¹ Tzavage, (1954) 9 P.D. 367, 372, per Cheshin, D.P.

² Matar, (1954) 8 P.D. 886, 894.

³ See Perlmuter, (1950) 5 P.D. 279, 281; Goldberg, (1951) 5 P.D. 1626, 1633, 1637; Arusi, (1954) 9 P.D. 576, 578.

⁴ Nagar, (1964) (I) 19 P.D. 141, 143.

⁵ Werner, (1957) 12 P.D. 340, 345; Na'aman, (1966) (IV) 20 P.D. 187. 190.

⁶ Blinder, (1953) 7 P.D. 1067, 1072; Tzavage, op. cit.; Werner, op. cit.

⁷ Chason, (1950) 4 P.D. 843, 855, per Olshan J.

⁸ Quoted from Wigmore, as cited by Berinson, J. in Pik, (1955) 10 P.D. 662, 668.

⁹ Ben-Chamo, (1963) 17 P.D. 2857, 2866, per Cohn, J.

¹⁰ From the Legislation File of the Attorney General (A.G. 19/56) which is kept in the State Archives.

¹¹ Following criticism of the requirement of corroboration in civil cases (see e.g., Ginossar, and Harnon, , “The Need for Corroboration in Civil Matters” (1964) 21 Hapraklit 19)Google Scholar sec. 6 was completely recast in 1968. According to the new provision a judgment may be given on the “strength of a single, uncorroborated testimony”. However, in certain specified circumstances the court has “to set out in its decision, in detail, what caused it to content itself with that testimony.” See further Livneh, , “The Law of Evidence (Amendment) Law, 1968” (1970) 5 Is.L.R. 268.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² Jarad, (1937) 5 P.L.R. 111, 116.

¹³ Subject to statutory exceptions like the need for corroboration of unsworn evidence of a child.

¹⁴ This was probably the kind of judgments Goitein, J. had in mind when he said: “The learned judges who have been out of England for several decades, vaguely remembering what they had learned in their youth, introduced into their judgments doubtful principles that became precedents for other judges.” Ram v. Minister of Finance, (1952) 8 P.D. 494, 501.

¹⁵ See Davies v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1954] A.C. 378; [1954] 1 All E.R. 507; Cross, , Evidence (3rd ed., 1967) 169Google Scholar.

¹⁶ See, e.g., Segal (1944) 11 P.L.R. 101, 108.

¹⁷ Segal (1944) 11 P.L.R. 101, 108.

¹⁸ See Chason (1950) 4 P.D. 843; Goldberg, (1951) 5 P.D. 1626; Tzavage, (1954) 9 P.D. 367.

¹⁹ Goldberg, ibid., at p. 1635, per Cheshin J. (emphasis added).

²⁰ Tzavage, ibid., p. 370, per Cheshin, D. P. (emphasis added).

²¹ The “involved” witness had already been mentioned in Perlmuter (1950) 5 P.D. 279, but the court then apparently treated him as an accomplice and consequently decided that the testimony of such a witness cannot corroborate that of an accomplice (ibid., pp. 281–282). A similar opinion was expressed in Goldberg, (1951) 5 P.D. 1626, 1638–1639. It was in Blinder, (1953) 7 P.D. 1067, that the specific status of the involved witness was for the first time established. Indeed, one can hardly reconcile Blinder and the ensuing cases with Perlmuter and Goldberg.

²² See Matar, (1954) 8 P.D. 886, 894; Tzavage, ibid., 367, 372, 374; Chagoel, (1957) 12 P.D. 160, 162; Flaum, (1969) (I) 24 P.D. 664, 668.

²³ Tzavage, ibid., p. 372, per Cheshin D.P. The fact that these words have recently been cited by Sussmann, J., in Flaum ((1969) (I) 24 P.D. at p. 668) may indicate that not all the Justices have welcomed the creation of a new category of the “involved” witness with great enthusiasm.

²⁴ Blinder, (1953) 7 P.D. 1067, 1072, per Cheshin J.; Tzavage, ibid., p. 372; Zuckerman, (1954) 9 P.D. 1599, 1606.

²⁵ Werner, (1957) 12 P.D. 340, 345; Na'aman, (1966) (IV) 20 P.D. 187, 190.

²⁶ See Flaum, ibid., 664, 669. See also Aliuha, (1958) 12 P.D. 1985.

