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Israel-Iranian Relations Assessed: Strategic Competition from the Power Cycle Perspective
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
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References
1 Menashri, David, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran—Religion, Society, and Power (London, 2001), 262Google Scholar.
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4 “Iran and World Bank Loans,” Prepared Testimony of Ray Takeyh, October 29, 2003, House subcommittee on Financial Services.
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6 Sobhani, Sohrab, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948–1988 (New York, 1989), 171Google Scholar.
7 Sariolghalam, Mahmood, “Israeli-Turkish Military Cooperation: Iranian Perceptions and Responses,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 29 (2001): 298Google Scholar.
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13 Interview with Israeli ministry of defense official, Tel Aviv, October 18, 2004. “There is definitely a tendency in Israel [to think the worst]…. Today, the prevailing culture or I would say the mindset of the intelligence industry is to attribute to the enemy almost infinite power and completely underestimate what our strength means to them.”
14 Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control, 138.
15 Interview with high-level foreign ministry official who spoke on condition of nonattribution, New York, April 1, 2004.
16 Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Hinnebusch, Raymond, The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (Boulder, 2002), 123Google Scholar.
17 Sadowski, Yahya, Scuds or Butter? The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East (Washington DC, 1993), 58Google Scholar.
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25 Parsaliti, Iraq's War Decisions, 317.
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28 Charles Doran, “Systemic Disequilibria,” 374.
29 Doran, Charles, “Globalization and Statecraft,” SAISPHERE (2000): 4–10Google Scholar.
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31 Segev, Samuel, The Iranian Triangle (New York, 1988), 11Google Scholar.
32 The rationale for this foreign policy concept was to weaken Israel's Arab enemies by forming alliances with the non-Arab nations in the region's periphery, such as Ethiopia, Iran, and Turkey, who all were wary of Nasserist expansionism and pro-Arab Soviet influence in the Middle East.
33 Interview with David Kimche, former director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Tel Aviv, October 22, 2004.
34 Sick, Gary, October Surprise (New York, 1991), 63Google Scholar, 142.
35 Sick, October Surprise, 114.
36 BBC, September 28, 1980.
37 Sick, October Surprise, 114–5.
38 Interview with Yossi Alpher, senior adviser to former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Ramat Hasharon, October 27, 2004. Sobhani, Sohrab, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948–1988 (New York, 1989), 150Google Scholar.
39 Sick, October Surprise, 70.
40 Sobhani, Sohrab, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948–1988 (New York, 1989), 149Google Scholar.
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42 Souresrafil, Behrouz, Khomeini and Israel (England, 1988), 111Google Scholar.
43 Interview with a former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, March 1, 2004. Nir died mysteriously in a plane crash in Mexico only weeks prior to his scheduled Congressional testimony on his role in the Iran-Contra affair.
44 Segev, Iranian Triangle, 137:8.
45 Interview with senior Israeli ministry of defense official, Tel Aviv, October 31, 2004. Segev, Iranian Triangle, 123. According to Samuel Segev, this sentiment was echoed by a key Iranian contact of the Israelis, Hassan Karroubi, the younger brother of Iran's current speaker of parliament, Mehdi Karroubi.
46 Ephraim Sneh, “Don't Be Fooled: Iran Still Traffics in Terror,” Los Angeles Times March 4, 2003.
47 Hunter, Shireen, Iran and the World (Indianapolis, 1990), 81Google Scholar:4.
48 Interview with high-level Iranian foreign ministry official who spoke on condition of nonattribution, New York, April 1, 2004.
49 Ehteshami writes that “disarray in Arab ranks has slowly begun to weaken the grip of the ‘Arabists’ in Iran's politico-religious circles, boosting the hands of the ‘Persianists’ in the establishment who are in favor of developing closer links with Iran's non-Arab neighbors and advocate the creation of an ‘Iran-first’ foreign policy based on an Iranian-culture worldview. (Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, “Iran's International Posture in the Wake of the Iraq War,” The Middle East Journal 58, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 188, note 20Google Scholar.
50 Interview with senior Iranian ministry of foreign affairs official, Tehran, August 7, 2004.
51 Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, After Khomeini (London, 1995), 132Google Scholar.
52 Interview, Tel Aviv, October 26, 2004.
53 Interview with AIPAC official, Washington DC, March 25, 2004.
54 Interview with Jesse Hordes, director of the Anti-Defamation League, Washington DC, March 25, 2004.
55 Interview with Bijan Khajepour, Washington DC, February 24, 2004.
56 Interview with Iranian foreign ministry official, New York, March 31, 2004.
57 Interview with Israeli UN diplomat, New York, March 31, 2004. Interview with a senior official in the Clinton administration who spoke on condition of non-attribution, Washington DC, March 4, 2004.
