Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-c9gpj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-16T00:44:19.948Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Unconditional Most-Favored-Nation Clause and the Maintenance of the Liberal Trade Regime in the Postwar 1870s

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2009

Bryan Coutain
Bryan Coutain
Affiliation:
E-mail: b-coutain@hotmail.com
Get access

Abstract

International institutions within the past thirty years become the subject of renewed interest as scholars vigorously dispute their utility. Neorealists draw on the post–World War II era to advance sweeping general claims of institutional inefficacy. This study, by contrast, deploys the same hard-test method Grieco applied to the 1970s Tokyo Round negotiations to the crisis-rife 1870s to construct a unique methodological objective: a rigorous hard-test of nineteenth-century institutional autonomy. Three principal findings emerged. First, the maintenance of a liberal world economy in the turbulent 1870s is explained by an unlikely commercial instrument and the unprecedented regime design of an unexplored international institution—respectively the unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) clause and the informal conventional tariff system (CTS) regime it underpinned—not British hegemony. Second, the international trade regime was not a public good unilaterally provisioned by “hegemonic” Britain via the 1846 Corn Laws Repeal. The regime was instead a private good that was collectively provisioned by all its constituent member states via the unprecedented interstate practices institutionalized in the 1860 Cobden-Chevalier Treaty and then autonomously maintained by a negarchical and self-enforcing sanctioning mechanism. Finally, the informal CTS regime's enforcement mechanism autonomously altered the interests and behaviors of states in directions incongruent with executive preferences solely through the brute force of rational calculations imposed by decentralized international institutional constraints. Both the French and British executives in the 1870s believed the regime was normatively inappropriate and unsuccessfully attempted to exit amid eight system-threatening crises. Nonetheless, the MFN-based regime's self-enforcing sanctioning mechanism autonomously induced compliance: conceptualized as unitary states' behavior deviating from executives' first-order preference. The extraordinarily turbulent 1870s therefore provide an unexplored historical vantage point to make strong institutionalist claims in an era, issue area, and under conditions that they are least likely to be validated.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 63 , Issue 1 , January 2009 , pp. 139 - 175
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Aggarwal, Vinod K. 1985. Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Trade in Textiles. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Ashby. 1872. Parliamentary Proceeding. New Republic, 17 July 1872.Google Scholar
Ashley, Percy. 1926. Modern Tariff History. New York: E. P. Dutton.Google Scholar
Axelrod, Robert, and Keohane, Robert O.. 1985. Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy. World Politics 38 (1):226–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barton, John H., Goldstein, Judith L., Josling, Timothy E., and Steinberg, Richard H.. 2006. Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the GATT and WTO. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Benvenisti, Eyal, and Hirsch, Moshe. 2004. The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation: Theoretical Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bidwell, Percy. 1947. International Trade Organization—Discussion. American Economic Review 37 (2):554–59.Google Scholar
Brown, Lucy. 1959. The Board of Trade and the Free-Trade Movement, 1830–1842. Oxford, England: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce. 1990. Pride of Place: The Origins of German Hegemony. World Politics 43 (1):28–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bullington, John P. 1927. International Treaties and the Clause ‘Rebus Sic Stantibus.’ University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register 76 (2):153–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bury, J. P. T. 1964. Napoléon III and the Second Empire. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Catudal, Honore Marcel. 1941. The Most-Favored-Nation Clause and the Courts. American Journal of International Law 35 (1):41–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Christensen, Thomas J., and Snyder, Jack. 1990. Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity. International Organization 44 (2):137–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cline, William. 1982. Reciprocity. Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Economics.Google Scholar
Commercial Treaties. 1870. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Condliffe, John Bell. 1950. The Commerce of Nations. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
Conybeare, John A. C. 1985. Trade Wars: A Comparative Study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot Conflicts. World Politics 38 (1):147–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Conybeare, John A. C. 1987. Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Cortell, Andrew P., and Davis, James W. Jr. 1996. How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms. International Studies Quarterly 40 (4):451–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coutain, Bryan. 2005. The Multilateral and Bilateral Provision of Trade: Institutional Forms and the Content of Commercial Cooperation in the World Economy, 1860–1995. Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania.Google Scholar
Crandall, Samuel. 1904. Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement. New York: Columbia University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Culbertson, William Smith. 1925. International Economic Policies: A Survey of the Economics of Diplomacy. New York: Appleton.Google Scholar
Culbertson, William Smith. 1937. Reciprocity: A National Policy for Foreign Trade. New York: Whittlesey House.Google Scholar
