Iran is currently experiencing serious water problems. Frequent droughts coupled with over-abstraction of surface and groundwater through a large network of hydraulic infrastructure and deep wells have escalated the nation’s water situation to a critical level. This is evidenced by drying lakes, rivers and wetlands, declining groundwater levels, land subsidence, water quality degradation, soil erosion, desertification and more frequent dust storms. This paper overviews the major drivers of Iran’s water problems. It is argued that while climatic changes and economic sanctions are commonly blamed as the main drivers of water problems, Iran is mainly suffering from a socio-economic drought—i.e. “water bankruptcy,” where water demand exceeds the natural water supply. In theory, this problem can be resolved by re-establishing the balance between water supply and demand through developing additional sources of water supply and implementing aggressive water demand reduction plans. Nevertheless, the current structure of the water governance system in Iran and the absence of a comprehensive understanding of the root causes of the problem leave minimal hope of developing sustainable solutions to Iran’s unprecedented water problems.

Urban air pollution is a major health risk in several large Iranian cities. Transportation, extensive use of fossil fuels, outdated urban fleets of gasoline and diesel vehicles, industrial sources within and close to the city boundaries and natural dust are major contributing factors. Starting with Tehran, emission inventories and mathematical air pollution models are being developed. Air quality is being monitored and reported to the public, though data availability and validity remain a challenge. While national and local air pollution mitigation plans are in place, progress remains slow, coordination is weak, and sources of funding are limited.

Migration is part of the Afghan social and cultural landscape. In spite of the unprecedented wave of returns following the fall of the Taliban regime and the establishment of a government backed by the international community, multidirectional cross-border movements will not come to an end. This paper focuses on the case of Hazara male migrants moving between the mountains of Central Afghanistan and the cities of Iran. For many young men, migration offers the opportunity to broaden their social networks beyond narrow kinship and neighborhood ties. It may be conceived as a necessary stage in their existence, a rite of passage to adulthood and a step toward manhood: the perilous journey may be understood as a spatial and partially social separation from the families and homes which contributes to cut the links with the period of childhood; their stay in Iran, during which they have to prove their capacity to face hardship and to save money while living among itinerant and temporary working teams, represents a period of liminality; at their return to their village of origin, they will be reincorporated as adult marriageable men, although they will keep commuting between Afghanistan and Iran for part of their life.

Iranians constitute one of the most numerous new immigrant groups from the Middle East, and one of the highest status foreign-born groups in the United States. Yet there are few published studies documenting their immigration to the United States, and their characteristics. An understanding of different aspects of Iranian adaptation to the United States requires a basic knowledge of their immigration history, and demographic, social and economic characteristics.

This paper presents the first systematic and comprehensive profile of Iranians in the U.S. based on the most recent available statistical data. The sources for this analysis are: (1) all available published reports from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and from the 1980 U.S. Census; (2) INS data tapes on Iranian immigrants admitted to the U.S.from 1972 to 1986; and (3) the 5 percent sample tape from the 1980 U.S. Census of population.

What have been the Historical Relationships Between the Islamic and Hindu religious traditions? Variations on this question inevitably come to mind in any attempt to assess the significance of the past dozen centuries of South Asian civilization, during which time significant Muslim populations have played important roles, interacting with Indian religions and cultures from a variety of perspectives. Although frequently this kind of question is posed in terms of assumptions about the immutable essences of Islam and Hinduism, I would like to argue that this kind of approach is fundamentally misleading, for several reasons. First, this approach is ahistorical in regarding religions as unchanging, and it fails to account for the varied and complex encounters, relationships, and interpretations that took place between many individual Muslims and Hindus. Second, it assumes that there is a single clear concept of what a Hindu is, although this notion is increasingly coming into question; considerable evidence has accumulated to indicate that external concepts of religion, first from post-Mongol Islamicate culture, and eventually from European Christianity in the colonial period, were brought to bear on a multitude of Indian religious traditions to create a single concept of Hinduism.

One of the most enduring legacies of Reza Shah's rule is the problematization of dress in Iranian politics. In the course of the twenty years that he was in power, the state promulgated a number of policies that had a deep, and at times traumatizing, effect on the everyday lives of Iranians. Following the example of Turkey, but unlike other Muslim governments in the Arab world, in South Asia, or in Southeast Asia, the first Pahlavi state set out to standardize and Europeanize the appearance of its people. This policy led to state-society and intra-societal conflicts that flared up again after the Islamic revolution of 1979. This article analyzes the state's dress policies, argues that they were mainly meant to promote nation-building, and ends with a translation of a short story that, better than any official documents or historical accounts, illustrates the impact of these policies on the everyday lives of ordinary people.

