1 While some scholars have used the terms traditional middle class or petty bourgeoisie, it would be incorrect to conceptualize the bazaar as a single class (I thank Benjamin Smith for reminding me of this). Parsa offers a good definition of the traditional bazaaris, or individuals who make up the physical Iranian bazaar: “[B]azaaris [is] a term referring to merchants, shopkeepers, and artisans…. [They] represented mostly medium and small-sized capital, although a segment possessed large wealth, producing and distributing mostly for the domestic market, except in the carpet sector” (Parsa, Misagh, “Entrepreneurs and Democratization: Iran and the Philippines,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 37 [1995]: 811CrossRefGoogle Scholar). For additional statistics on the bazaar see Shambayati, Hootan, “The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran,” Comparative Politics, 26 (1994): 321–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ghandchi-Tehrani, Davoud, Bazaaris and Clergy: Socio-economic Origins of Radicalism and Revolution in Iran (Ph.D. diss., City University of New York, 1982)Google Scholar.

2 Denoeux, Guilain, Urban Unrest in the Middle East: A Comparative Study of Informal Networks in Egypt, Iran, and Lebanon (Albany, 1993): 147Google Scholar; and see Ashraf, Ahmad, “Bazaar-mosque Alliance: The Social Basis of Revolts and Revolutions,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 1 (1988): 559CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Parsa, “Entrepreneurs and Democratization: Iran and the Philippines,” 826 for his similar assessment.

3 The vast majority of scholars cite the efforts of the bazaar during the revolutionary movement, but their efforts are typically discussed in terms of a bazaar-clergy coalition with the former generally taking a backseat to the clerics who eventually gained leadership of the country. However, Parsa, Misagh, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick, 1989)Google Scholar; Mozaffari, Mehdi, “Why the Bazaar Rebels,” Journal of Peace Research, 28 (1991): 377–391CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Nategh, Homa, Bazarganan (Tehran, 1994)Google Scholar have forged important ground in pressing the case of the bazaar. Other recent works are Keshavarzian, Arang, A Bazaar and Two Regimes: Continuity and Discontinuity in the Tehran Bazaar, 1963–The Present (Cambridge, forthcoming)Google Scholar and Smith, Benjamin, “Collective Action with and without Islam: Mobilizing the Bazaar in Iran,” Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington, 2003): 212–41Google Scholar.

4 Looney, R.E., Economic Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New York, 1982): 167Google Scholar.

5 Mozaffari, “Why the Bazaar Rebels,” 377. On the early industrial Iranian economy, see Katouzian, Homa, The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Psuedo-Modernism, 1926–1979 (London, 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On early industrial state-bazaar relations, see Moaddel, Mansoor, “The Shi'i Ulama and the State in Iran,” Theory and Society 15 (1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and also Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Psuedo-Modernism, 1926–1979, 54–5.

6 Interview, September 2004.

7 In an oft-cited quote from his memoir, the Shah wrote, “I could not stop building supermarkets. I wanted a modern country. Moving against the bazaars was typical of the political and social risks I had to take in my drive for modernization” (Mohammed Pahlavi, Reza, Answer to History [New York, 1980]: 156)Google Scholar. The government's destruction of a large section of the bazaar in Mashhad in 1975 (see Shambayati, “The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran,” 307; and also Ashraf, “Bazaar-mosque Alliance: The Social Basis of Revolts and Revolutions,” 557) and his subsequent plans for an eight-lane highway running straight through the Tehran bazaar were also some of the ways the leader set out to eliminate the bazaar.

8 On this event, see Keddie, Nikki R., “Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspectives,” The American Historical Review 88 (1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Moaddel, “The Shi'i Ulama and the State in Iran,” 1986.

9 “…revolutionary governments can lead their populations through the most dire economic straits if they are able to create a popular sense of identification with the government—of possession and control of the institutions of power” (Countryman, Edward, “Consolidating Power in Revolutionary America: The Case of New York, 1775–1783,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 6 [1976]: 667–8)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and see Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968): 308–11Google Scholar.

10 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.

11 See Amjad, Mohammed, Iran: From Royal Dictatorship to Theocracy (New York, 1989)Google Scholar, 98 and Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, 1982), 440–1Google Scholar.

12 Abrahamian, Ervand, “The Political Challenge,” MERIP Reports, 69 (1978): 3Google Scholar.

13 Zonis, Marvin, Majestic Failure (Chicago, 1991), 75.Google Scholar

14 Foran, John, Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution (Boulder, 1993), 335.Google Scholar

15 See Amuzegar, Jahangir, The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy (Albany, 1991), 276Google Scholar.

16 Bashiriyeh, Hossein, The State and Revolution in Iran, 1962–1982 (New York, 1984), 103.Google Scholar

17 Zahedi, Dariush, The Iranian Revolution Then and Now: Indicators of Regime Instability (Boulder, 2000), 87Google Scholar. During the early 1950s, the Israeli Knesset used the National Judiciary rather than the Chamber of Commerce to fix prices and hand down punishments to merchants accused of profiteering. The 3 June 1952 New York Times wrote that the judiciary, unlike the Chamber of Commerce, would “apply the anti-profiteering legislation vigorously and impartially.” The Shah's Chamber of Guilds court system, on the other hand, was probably interpreted as an extension of Rastakhiz and thus the Shah himself—had he used the Majlis or the national courts he would have been able to distance himself from the campaign and prevented increasing opposition to his leadership.