Destler, I. M. 1992. American Trade Politics. 2d ed.Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.Google Scholar
Destler, I. M., and Odell, John S.. 1987. Anti-Protection: Changing Forces in United States Trade Politics. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.Google Scholar
Deudney, Daniel H. 1995. The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, circa 1787–1861. International Organization 49 (2):191–228.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dietzel, H. 1903. The German Tariff Controversy. Quarterly Journal of Economics 17 (3):365–416.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dunham, Arthur Louis. 1930. The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1860 and the Progress of the Industrial Revolution in France. New York: Russell & Russell.Google Scholar
Eckalbar, John C. 1979. The Saint-Simonians in Industry and Economic Development. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 38 (1):83–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eckstein, Harry. 1992. Case Study and Theory in Political Science. In Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change, 152–63. Berkeley: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Economist. 2008. Dried Up: Talks over the Doha Round of Global Trade Negotiations Have Collapsed. The Economist. Online ed. 29 July 2008. Available at ⟨http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11831960&source=features_box_main⟩. Accessed 14 October 2008.Google Scholar
Edinburgh Review. 1843. Free Trade and Retaliation. LXXVIII (CLVII):1–47.Google Scholar
Edinburgh Review. 1860. Commercial Relations Between England and France. CXI (CCXXVI):145–62.Google Scholar
Edinburgh Review. 1867. The Prussian Campaign of 1866. CXXV (CCLVI):185–200.Google Scholar
Edinburgh Review. 1891. Germany and Von Moltke. CLXXIV (CCCLVIII):528–65.Google Scholar
Evans, Peter B. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evans, Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Theda. 1985. Bring the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fisher, Herbert. 1896. The Protectionist Reaction in France. Economic Journal 6 (23):341–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ford, Worthington Chauncey. 1902. The Commercial Policy of Europe. Publications of the American Economic Association 3 (1):118–57.Google Scholar
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 1947. Vol. I. New York: United Nations Publications.Google Scholar
Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1943. Bread and Democracy in Germany. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Giesberg, Robert. 1966. The Treaty of Frankfort: A Study in Diplomatic History, September 1870–September 1873. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gilpin, Robert. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gladstone, William. 1870. Germany, France, and England. Edinburgh Review CXXXII (CCLXIX):284–304.Google Scholar
Gladstone, William. 1887. The History of 1850–60. English Historical Review II.Google Scholar
Goldstein, Judith. 1993. Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Goldstein, Judith. 1996. International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American “Unfair” Trade Laws. International Organization 50 (4):541–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gorter, Wytze. 1954. GATT After Six Years: An Appraisal. International Organization 8 (1):1–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gourevitch, Peter. 1977. International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873–1896. Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8 (2):281–313.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gowa, Joanne. 1989. Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade. American Political Science Review 83 (4):1245–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gowa, Joanne, and Mansfield, Edward D.. 1993. Power Politics and International Trade. American Political Science Review 87 (2):408–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gowa, Joanne, and Mansfield, Edward D.. 2004. Alliances, Imperfect Markets, and Major-Power Trade. International Organization 58 (4):775–805.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gregory, Theodor Emanuel. 1921. Tariffs: A Study in Method. London: Charles Griffin.Google Scholar
Grieco, Joseph M. 1993. Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Haggard, Stephan. 1988. Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. International Organization 42 (1):91–119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haight, Frank Arnold. 1941. A History of French Commercial Policies. New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Hall, Peter A., and Taylor, Rosemary C. R.. 1996. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Studies 44 (5):936–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Herod, Joseph R. 1901. Favored Nation Treatment. New York: Banks Law.Google Scholar
Hobson, John Atkinson. 1919. Richard Cobden: The International Man. New York: Holt.Google Scholar
Hoffmann, Stanley. 1977. An American Social Science: International Relations. Daedalus 106:41–60.Google Scholar
Hornbeck, Stanley Kuhl. 1909. The Most-Favored-Nation Clause. American Journal of International Law 3 (2):395–422.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hornbeck, Stanley Kuhl. 1910. The Most-Favored-Nation Clause in Commercial Treaties: Its Function in Theory and Practice and its Relation to Tariff Policies. Madison: University of Wisconsin.Google Scholar
Howe, Anthony. 1997. Free Trade and Liberal England, 1846–1946. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Ikenberry, G. John. 1988. Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Iliasu, A. A. 1971. The Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860. Historical Journal 14 (1):67–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Irwin, Douglas A. 1993. Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Policies in the World Trading System: A Historical Perspective. In New Dimensions in Regional Integration, edited by De Melo, Jamie and Panagariya, Arvind, 90–118. New York: Cambridge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Irwin, Douglas A. 1995. The GATT in Historical Perspective. American Economic Review 85 (2):323–28.Google Scholar
