There are many ways in which one could study what is frequently called the Atlantic Community. First, one could trace the history of proposals made in order to strengthen the bond between the United States and nations situated on the other side of the Atlantic. Such suggestions, whether they aimed at federal union or at a close alliance, came either from Britain or from the United States, were always centered on the “British-American connection,” and aimed at making the two great English-speaking peoples the magnet that would attract lesser breeds, the force whose strength and virtues would preserve law, order, and peace in the world. Although such blue-prints rarely left visible traces on official policy in the United States, they are significant, both because British policy since the war often appeared inspired by the hope, or the nostalgia, for a world of this hue, and because overtones of these earlier appeals may have crept into recent American tactics in support of Britain's application to the Common Market.

The North Atlantic Treaty has been in existence since April 4, 1949. Article 9 of this treaty gave birth to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the imposing headquarters on the edge of the Bois de Boulogne in Paris bear witness to its reality. In his chapter dealing with the nature of the Community, Stanley Hoffmann discusses the question of whether a true Atlantic Community exists outside the pages of the treaty. The present study will examine the existence of that Community insofar as two of its principal members are concerned: France and the Federal Republic of Germany.

It would be difficult to imagine a more inappropriate moment for trying to assess the British role in the evolution of the Atlantic Community. Writing in May 1963, one is all too aware of the importance of the decisions that will still have to be taken to meet the situation that has arisen from the failure of Britain's application to join the Common Market. Both the protagonists of Britain's entry and the opponents of this move, however, drew closer together on at least one point as the long debate over the negotiations went on. Both sides agreed that the decision—one way or the other—would be a major turning point in Britain's history. Indeed, if we omit the crises of two world wars, it would be difficult to think of an adequate parallel. Even the bitterly contested repeal of the Corn Laws in the 1840's— the event which is usually taken as signifying the triumph of industrial over agrarian Britain—was less far-reaching in its implications.

When major plans for European or Atlantic integration are under discussion, European neutrals receive little attention. Much concern is expressed over the impact of the European Economic Community or of an Atlantic Community upon Latin America, Africa, or Asia, and considerable care is exercised to alleviate apprehension, to quiet fears, to subdue sharp reactions, and, finally, to prevent retaliatory action. But the situation of the small neutral European states is only mentioned in passing. In the last analysis, more consideration is shown for distant and often hostile neutralists than for neutral, but friendly, neighbors.

Before considering evolving relations between the United States and the Atlantic Community, it is useful to examine briefly the meaning of the words “Atlantic Community,” a term that means different things to different people. It has no agreed definition because it is still a concept and not yet an institution. It purports to be geographically descriptive. However, when one considers the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is generally regarded as the most important institutional reflection of a community of interests between the European and North American countries bordering the Atlantic basin, one finds Italy, Greece, and Turkey are members while Spain and Eire, both Atlantic countries, are absent. Similarly, if one looks at the membership of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is another institution generally regarded as reflecting common interests of the “Atlantic Community,” one finds that all the NATO members belong as well as Eire, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and Spain. Although there are political reasons to account for all this confusion, at the present time the term “Atlantic Community” connotes neither an agreed geographic area nor a specific group of countries.

The Atlantic Community regards itself as the core of the free world and, at least in aspiration, as the leader of all the peoples which have not fallen under the communist spell. The major barriers to the successful assertion of that leadership are the suspicion and hostility generated by the era of Western imperial overlordship of most of the world and the radical divergence in view as to what constitutes the major problem of our times. Although there are marked differences of emphasis within it, the Atlantic Community arms and guards against the threat of communist imperialism, while much of Asia and Africa still see the colonialism of the West as the gravest and most immediate menace to their own freedom and the peace of the world. For the most part they want to abstain from what seems to them the sterile and unrewarding task of holding back communism in order to be able to concentrate on their own immense problems of stabilization, integration, and development. Aware of their pressing needs, and of what the West has to offer, they look to the Atlantic Community for economic and other assistance, even though they may also be ready to accept assistance from the communist states as well. It is probable that most of those in responsible positions in the Atlantic Community have a greater degree of understanding and sympathetic appreciation of the position of the underdeveloped countries than the leaders of the latter have of the West's concern with communism.

In discussing the process of integration in western Europe, communist writings invariably put the word in quotation marks, and often preface it with “so-called,” to drive home the central point that, while technological progress does create a tendency toward international economic activity, the capitalist system is inherently incapable of an effective response to this necessity. What is involved is not so much the broad, undefined movement toward an Atlantic Community, which Soviet strategists tend to discount, as the specific and practical development of the European Common Market. With or without quotation marks, the movement toward European integration has become a major factor in the evolution of Soviet ideology and policy. Despite its ups and downs, the Common Market has resulted in profound modifications in Soviet ideas concerning contemporary capitalism and the present configuration of power; it has led to a radical revision of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistant (COMECON)—the Soviet counterpart organization for eastern Europe; and it has greatly complicated Moscow's leadership of the world communist movement. Over the long run, if the non-communist nations are able to sustain a movement toward growth and integration, this development gives promise of leading to fundamental transformations in Soviet policies and in the Soviet system itself.