18 Abrahamian “The Political Challenge,” 4.

19 See Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 497. Also see Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Psuedo-Modernism, 1926–1979.

20 See Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 497. Also see Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Psuedo-Modernism, 1926–1979. By Salehi-Isfahani's estimates, the money supply had been increasing 37.9 percent annually between 1972–1973 and 1977–1978 (Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad, “The Political Economy of Credit Subsidy in Iran, 1973–1978,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 21 [1989]: 364CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

21 Salehi-Isfahani, “The Political Economy of Credit Subsidy in Iran, 1973–1978,” 364.

22 Amuzegar, The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy, 246.

23 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 498. Also see Frank, Lawrence P., “Two Responses to the Oil Boom: Iranian and Nigerian Politics after 1973,” Comparative Politics, 16 (1984): 295–314CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 Zahedi, The Iranian Revolution Then and Now: Indicators of Regime Instability, 87–8.

25 Katouzian refers to them as the Shah's “shock troops” (The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Psuedo-Modernism, 1926–1979, 334), and Abrahamian dubs these recruits “anti-profiteering goons” (“The Political Challenge,” 4).

26 Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power (New York, 1980), 94. Although the Tehran bazaar was hit the hardest given the enormity of its grand bazaar and status as main distributional hub for the national economy, the campaign reached all cities in Iran. For example, in Tabriz (the fourth largest city in Iran) forty-four shopkeepers were sent to jail and 981 were fined during the first forty-five days of the campaign (Zonis, Majestic Failure, 77).

27 Zonis, Majestic Failure, 77.

28 Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution, 103–4.

29 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 498.

30 Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, 96. Although it appears that bazaaris were helpless in retaliating against Rastakhiz or the government, Shambayati claims that some bazaaris paid individuals to patrol the bazaar and provide security against attacking members of Rastakhiz or SAVAK operatives during the revolutionary movement. This line of defense was likely used during the anti-profiteering campaign as well (Shambayati, The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy, 326).

31 “As a whole, the price campaign was a failure. Official indices went down for six months but black-market prices for essential commodities rose sharply. The shortages were not relieved, and if anything became more pronounced (Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, 96). Zonis claims that the campaign only had “trivial consequences on consumer prices” (Majestic Failure, 78).

32 Odell, Lawrence H., “Japan Fights Widespread Violation of Control Regulations,” Far Eastern Survey, 9 (1940): 122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

33 Amuzegar, The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy, 246.

34 Roxborough, Ian, “Inflation and Social Pacts in Brazil and Mexico,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 24 (1992): 639.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

35 Amuzegar, The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy, 278.

36 Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, 96–7.

37 Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, 97.

38 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 498.

39 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 498.

40 Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, 96.

41 Azam Nemati, “Alley of Faith,” Persian Mirror (2001), available from www.persianmirror.com, accessed January 2005.

42 Nemati, “Alley of Faith.”

43 See Keddie, Nikki R., Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran (New Haven, 1981)Google Scholar; Abrahamian, Ervand, “Bazaar and Mosque in Iran's Revolution: Interview with Ahmad Ashraf,” MERIP Reports (March–April): 16–18Google Scholar; Moaddel, “The Shi'i Ulama and the State in Iran,” 519–556; Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution; and Smith, “Collective Action with and without Islam: Mobilizing the Bazaar in Iran,” 212–41.

44 Ghandchi-Tehrani, Bazaaris and Clergy: Socio-economic Origins of Radicalism and Revolution in Iran, 131. Also see Farhi, Farideh, States and Urban-based Revolutions: Iran and Nicaragua (Urbana and Chicago, 1990), 70Google Scholar. The bazaar also often provided food for Islamic welfare organizations (Ghandchi-Tehrani, Bazaaris and Clergy: Socio-economic Origins of Radicalism and Revolution in Iran, 156.

45 Interview, September 2004.

46 Moaddel, “The Shi'i Ulama and the State in Iran,” 331.

47 Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, 96.

48 Zahedi, The Iranian Revolution Then and Now: Indicators of Regime Instability, 85.

49 “Beyond this immediate aim [of overthrowing the Shah] there was, and still is, no agreement as to the root causes of the February revolution and its ultimate objectives” (Pesaran, M.H., “The System of Dependent Capitalism in Pre-and Post-revolutionary Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 14 [1982]: 501)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

50 Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York, 2002), 7–8.Google Scholar

51 Mottahedeh, Roy, Mantle of the Prophet (New York, 1985), 35.Google Scholar