Jackson, John Howard. 1998. The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.Google Scholar
James, Scott C., and Lake, David A.. 1989. The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846. International Organization 43 (1):1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahler, Miles. 1985. Politics of International Debt: Explaining the Crisis. International Organization 39 (3):357–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Katzenstein, Peter J. 1978. Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.Google Scholar
Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Keohane, Robert O., and Martin, Lisa L.. 1995. The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. International Security 20 (1):39–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kindleberger, Charles P. 1981. Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides. International Studies Quarterly 25 (2):242–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kindleberger, Charles P.. 1986. The World in Depression, 1929–1939. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Koremenos, Barbara, Lipson, Charles, and Snidal, Duncan. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. International Organization 55 (4):761–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. State Power and the Structure of International Trade. World Politics 28 (3):317–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krasner, Stephen D. 1979. The Tokyo Round: Particularistic Interests and Prospects for Stability in the Global Trading System. International Studies Quarterly 23 (4):491–531.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lake, David. 1988. Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887–1939. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Laughlin, Laurence, and Willis, H. Parker. 1903. Reciprocity. New York: Barker & Taylor.Google Scholar
Lavelle, Kathryn C. 2007. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in International Organization: U.S. Involvement in the League of Nations. Review of International Organizations 2 (4):371–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lazer, David. 1999. The Free Trade Epidemic of the 1860s and other Outbreaks of Economic Discrimination. World Politics 51 (4):447–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
League of Nations. 1928. The Most-Favored-Nation Clause. American Journal of International Law 22 (1):133–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
League of Nations. 1936. Equality of Treatment in the Present State of International Commercial Relations: The Most-Favoured-Nation Clause. Series of League of Nations Publication: II. Economic and Financial II.B.9. Geneva: League of Nations.Google Scholar
Levasseur, Émile. 1892. The Recent Commercial Policy of France. Journal of Political Economy 1 (1):20–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levi, Leone. 1877. Statistical Results of the Recent Treaties of Commerce Between Different States of Europe. Journal of the Statistical Society of London 40 (1):1–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lipson, Charles. 1981. The International Organization of Third World Debt. International Organization 34 (4):603–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Long, Dwight C. 1936. The Austro-French Commercial Treaty of 1866. American Historical Review 41 (3):474–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lord, Robert Howard. 1924. The Origins of the War of 1870; New Documents from the German Archives. New York: Russell & Russell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lotz, Walther. 1907. The Commercial Policy of Germany. Journal of Political Economy 15 (5):257–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, Lisa L. 1992. Interests, Power, and Multilateralism. International Organization 46 (4):765–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, Lisa L., and Simmons, Beth A.. 1998. Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions. International Organization 52 (4):729–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mason, E. S. 1931. Saint-Simonism and the Rationalisation of Industry. Quarterly Journal of Economics 45 (4):640–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McGilchrist, John. 1865. Richard Cobden, the Apostle of Free Trade: His Political Career and Public Services. New York: Harper.Google Scholar
McGillivray, Fiona. 2001. International Trade and Political Institutions: Instituting Trade in the Long Nineteenth Century. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKeown, Timothy. 1983. Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe. International Organization 37 (1):79–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mearsheimer, John. 1995. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security 19 (3):5–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meredith, Hugh Owen. 1904. Protection in France. London: P. S. King.Google Scholar
Mill, J. S. 1870. Treaty Obligations. Fortnightly Review XLVIII (VIII):715–20.Google Scholar
Millard, Thomas F. 1909. America and the Far Eastern Question. New York: Moffat, Yard & Co.Google Scholar
Mitchell, Ronald B. 1994. Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance. International Organization 48 (3):425–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mitchell, Ronald, and Keilbach, Patricia M.. 2001. Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange. International Organization 55 (4):891–917.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morley, John. 1870. France and Germany. Fortnightly Review VIII (XLV).Google Scholar
Morley, John. 1881. The Life of Richard Cobden. Boston: Robert Brothers.Google Scholar
Morley, John. 1911. The Life of William Ewart Gladstone. New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Nye, John V. C. 2007. War, Wine, and Taxes: The Political Economy of Anglo-French Trade, 1689–1900. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olson, Mancur. 1993. “Comment.” In New Dimensions in Regional Integration, edited by De Melo, Jamie and Panagariya, Arvind, 122–27. New York: Cambridge.Google Scholar
