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2. Not all analysts respond in this way; see Stein, Janice, “Can Decision-Makers Be Rational and Should They Be? Evaluating the Quality of Decision,” in Brecher, Michael, ed., Studies in Crisis Behavior (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1978), pp. 316–39Google Scholar. She argues that skeptics ought not to “dismiss the evidence of rationality that characterizes some decision-makers some of the time even under stress in a crisis.” Furthermore, she notes with approval the phenomenological position that “decision-makers want to be, and assume that they are, rational in argument, process, and choice. They perceive the real as rational, and because their perceptions define reality, the rational becomes real.” Finally, she points to negative ethical and practical consequences of abandoning rationality: “If decision-makers cannot be rational, they cannot be held responsible. In its extreme form, acceptance of arationality must preclude judgments of responsibility in the face of history.… To judge decision-makers irresponsible, they must be free to be rational.” See also her “Freud and Descartes: The Paradoxes of Psychological Logic,” International Journal 32 (Summer 1977), pp. 429–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3. Steinbruner, , Cybernetic Theory, p. 339Google Scholar.

4. Kinder, and Weiss, , “In Lieu of Rationality: Psychological Perspectives on Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 22 (12 1978), p. 732CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5. Furthermore, they demonstrate how Jervis, , in Perception and Misperception, Janis, Irving and Mann, Leon, in Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977)Google Scholar, and Axelrod, Robert, in Structure of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976)Google Scholar, all fall back on traditional notions of rationality for prescriptive guidance, even though their descriptive work suggests that these notions are inadequate.

6. See March, James G., “Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice,” Bell Journal of Economics 9 (Spring 1978), pp. 587–608CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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10. Ibid., pp. 590, 605.

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12. Steinbruner, , Cybernetic Theory, pp. 40–44Google Scholar.

13. Among the authors who discuss variants or aspects of this worldview are Barzun, Jacques, Classic, Romantic, and Modern (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975)Google Scholar; Berlin, Isaiah, Against the Current (New York: Viking, 1980)Google Scholar; Emery, F. E. and Trist, E. L., “The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments,” Human Relations 18 (02 1965), pp. 21–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gouldner, Alvin W., “Romanticism and Classicism: Deep Structures in Social Science,” in his For Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 323–66Google Scholar; Luke, David and Reeves, Nigel, “Introduction,” in Luke, and Reeves, , eds., Kleist (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), pp. 7–49Google Scholar; Mintzberg, Henry, “Planning on the Left Side and Managing on the Right,” Harvard Business Review 54 (07–08 1976), pp. 49–58Google Scholar; Polanyi, Michael, Personal Knowledge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962)Google Scholar; Skinner, Wickham and Sasser, W. Earl, “Managers with Impact: Versatile and Inconsistent,” Harvard Business Review 55 (11–12 1977), pp. 140–48Google Scholar; Maanen, J. Van, ed., Organizational Careers (New York: John Wiley, 1977)Google Scholar; Westcott, Malcolm R., Toward A Contemporary Psychology of Intuition (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968)Google Scholar.

14. Gouldner, , “Romanticism and Classicism,” p. 342Google Scholar.

15. The affirmation of diversity is prominent not only in 19th century Romanticism but also in the current of thought that grew out of relativity theory in physics and certain developments in modern biology. For example, the biologist J. von Uexküll asserts that “an objective picture of the world, which does justice to all subjects, must necessarily remain a phantom.” Moreover, “there are just as many spaces and times as there are subjects, because every subject is enclosed in his own environment.” Von Uexküll applies this insight to human interactions, using a metaphor from the theater: “When we see our fellow men walking around, they are striding upon our stages, while we move on their stages. These stages are never identical, and in most cases they are fundamentally different. And we cannot demand to play the same role on other stages as we play on our own.” Theoretische Biologie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973), pp. 57Google Scholar, 340–41, 121–22; translated by and quoted in Willeford, William, “Toward a Dynamic Concept of Feeling,” Journal of Analytic Psychology 20 (01 1975), p. 25CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16. Willeford, , an analytical psychologist, provides an example of this point of view as it relates to interpersonal interactions in “Toward a Dynamic Concept,” pp. 25–26Google Scholar: “Each human subject occupies his own environment, largely shaped by his own inner organization, reflecting various and complex individual differences.… These subjective spheres, which define ‘mine’ and ‘not-mine,’ are the basis of territories which may be violently invaded and plundered if no other form of accommodation among subjective spheres is achieved.… The subjective sphere is threatened not only by other subjective spheres but by its own dissociability. It is threatened, more specifically, by affect generated by its own autonomous contents and processes. And yet affect is also the source of positive values.” Willeford argues that it is through a capacity to make “complex feeling judgements” that a subject maintains the integrity of his or her own subjective sphere and effects accommodations between it and other subjective spheres.