²⁷ Flaum, ibid.

²⁸ Mustafa, (1953) 7 P.D. 717, 722 per Cheshin J. See also Katz-Cohen (1948) 2 P.D. 681, 686.

²⁹ Tzavage, ibid., 367, 372.

³⁰ Na'aman, (1966) (IV) 20 P.D. 187, 191, per Landau J.; Flaum, (1969) (I) 24 P.D. 664, 669.

³¹ Na'aman, ibid.

³² Ibid., p. 192.

³³ Ibid., pp. 191–192.

³⁴ Concordia Ltd., (1950) 3 P.M. 412, 418 as explained in Na'aman, ibid.

³⁵ Pik, (1955) 10 P.D. 662, 669; Na'aman, ibid.

³⁶ Pik, ibid., pp. 666–668; Na'aman, ibid., p. 192. Section 8 of the Penal Law Amendment (Prostitution Offences) Law, 5722–1962, now provides that the woman's evidence requires corroboration.

³⁷ See 7 Wigmore, , Evidence, (3rd ed. 1940) § 2060, pp. 339–341Google Scholar. See also Wager, (1968) (II) 22 P.D. 477; Epstein, (1954) 9 P.D. 718; Abu-Gosh, (1961) 16 P.D. 80, 82–83.

³⁸ See R. v. Mullins (1848), 3 C.C., Cox526Google Scholar; R. v. Bickley (1909), 2 Cr. App. Rep. 53; Sneddon v. Stevenson, [1967] 2 All E.R. 1277, 1279–1280.

³⁹ See Brandwein, (1956) 10 P.D. 769. See also Bach, , “Police Agents and Agents Provocateurs” (1963) 19 Hapraklit 132.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Nagar, (1964) (I) 19 P.D. 141, as explained in Na'aman, ibid., p. 191.

⁴¹ Levit, (1959) 14 P.D. 1057, 1062, per Silberg J.

⁴² See the explanation given to Levit in Na'aman, ibid.

⁴³ Cross, , Evidence (3rd ed. 1967) 171Google Scholar. The author also observes that when A and B steal property and C is charged with receiving it from B, there is no reason for treating A as C's accomplice.

⁴⁴ Davies v. D.P.P., [1954] A.C. 378, 401.

⁴⁵ Blinder, (1953) 7 P.D. 1067; Tzavage, (1954) 9 P.D. 367.

⁴⁶ See pp. 83–4.

⁴⁷ “It is obvious that since we have created ‘an intermediate stage between an objective witness and an accomplice’, classifying the witnesses into three categories, instead of two, has become even more complicated.” Flaum, (1969) (I) 24 P.D. 664, 669 per Sussmann J.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 664.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 669. The same rule applies to an accessory after the fact, assisting the main offender to escape punishment: the accessory commits an offence under section 26 of the Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936, but in respect of the law of evidence he is considered an “involved” witness. See ibid., pp. 671–672.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 669, 670. But quaere whether such a receiver should not be considered a party or an accessory to the theft itself.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 670. When a person, before the perpetration of a robbery, agrees to serve as paid or unpaid guardian of the money obtained through the crime, he will be considered an accomplice to the robbery. He made it easier for the robbers and spared them the trouble of hiding the money. His assistance promoted their criminal purpose. See ibid., p. 670.

⁵² See Pik, (1955) 10 P.D. 662, 667; 7 Wigmore, , Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) § 2060, pp. 341–342Google Scholar. But see R. v. Vernon, [1962] Crim. L.R. 35 and the Commentary on p. 37. See also Williams, G., “Corroboration—Accomplices” [1962] Crim. L.R. 588, 594–595Google Scholar.

⁵³ See Chason, (1950) 4 P.D. 843, 852–953.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 855. See also Cross, , Evidence (3rd ed. 1967) 169Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ “This reminds us of the famous antinomy in Greek philosophy wherein a man said: ‘I am a Cretan’, whereas it was known that all Cretans are liars.” Tzalivi, (1952) 7 P.D. 17, 20, per Silberg J.

⁵⁶ See ibid.

⁵⁷ On the question, what amounts to corroboration, it is substantially immaterial whether the evidence requiring corroboration is that of an accomplice or any other, like that required in sexual offences, since it is always the same “idea of security” that lies at the root of the requirement of corroboration (see Shvilly, (1952) 7 P.D. 438, 445). Therefore, in this part we need not restrict ourselves to cases referring specifically to accomplices.