The claim to belong to the “Aryan race,” believed to be rooted in the ancient self-designation ariya, is a fundamental pillar of the Iranian nationalist discourse. This paper aims to show that in fact it is a twentieth-century import from Europe, where after being instrumentalized for colonial endeavors and Nazi atrocities, it has become almost completely discredited. Yet Iranians continue to nonchalantly refer to themselves as Aryans and the myth of the “land of Aryans” persists, even in academic circles. It will be argued that the reason for this resilience is the specific role Aryanism plays in Iranian identity politics, and the strategies designed to manage the trauma of the encounter with Europe.

Because of its diverse geological formations, climates, and soils, Iran is home to outstanding biodiversity. National conservation started in Iran over fifty years ago and today nearly 10 percent of the country is protected. However, biodiversity in Iran is threatened, with about 100 species of vertebrate fauna vulnerable or endangered. Increased population and human activity, climate change, drought, desertification, agriculture, poaching, and economic sanctions have helped create this crisis. Many of these causes can be mitigated through better planning, sustainable policies, and increased civil society and local engagement. Promoting awareness about the impacts of human practices will also be important for the long-term sustainability of Iran’s ecosystems. Iranian conservation NGOs have already taken an active role in preserving biodiversity.

This paper examines the transformation of the Iranian economy through the twentieth century within a global context. At the start of that century, the Iranian economy had long remained stagnant, poor, and largely agrarian, with a marginal role in the world economy. By the turn of the twenty-first century, Iran had transformed into a complex and relatively large economy with important consequences for the economies of the Middle East and other parts of the world. While the initial conditions and the evolution of domestic institutions and resources played major roles in the pace and nature of that transformation, relations with the rest of the world had crucial influences as well. This paper focuses on the latter forces, while taking account of their interactions with domestic factors in shaping the particular form of economic development in Iran. We study the ways in which the development of the Iranian economy has been affected by international price movements and by the ebbs and flows of trade, investment, and economic growth in the rest of the world. In considering these effects, we also analyze the role of domestic political economy factors and policies in enhancing or hindering the ability of domestic producers to respond to external challenges and opportunities.

Emigration from Afghanistan is the product of socio-political circumstances—drought, regime changes, wars—and economic structures—pastoralism and agricultural seasonal cycles—but it is also situated in a historical continuum of recurrent population movements on a regional scale. As a phenomenon, it has been well-researched in Pakistan, but has been less well understood from the Iranian side. However, many Afghans, notably but not exclusively Hazaras, have settled there since the end of the nineteenth century. Immigration from Afghanistan intensified from the 1970s onwards following the Iranian oil boom and drought in Afghanistan and the political turbulence in that country after 1978. The policies of the Islamic Republic towards this population have been both variable and inconsistent. Recently, their main priority has been the repatriation of Afghans in an atmosphere of both official and popular xenophobia. The experience of exile has resulted in important social changes, in particular with respect to education and the position of women. Moreover, the Afghan presence on Iranian soil appears to be irreversible: it satisfies economic needs, reflects the intensity of commercial exchanges between the two countries, and in itself constitutes a complex trans-border reality. Finally, it sustains a public and juridical debate on the definition of citizenship and appears to be inherent in the idea of the Iranian nation itself.

The extreme salinity and temperature fluctuations of the Persian Gulf waters have created unique marine and coastal ecosystems, with numerous benefits to Iran and neighboring countries. However, human activities, including rapid coastal development, land-based pollution, oil and gas extraction, and shipping, are threatening the survival of these ecosystems. With long shorelines, a large coastal population, and locally important fisheries and tourism-related jobs, Iran has a lot at stake in the degradation of its marine and coastal environments. However, it is not too late to put a stop to further degradation. This article recommends a number of targeted actions at the local, national, and regional levels to address the threats to the Persian Gulf ’s environment and protect this important renewable resource.

Masculinity, like other kinds of social identity, is an ongoing construction in a dialogue between one's self-image and others' perceptions of one. The interplay between ethnicity and masculinity is a main theme in this article. Due to geographical displacement, the Iranian man's masculine identity has been challenged and renegotiated on the one hand by Iranian women's struggle for emancipation and on the other hand by the Swedish mediawork. Iranian men are displaced from the position of having a powerful gaze, which fixed and controlled women into a position of being an object of the gaze of others. The dominant gaze in Sweden makes them (in)visible in the same way their gaze makes women (in)visible in Iran.