The existence of an Atlantic Community with important economic aspects is revealed in the past and present relations among the countries of western Europe and North America. This Community is something less than the fusion of the nations of the Atlantic area advocated by some; it is something more comprehensive and more pervasive than the organizational alternative to “partnership” that others mean by the word. The Atlantic Community dealt with in this article is a state of affairs more than a concept; it does not have to be precisely delineated so long as we can discern its solid central mass. This Atlantic Community—such as it is, and whatever exactly it is—is the child of history and policy. Both genealogies are clearly established and well-known; to recall them helps pose the major questions of the present and future

When I reported to a colleague that I was writing a chapter on the relationship between the Atlantic Community and the United Nations, the response was immediate, emphatic, and somewhat disconcerting. “What do you propose to say?” he snorted. “Actually the two things are quite separate and distinct. There really is no relationship between them at all.”

The debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control, which now divides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is framed largely in military terms: what is the best way to protect the NATO area and its members from aggression? The military aspects are complex in themselves, but the import of these issues extends far beyond defense. Their handling will greatly affect prospects for a partnership between the United States and a strong, united Europe

These reflections on the centrifugal tendencies of interstate associations and the need for a stronger central union were penned 175 years ago by Alexander Hamilton, but they could easily have been taken, save for the quaint language, from the current debate on the Atlantic Community. As Hamilton pondered the problem of strengthening the integrating sinews of the new nation, so modern Hamiltons voice similar thoughts concerning the possibility of creating a stronger Atlantic political community.

From the time of the Marshall Plan to the present, American policy toward Europe has been guided simultaneously by two aspirations. One has been to see western Europe unified, the other—stemming from the conviction that the fate of the United States is inextricably tied to that of Europe—has been to create strong bonds among the Atlantic nations. Until quite recently it was believed that these two aspirations stood in a kind of predetermined harmony to each other: the more tightly the European nations would band together, gaining strength and prosperity from their union, the better it would be for all members of the Atlantic Community; and the more intimately Europe was linked with the United States, the more Europe, as a unit, would stand to gain.

It is a commonplace that the world in which we live has changed more rapidly and more drastically in the last hundred years than perhaps at any other stage of its history. So evident is this fact, and so familiar are the forces that have made for change, that by a curious paradox the mere repetition of arguments about “the shrinking globe,” “the increased speed of travel,” “the growth of communications,” and so on has tended to deaden our awareness of what they mean. From the earliest years of the century, we have become accustomed to hearing that the invention of automobiles, of aircraft, of telephones, and of radio would radically transform our world. If, now, we once more hear the same, or similar statements, made about space travel, ballistic missiles, atomic energy, and television, our immediate reflex is probably a shrug, denoting the understandable feeling that we have met it all before.

“The nations seem to be advancing to unity,” wrote Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835. “Our means of intellectual intercourse unite the most remote parts of the earth; and it is impossible for men to remain strangers to each other, or to be ignorant of the events which are taking place in any corner of the globe.”

I fully share the conviction expressed by President Kennedy in May 1962 that “Atlantic unity represents the true course of history.” This seems to me inevitable despite the complications, contradictions, and conflicts of national policies which are still very much with us.

The Security Council at its 1027th to 1033rd meetings, April 17–24, 1963, considered this question, which was brought to the attention of the Council in a letter dated April 10, 1963, from the Chargé d'Affaires of the permanent mission of Senegal, addressed to the President of the Security Council. The government of Senegal called upon the Security Council to discuss the violations of Senegalese air space and territory on the border between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea. The letter cited the violation of air space by four Portuguese aircraft, the dropping of grenades on the village of Bouniack on April 9, 1963, and three similar violations of territory and air space which occurred on December 16, 1961, and which were drawn to the attention of the President of the Security Council on December 22, 1961.

Third part of the fourteenth session: The Consultative Assembly held the third part of its fourteenth ordinary session on January 14–18, 1963, under the presidency of Mr. Per Federspiel (Danish Moderate Liberal).1 Mr. Piccioni, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, made a statement summarizing the activities of the Committee of Ministers since the second part of the fourteenth session. Commenting on various points of the Assembly's agenda, Mr. Piccioni noted the desire to examine ways of reactivating the Council of Europe. Although he was opposed to any structural modifications, he welcomed the proposal whereby the Committee of Ministers should inform the joint committee of the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers of its observations on recommendations which it rejected. On the general question of European integration, he emphasized the importance of Britain's negotiations for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). He reaffirmed his country's desire to maintain the solidarity of the existing members of EEC but stressed Italy's constant efforts to seek a successful outcome to the negotiations.

The European Parliament met in Strasbourg on February 5–6, 1963. The session opened with a statement by Mr. Robert Marjolin, French vice-president of the European Economic Community (EEC) Commission, on the economic situation of the Community. Provided that there was no slump in any important country outside the Six, Mr. Marjolin said that satisfactory economic growth was to be expected within the Community during 1963. He forecast that the rising costs of consumer goods would slacken then level off in the present year.

The Council of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) held its 27th meeting at the ministerial level in Oslo on October 22, 1962. According to the communiqué released at the end of the meeting, the Ministers reviewed the developments within the Association and noted that the principles of a free trade area were working well in practice and giving satisfaction to both governments and traders in all their countries.