⁵⁸ Shapira, (1957) 12 P.D. 245, 248; Belgali, (1963) (III) 18 P.D. 61, 64.

⁵⁹ Shvilly, ibid., 438, 444–445; Levy, (1961) 15 P.D. 1345, 1347.

⁶⁰ Tzuberi, (1958) 13 P.D. 367, 369.

⁶¹ Mordechai, (1968) (II) 22 P.D. 63, 67.

⁶² Levit, (1959) 14 P.D. 1057, 1062; Ploni, (1959) 14 P.D. 1489, 1499. See also Piferling, (1951) 5 P.D. 1209, 1220; Yakobovitz, (1950) 6 P.D. 514, 565.

⁶³ See 7 Wigmore, , Evidence, (3rd ed. 1940) § 2059, pp. 327–328Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ See ibid., p. 327.

⁶⁵ See Tumahole Bereng v. R., [1949] A.C. 253, 265.

⁶⁶ The leading case is R. v. Baskerville, [1916] 2 K.B. 658, 667. See also Cross, , Evidence (3rd ed. 1967) 172Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ See Wigmore, op. cit., pp. 329–330.

⁶⁸ E.g., Shvilly, (1952) 7 P.D. 438, 444–445; Levy, (1961) 15 P.D. 1345, 1347.

⁶⁹ Azulai, (1967) (II) 21 P.D. 44, 46.

⁷⁰ Zuckerman, (1954) 9 P.D. 1599, 1616; Levy & Dalumi, (1957) 11 P.D. 844, 845; Tzuberi, (1968) 13 P.D. 367, 369. In Mordechai ((1968) (II) 22 P.D. 63, 76) Berinson, J. said: “The corroborating testimony has to relate to some material point that implicates the accused with the offence …giving an accurate description of the perpetration of the offence does not implicate these accused with the offence and does not in fact constitute corroboration at all”.

⁷¹ This is the rule in R. v. Baskerville ([1916] 2 K.B. 658) as was adopted by the Supreme Court in Ploni ((1959) 14 P.D. 1489, 1499) in order to emphasize the distinction between corroborating evidence and the “something” needed for examining the genuineness of a confession. As regards confessions, an accused might possibly confess to an offence he had not committed or even to an offence which had not at all been committed. Therefore, the “something” is an evidential item which, at least to a small extent, confirms the contents of the confession, without necessarily connecting them with the accused's identity as the one who committed the offence. As to the accomplice, he can always supply the details of the transaction in which he participated. With him there is the danger that he might incriminate the wrong person. That is why the corroborating evidence should implicate the accused. On the distinction between the “something” and corroboration, see Lazar-Weber, (1952) 6 P.D. 873, 882–883.

⁷² Ibid.; 7 Wigmore, , Evidence, § 2059, p. 327Google Scholar, See also Yehudai, (1956) 11 P.D. 365, 368. To constitute corroboration the confession does not need any additional “something”: Lazar-Weber, ibid.

⁷³ See, e.g., Goldberg, (1951) 5 P.D. 1626, 1638; Chayat, (1957) 12 P.D. 841.

⁷⁴ See, e.g. R. v. Birkett (1839) 8 C & P. 732; 173 E.R. 694.

⁷⁵ Mordechai, ibid.

⁷⁶ Shayovitz, (1964) (III) 19 P.D. 421, 474; Na'aman, (1966) (IV) 20 P.D. 187, 192–193. But compare Azulai, (1967) (II) 21 P.D. 44.

⁷⁷ Davies v. D.P.P., [1954] A.C. 378, 400–401.

⁷⁸ In Tzavage ((1954) 9 P.D. 367, 373–374), the English rule was cited; as to the local law, the Supreme Court noted that it was refraining from expressing any opinion.

⁷⁹ See, e.g., Ben-Ami, (1963) (III) 18 P.D. 225, 235. Silence may serve to strengthen prima facie evidence only qualitatively, but does not constitute an independent piece of evidence: Kandil, (1949) 2 P.D. 813, 835; Zarka, (1949) 4 P.D. 504, 538–539. On refraining from giving evidence see also R. v. Jackson, [1953] 1 All E.R. 873; Cracknell v. Smith, [1960] 3 All E.R. 569.