This paper attempts to explain the emergence and development of para-governmental organizations (bonyads) in Iran and demonstrate their contradictory position in the Iranian political economy. These organizations represent the dual power structure in Iran which reinforces the financial authority of religious leaders without accountability. By analyzing the functions of these organizations, the paper sets out to probe their economic policies in line with the government's populist macroeconomic policies. The paper demonstrates the adverse effects of these organizations on political development and economic reforms in the post-Khomeini era when the struggle for accountability soared.

The dialogic interaction among India, Europe, and the Arab-Islamic culture in the 18th and 19th centuries led to a refashioning of Iran and a rescripting of “the people” and “the nation” in Iranian political and historical discourses. The newly imagined Iran, constructed of textual traces and archaeological ruins, fashioned a new syntax for the reconstruction of the past and the formation of a new national time, territory, writ, culture, literature, and politics. Language, the medium of communication and signification, and the locus of tradition and cultural memory, was restyled. Arabic words were purged, “authentic” Persian terms forged, and neologisms and lexicography were constituted as endeavors for “national reawakening.” Iran-centered histories displaced dynastic and Islam-centered chronicles. In order to recover from historical amnesia, people reinvented pre-Islamic Iran as a lost Utopia with Kayumars as a Persian prophet predating Adam, Mazdak as a theoretician and practitioner of freedom and equality, Kavah-yi Ahangar as the originator of “national will” (himmat-i milli), and Anushirvan as a paradigmatic just-constitutional monarch.

More than a generation has passed since the substantial immigration of Iranians to the United States in the late 1970s, resulting in a sizable second-generation population (defined by convention as persons born in the United States and those who immigrated under the age of thirteen). This article presents a first look at the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the second generation at the national level, and compares them with those of the first generation (Iran- or foreign-born population). It uses the 2005–07 merged data set compiled by the United States Census in the American Community Survey (ACS). The results indicate a preliminary continuation of economic and educational success from the first- to the second-generation Iranians. Moreover, this achievement has become more balanced across gender lines in the second generation. Specifically, in terms of educational attainment and labor force participation, females have quickly closed the gap with their male counterparts. Because the second generation is still young, it is premature to assess the extent of intergenerational mobility among Iranians. But given this generation's initial achievements, one can only expect an upward trajectory.

Iran has often been the subject of many nonfiction films and television programs produced by Western countries, particularly Britain and the United States. Although these films about Iran were made by a diverse group of private and governmental agencies, overall they have tended both to emphasize the supremacy of West over the ancient, backward East and to support the evolving policies and ideologies toward Iran held by the Western governments and their multi-national corporations.

Western audiences who viewed these films and programs as enployees of corporations, members of armed forces units, students in schools or the general public, must have experienced a certain self-congratulatory gratification with their own ideological and material conditions and a confidence in the policies espoused by their governments toward underdeveloped countries such as Iran. From the scant information available, it seems that the responses of the Iranian audiences (especially of those educated in the West and whose views of Iran, as we shall see later, partially coincided with those of Westerners) to these films were composed of a mixture of shame for their failure to modernize, and exasperation at being incorrectly or insufficiently represented.

Critics of economic development strategies followed by most Middle Eastern countries often point to their lagging human development indicators as a sign of failure. While it is true that the growth performance of these countries has been generally quite poor since the 1980s—only Sub-Saharan Africa has had a worse experience—it is not true that they have failed to expand education. In fact, the rate of growth of years of schooling in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has been the fastest of any region in the last forty years.

The difficulty for economic growth appears to lie in translating this rising education into rising productivity. Doing so is not just a matter of restoring growth, though that is an essential task, but to alleviate acute social pressures arising from youth unemployment fuelled by rapid population growth. For quite a while these employment problems were solved by accumulation of physical capital bought with oil. With that option no longer viable, solutions for human resource problems must be found elsewhere, particularly in the markets for labor and human capital.

For Second-Generation Iranians in the Untied States the question of identity is not as easily settled as it is for their parents. Their parents claim they are genuine Iranians because they were born and raised in Iran, they relate to Iranian culture more than to American culture, they were active members of the Iranian society for decades, they might still have immediate family members in Iran, and they still hope to go back there someday. Are second-generation Iranian youths able to make these claims? Do they think of themselves as Iranians? Apart from the fact that some were born in Iran, might still know the Persian language, and are familiar with some aspects of Iranian culture, what else about these young people makes them distinctly Iranian?

Sociological studies of immigrants indicate that the first generation's pattern of adaptation is quite different from that of the second and third.'