Oye, Kenneth A. 1992. Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange: World Political Economy in the 1930s and 1980s. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Pahre, Robert. 2001. Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Clustered Negotiations. International Organization 55 (4):859–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pauly, Louis. 1996. The League of Nations and the Foreshadowing of the International Monetary Fund. Essays in International Finance No. 201, 1–47. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University.Google Scholar
Platt, D. C. M. 1968. Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy 1815–1914. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Plessis, Alain. 1985. The Rise and Fall of the Second Empire, 1852–1871. Translated Mandlebaum, by Jonathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Pollard, Sidney. 1974. European Economic Integration, 1815–1870. London: Thames and Hudson.Google Scholar
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1892. Notes and Memoranda. Quarterly Journal of Economics 6 (3):338–41.Google Scholar
Quarterly Review. 1864a. The Danish Duchies. 115 (230):226–87.Google Scholar
Quarterly Review. 1864b. The Foreign Policy of England. 115 (230):481–529.Google Scholar
Quarterly Review. 1870a. The War Between France and Germany. 129 (258):293–327.Google Scholar
Quarterly Review. 1870b. The French and German Armies. 129 (258):415–54.Google Scholar
Quarterly Review. 1871. The Third French Republic, and the Second German Empire. 130 (260):351–73.Google Scholar
Ratcliffe, B. 1978. The Tariff Reform Campaign in France, 1831–1836. Journal of European Economic History 7 (1):61–138.Google Scholar
Republican National Committee. 1908. Republican Campaign Textbook. Philadelphia: Dunlap.Google Scholar
Rhodes, Carolyn. 1993. Reciprocity, U.S. Trade Policy, and the GATT Regime. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Robinson, Moncure. 1880. Obituary Notice of Michel Chevalier. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 19 (107):28–37.Google Scholar
Rose, J. H. 1894. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, 1789–1815. London: C. J. Clay.Google Scholar
Rosenberg, Hans. 1943. Political and Social Consequences of the Great Depression of 1873–1896 in Central Europe. Economic History Review 13 (1/2):58–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosendorff, Peter B., and Milner, Helen V.. 2001. The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. International Organization 55 (4):829–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Saksena, Jyotika. 2006. Regime Design Matters: The CTBT and India's Nuclear Dilemma. Comparative Strategy 25 (3):209–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simon, M. Jules. 1879. The Government of M. Thiers: From 8th February, 1871, to 24th May, 1873. New York: Scribner.Google Scholar
Smith, Michael S. 1977. Free Trade Versus Protection in the Early Third Republic: Economic Interests, Tariff Policy, and the Making of the Republican Synthesis. French Historical Studies 10 (2):293–314.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Michael S. 1980. Tariff Reform in France,1860–1900: The Politics of Economic Interest. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Snyder, Richard Carlton. 1948. The Most-Favored-Nation Clause: An Analysis with Particular Reference to Recent Treaty Practice and Tariffs. New York: King's Crown.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Steinmo, Sven, Thelen, Kathleen, and Longstreth, Frank. 1992. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stinchcombe, Arthur L. 1968. Constructing Social Theories. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.Google Scholar
Stone, N. I. 1905. The International Aspect of our Tariff Situation. North American Review 180:381–93.Google Scholar
Stone, N. I. 1907. The Double Tariff System. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 29 (May):38–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stone, N. I. 1908. The Conventional Tariff System. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 32 (September):103–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stone, N. I. 1909. Dual Tariff Systems. American Economic Association Quarterly 10 (1):301–13.Google Scholar
Tasca, Henry J. 1938. The Reciprocal Trade Policy of the United States: A Study in Trade Philosophy. New York: Russell & Russell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thiers, Louis Adolphe. 1915. Memoirs of M. Thiers, 1870–1873. New York: Howard Fertig.Google Scholar
Thompson, Richard Wiggington. 1888. The History of Protective Tariff Laws. Chicago: R. S. Peale.Google Scholar
Tumlir, Jan. 1985. Protectionism: Trade Policy in Democratic Societies. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.Google Scholar
Verdier, Daniel. 1994. Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France, and the United States, 1869–1990. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Viner, Jacob. 1951. International Economics: Studies. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1988. The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory. Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (4):615–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weber, Max. 1958. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Wendt, Alexander. 2001. Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design. International Organization 55 (4):1019–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Whale, Phillip Barrett. 1967. International Trade. London: F. Cass.Google Scholar
Wilcox, Clair. 1947. The London Draft of a Charter for an International Trade Organization. American Economic Review 37 (2):529–41.Google Scholar
William Senior, Nassau. 1878. Conversations with M. Thiers, M. Guizot, and Other Distinguished Persons, During the Second Empire, Vol. 2, edited by Simpson, M. C. M.. London: Hurst.Google Scholar
Yarbrough, Robert M., and Yarbrough, Beth V.. 1992. Cooperation and Governance in International Trade: The Strategic Organizational Approach. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zeldin, Theodore. 1958. The Political System of Napoleon III. New York: Norton.Google Scholar