⁸⁰ R. v. Cramp (1880), 14 Cox C.C. 390. Cramp was charged with an attempt to cause a miscarriage. It was proved that the complainant's father went to the accused and told him: “I have here those things which you gave my daughter to produce abortion”, but the accused kept silent and did nothing to deny that statement: his silence was taken to corroborate the complainant's evidence.

⁸¹ Credland v. Knowler (1951), 35 Cr. App. Rep. 48.

⁸² R. v. Clynes (1960), 44 Cr. App. Rep. 158.

⁸³ Tumahole Bereng v. R., [1949] A.C. 253, 370. Professor Cross, however, wonders why lies told by the accused in court should never amount to corroboration, as would lies told out of court: Cross, , Evidence (3rd ed. 1967) 179Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ (1950) 6 P.D. 514, 518, 564–566, followed in Levit, (1959) 14 P.D. 1057, 1063.

⁸⁵ Aricha, (1950) 5 P.D. 1200, 1207.

⁸⁶ Mizrachi, (1951) 5 P.D. 1504, 1528–1529.

⁸⁷ Yakobovitz, (1950) 6 P.D. 514, 565.

⁸⁸ Mordechai, (1968) (II) 22 P.D. 63, 70.

⁸⁹ “Authorities for this are plenty,” said Silberg, J., but omitted to cite any; and yet, as shown above in the earlier cases, just the opposite had been decided.

⁹⁰ Shvilly, (1952) 7 P.D. 438, 444–445; Ben-Ami, (1952) 7 P.D. 467, 468–469; Yehudai, (1956) 11 P.D. 365, 368; Levit, (1959) 14 P.D. 1057, 1063–1064. See also Ploni v. Almonit, (1961) 15 P.D. 2300, 2303.

⁹¹ Mordechai, ibid.

⁹² Ibid., per Silberg, D.P.

⁹³ Belgali, (1963) (III) 18 P.D. 61, 64.

⁹⁴ Levy & Dalumi, (1957) 11 P.D. 844, 845.

⁹⁵ See note 3 supra.

⁹⁶ R. v. Willis, [1916] 1 K.B. 933.

⁹⁷ R. v. Allen, R. v. Evans (Owen), [1965] 2 Q.B. 295.

⁹⁸ See R. v. Baskerville, [1916] 2 K.B. 658, 670.

⁹⁹ Zuckerman, (1954) 9 P.D. 1500, 1611.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 1612.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 1611, per Goitein J. See also Shem Tov, (1955) 10 P.D. 610, 612–613; Sleiman (1961) 31 P.M. 199, 205; Shwartz, (1967) 62 P.M. 178, 181–184. Zuckerman was the first Israeli case on this point. From the American cases that were cited there, it emerged that most judges are ready to accept such evidence, provided the qualifications and experience of the dog and its trainer are reliable. But our Supreme Court hesitated to follow this view, considering that an acquittal by benefit of the doubt is safer than a conviction based on bloodhound identification. For further discussion on the admissibility and weight of such evidence, see Hudson, , “Bloodhound Testimony” [1963] Crim. L.R. 555Google Scholar; Hudson, , “Bloodhound Testimony Again” [1967] Crim. L.R. 110Google Scholar.

¹⁰² Matar, (1954) 8 P.D. 886, 894.

¹⁰³ Tzavage, (1954) 9 P.D. 367, 374; Chagoel, (1957) 12 P.D. 160, 162. But see Matatof, (1954) 8 P.D. 736, 737.

¹⁰⁴ Chagoel, ibid.

¹⁰⁵ See pp. 82, 93, 96.

¹⁰⁶ Nagar, (1964) (I) 19 P.D. 141, 143.

¹⁰⁷ Werner, (1957) 12 P.D. 340, 345; Na'aman, (1966) (IV) 20 P.D. 187, 190.

¹⁰⁸ See pp. 92–3.

¹⁰⁹ A similar opinion was also expressed in Israel, in Teper, ((1957) 12 P.D. 202, 204–206), but there no technical corroboration was required.

¹¹⁰ See p. 92.

¹¹¹ See pp. 82, 93, 95.

¹¹² See Cross, , Evidence (3rd ed. 1967) 173Google Scholar. In Scotland a conviction resting entirely on the testimony of two accomplices was sustained on appeal: Walker, and Walker, , The Law of Evidence in Scotland (1964) 388Google Scholar.