58 Pollack, Kenneth, The Persian Puzzle (New York, 2004), 257–8Google Scholar.
59 Interview with Dan Meridor, former Israeli cabinet minister, Tel Aviv, October 27, 2004.
60 Interview with Ephraim Inbar, Jerusalem, October 19, 2004.
61 Peres, Shimon, The New Middle East (New York, 1993), 43Google Scholar.
62 Interview, Tel Aviv, October 31, 2004.
63 Interview with AIPAC representative, Washington DC, March 25, 2004.
64 Peres, New Middle East, 69.
65 The idea of isolating Iran and excluding it from regional decision-making was adopted by the United States in May 1993 through the so-called Dual containment policy. Dual Containment was intimately connected to the Middle East peace process, and aimed at isolating both Iran and Iraq in order to enable the Oslo process to succeed. According to a senior Clinton aid, the perception was that Iran needed to be isolated and excluded in order for peace between the Arabs and Israelis to be possible.
66 Interview with a senior official in the Clinton administration who spoke on condition of nonattribution, Washington DC, March 4, 2004.
67 Interview with Ephraim Inbar, Jerusalem, October 19, 2004.
68 Interview with Israeli UN diplomat, New York, March 31, 2004.
69 World Press, March 13, 1993.
70 White, Paul and Logan, William, Remaking the Middle East (Oxford, 1997), 218Google Scholar.
71 Menashri, David, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran–Religion, Society, and Power (London, 2001), 295Google Scholar.
72 Reuter, March 7, 1996.
73 Agence France Press, October 28, 1987. (From Souresrafil, B., Khomeini and Israel, 114).
74 New York Times, February 6, 1991.
75 Interview with leading reformist intellectual, Tehran, August 21, 2004.
76 Interview with diplomat at the Iranian UN Mission, New York, February 26, 2004. Sariolghalam, Mahmood, “Israeli-Turkish Military Cooperation: Iranian Perceptions and Responses,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology (2001): 297Google Scholar.
77 Interview with senior Iranian foreign ministry official, Tehran, August 25, 2004.
78 Ettela'at September 11, 1993.
79 Clark Staten, “Israeli-PLO Peace Agreement—Cause of Further Terrorism?” EmergencyNet News Service, September 14, 1993.
80 Interview with leading reformist intellectual, Tehran, August 21, 2004.
81 Interview with Israeli UN diplomat, New York, March 31, 2004. According to a senior American State Department official, the U.S. shared this perception.
82 Interview, Tel Aviv, October 17, 2004.
83 Interview with a senior official in the Clinton administration who spoke on condition of non-attribution, Washington DC, March 4, 2004.
84 “Peres: Iran tries to topple my regime,” Reuters, April 8, 1996.
85 Interview with AIPAC representative, Washington DC, March 25, 2004.
86 Interview with a senior official in the Clinton administration who spoke on condition of nonattribution, Washington DC, March 4, 2004.
87 IDF Radio, November 10, 1996.
88 Interview, Jerusalem, October 28, 2004.
89 IDF Radio, November 10, 1996.
90 IRNA, “Likud said to seek understanding with Iran,” July 24, 1996.
91 Interview with Zeev Schiff, Tel Aviv, October 17, 2004.
92 Interview, Jerusalem, October 28, 2004.
93 IDF Radio, November 10, 1996.
94 Interview with AIPAC representative, Washington DC, March 25, 2004.
95 Interview with Iranian political strategist, New York, February 26, 2004.
96 The correlation is noticeable between intense Iranian animosity towards the peace process and aggressive Israeli pursuit of an accord with the Arabs and unenthusiastic Israeli attitude toward reconciliation with the Palestinians and a more laissez-faire Iranian policy.
97 Interview with Ambassador Nejad-Hosseinian, Iran's former ambassador to the UN 1997–2002, Tehran, August 12, 2004.
98 Interview with high-level Iranian foreign ministry official who spoke on condition of non-attribution, New York, April 1, 2004.
99 Interview, Tel Aviv, October 31, 2004.
100 This indicates the survival of the strategic logic of the periphery doctrine, albeit adapted to the technological realities of the twenty-first century. According to Ephraim Sneh, India, Azerbaijan, and the central Asian states constitute the new peripheral states through whom Israel is weakening Iran.
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