the Proposals to Change the Electoral System and Their Effect on the Composition of the Knesset”.