¹¹³ See Williams, G., “Corroboration—Accomplices” [1962] Crim. L.R. 588, 592–593.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ Chason, (1950) 4 P.D. 943, 852, per Olshan J.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 855.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ See Farkash, (1956) 11 P.D. 677, 679.

¹¹⁸ Farkash, (1956) 11 P.D. 852, per Olshan J.

¹¹⁹ Na'aman, (1966) (IV) 20 P.D. 187, 192, per Landau J. See also Lazar-Weber, (1950) 6 P.D. 873, 882.

¹²⁰ See 7 Wigmore, , Evidence, (3rd ed. 1949) § 2057Google Scholar; Williams, G., “Corroboration— Accomplices” [1962] Crim. L.R. 588.Google Scholar See also Abu-Gosh, (1961) 16 P.D. 80, 83.

¹²¹ See G. Williams, ibid., pp. 588–589.

¹²² See pp. 90–91.

¹²³ See G. Williams, ibid., p. 589.

¹²⁴ Wall, M., Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases (Thomas, U.S.A., 1965) ch. VI.Google Scholar

¹²⁵ See M. Wall, op. cit., particularly p. 183.

¹²⁶ “Granted that a witness who has participated in a crime may falsely accuse an innocent man, but is this as likely to happen as is an honest mistake in identification? Assuming that such a witness does falsely implicate another, his perjury is usually far more easily exposed, since it must be rather detailed, than is the honest mistake of a person who testifies as to identity. If experience and logic teach us anything, it is that identification evidence has a greater need for corroboration than any other kind of evidence”. Ibid., p. 187.

¹²⁷ Williams, G., “Corroboration—Sexual Cases” [1962] Crim. L.R. 662.Google ScholarPubMed

¹²⁸ See in particular Professor Williams' opinions that were quoted by J., Halevy in Ben-Chamo (1963) 17Google ScholarP.D. 2857, 2871–2873.

¹²⁹ Williams, G., “Corroboration—Accomplices” [1962] Crim. L.R. 588.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ See Yakobovitz, (1950) 6 P.D. 514, 542.

¹³¹ Jamal, (1959) 13 P.D. 692, 696.

¹³² Sa'adia, (1962) 16 P.D. 1860, 1862.

¹³³ See Williams, G., “Corroboration—Sexual Cases” [1962] Crim. L.R. 662.Google ScholarPubMed

¹³⁴ Phelps v. United States, 252 F. 2d 49, 52 (1958), quoted by J., Sussmann in Flaum, (1969) (I) 24P.D. 664, 670.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ Subject to the following exceptions, where corroboration is required: Seditious offences, perjury, testimony of a victim of a sexual offence, the unsworn evidence of a child, evidence of children taken by a youth interrogator and the testimony of an accomplice.

¹³⁶ Il-Nabari, (1953) 7 P.D. 964, 967.

¹³⁷ Il-Chalak, (1952) 6 P.D. 753; Brandwine, (1952) 6 P.D. 1284; Halperin, (1965) (III) 20 P.D. 449, 469–473.

¹³⁸ Il-Nabari, ibid.; Halperin, ibid.

¹³⁹ As the Supreme Court said, for instance, in Levy & Dalumi ((1957) 11 P.D. 844, 845): “It may happen that the trial judge is convinced that the testimony of the accomplice is true, and yet he may have to find corroborating evidence before he can convict” (emphasis added). An example for such an accomplice is given by Professor Glanville Williams: when the witness is treated as an accomplice, but in fact, he took only a minor part in committing the offence, sincerely repents and makes every effort of help the police, giving them information enabling them to recover property stolen during the crime, and when in court his testimony seems reliable. See Williams, G., “Corroboration—Accomplices” [1962] Crim L.R. 588, 591.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ See ibid., p. 590. The citation in that of an Irish judge.

¹⁴¹ See Arusi, (1954) 9 P.D. 576, 578. In these cases, strong corroborating evidence is required: Levy & Dalumi, ibid.Edelman, (1960) 15 P.D. 653, 662.

¹⁴² Shvilly, (1952) 7 P.D. 438, 445, per Silberg, J.; Arusi, ibid.

¹⁴³ Sleiman, (1966) (IV) 20 P.D. 141, 152, per Cohen, J.

¹⁴⁴ See p. 83.

¹⁴⁵ See p. 99.

¹⁴⁶ Ben-Chamo, (1963) 17 P.D. 2857, 2866, per Cohn J. (dissenting).

¹⁴⁷ See, e.g. Professor G. Williams' article supra note 139 and also 7 Wigmore, , Evidence, (3rd ed. 1940) § 2060.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ Ben-Chamo, ibid. But it is noteworthy that exactly the opposite reasoning has once been given by Olshan, J. (as he then was) in Chason ((1950) 4 P.D. 843, 856): The rule is stricter in Israel than in England because of the difference in the composition of the court, the non-existence of juries in Israel. In England twelve jurymen have to decide on the credibility of the witness, while here, such decision rests with a single judge (or occasionally a bench of three). It seems, however, that the Supreme Court failed to take into consideration the basic distinction between professional judges and laymen.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ See pp. 83–4.

¹⁵¹ See p. 83.

¹⁵² See e.g., Leibman v. Lifshitz, (1950) 6 P.D. 57, 72, 80; Kaufman v. Margins, (1950) 6 P.D. 1005, 1031.

¹⁵³ See Kaufman v. Margins, ibid., p. 1010 per Silberg J.

¹⁵⁴ “…we do not think an accused person has any vested right as to the kind or quantum of evidence which the court may require to prove him guilty of an offence.” Jarad, (1937) 5 P.L.R. 111, 114. See also Cohen & Buslik v. Att. Gen., (1953) 8 P.D. 4, 16; Ploni, (1967) (I) 22 P.D. 225, 228.

¹⁵⁵ Section 33(b) of the Courts Law, 5717–1957, says: “A precedent established by the Supreme Court binds every Court, except the Supreme Court”. See further, Gavison, R., “The Relationship in Contemporary Legal Systems Between Written and Unwritten Sources of Law” Israeli Reports to the Eighth International Congress of Comparative Law (Jerusalem, 1970) 36, 39–40Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁶ See 7 Wigmore, , Evidence, (3rd ed. 1949) § 2056;Google Scholar 30 Am. Jur. 2d, “Evidence”, § 1151 (1967); Note, “The Rosenberg Case: Some Reflections on Federal Criminal Law”, (1954) 54 Colum. L.R. 219, 233–237.

¹⁵⁷ See, e.g., Wigmore, op. cit., §§ 2057, 2060. Wigmore's views have repeatedly been quoted by the Supreme Court; e.g., in Pik, (1955) 10 P.D. 662, 668 and in Ben-Chamo, (1963) 17 P.D. 2857, 2866.

¹⁵⁸ See Note, op. cit., 236–37.

¹⁵⁹ Neither in the Model Code of Evidence (1942), nor in the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953).

¹⁶⁰ See Pound, , Jurisprudence, (1954) vol. V, pp. 574–575Google Scholar; Lenhoff, , “The Law of Evidence, A Comparative Study” (1954) 3 Am. J. Comp. L. 313, 334–342.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁶¹ See Code de Procédure Pénale, sec. 428; Bouzat, et Pinatel, , Traité de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie, (1963) 938–939Google Scholar; Vidal, et Magnol, , Cours de Droit Criminel, (7° ed.) 864–865Google Scholar; Garraud, , Précis de Droit Criminel, (14° ed.) 780–781Google Scholar. Only as to some seditious offences does the French law require corroborating evidence to the testimony of the incited person and this is thought to be a remnant of the old rule testis unus testis nullus. See the French Act of July 28, 1894, sec. 2(5), D.P. 94. 4. 81. Encyclopédie Dalloz, Droit Criminel, II, (1954) “Preuve”, 30.

¹⁶² See supra part V.

¹⁶³ See p. 96.

¹⁶⁴ See pp. 92–93, 95.

¹⁶⁵ See pp. 96–9.

¹⁶⁶ See pp. 99–100.

¹⁶⁷ See p. 101.

¹⁶⁸ See pp. 81–2, 84–5.

¹⁶⁹ See supra part III.

¹⁷⁰ See pp. 87–8.

¹⁷¹ See pp. 86–7.

¹⁷² See pp. 83–4, 87.

¹⁷³ See pp. 84, 101, 102.

¹⁷⁴ For instance as to the unsworn evidence of a child under sec. 6A of the Evidence Ordinance.

¹⁷⁵ Similar to the explanation that is now required in some civil matters when the court gives judgment on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness. See note 11.