17. See Westcott, , Psychology of Intuition, and Bastick, Tony, Intuition (New York: John Wiley, 1982)Google Scholar, for discussions of intuitive capabilities; see also notes 18 and 27 below. See Hillman, James, “The Feeling Function,” in von Franz, M. L. and Hillman, , Lectures on Jung's Typology (Zurich: Spring, 1971), pp. 75–150Google Scholar, and Willeford, “Toward a Dynamic Concept,” for discussions of feeling capabilities. See also Davies, A. F., Skills, Outlooks and Passions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980)Google Scholar, especially the section on “the cultivation of affect” in the Conclusion. In addition, see note 20 below.

18. “Intuition” has many uses: Wild, K. documents 31 different conceptualizations in Intuition (London: Cambridge University Press, 1938)Google Scholar. Westcott, , Psychology of Intuition, pp. 5–53Google Scholar, identifies three traditions of meaning, Classical Intuitionism, Contemporary Intuitionism, and Inferential Intuitionism. This article falls into the Inferential tradition. Classical Intuitionism presents intuition “as a special kind of contact with prime reality, producing a sense of ultimate unity, true beauty, perfect certainty, and blessedness.” From this standpoint, “intuition stands alone as the high road to the highest and most perfect truth, directly and immediately apprehended” (p. 22). Westcott locates Bergson, Spinoza, and Croce in the classical tradition. The Contemporary tradition “sees intuition as the immediate apprehension of limited basic truths, which are applicable to the problems of the intellect.… [These] truths are the elementary and basic truths of deductive logic, of mathematical axioms, of causality, and so on… While they are to be taken as truths which may be applied and used in terms of the intellect, this position is moderated by a tendency to withdraw altogether from the question of absolute truth. Instead, the idea of ‘justifiable belief is substituted…” (p. 22). Westcott locates Ewing, Stocks, and Bahm in the contemporary tradition. The Inferential tradition rejects both immediate apprehension and fundamental, certain truth. Intuition is a form of inference behavior based on inexact and obscure data. They are combined rapidly, leading to plausible and accurate conclusions; but the subject cannot specify how these conclusions were reached. The notion of data, information, cues, or evidence is central to this conception of intuition. Wescott locates most contemporary psychologists interested in intuition, from C. G. Jung onward, in this tradition. I use the term intuition broadly enough to include both Westcott and Jung. For Westcott, intuition means “reaching conclusions [that are accurate] on the basis of little information which are ordinarily reached on the basis of significantly more information” (p. 71). Jung emphasizes the capacity to perceive possibilities, implications, principles, and totalities; see Jung, C. G., Psychological Types (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971)Google Scholar, and Analytical Psychology (New York: Vintage, 1968)Google Scholar. It is Jung's extroverted, as opposed to introverted, intuition that is of special relevance to me. Extroverted intuition focuses on the principles and potential of external events-social, political, and business interactions-as opposed to the principles and potential of the inner life. Jung and Westcott agree that the ability to act intuitively is a virtue in situations in which explicit information is inadequate and ordinary logics do not apply. Furthermore, there are important individual differences in the capacity to act intuitively (see note 27 below). On the cultivation of intuition, see Mogar, Robert E., “Toward a Psychological Theory of Education,” Journal of Humanistic Psychology 9 (Spring 1969), pp. 17–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Westcott, Psychology of Intuition; and Bastick, Intuition.

19. See Hillman, , “The Feeling Function,” and Emotion (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960)Google Scholar; Willeford, “Toward a Dynamic Concept”; and Davies, Skills, Outlooks, and Passions. The abilities psychologists study under the heading of “skill in social perception” would probably also be relevant here. See Westcott, , Psychology of Intuition, pp. 46–48, 55–65Google Scholar.

20. In the business world, the appropriate term would probably be manager. See Mintzberg, “Planning on the Left Side”; Skinner and Sasser, “Managers with Impact”; and Wrapp, H. Edward, “Good Managers Don't Make Policy Decisions,” Harvard Business Review 45 (09–10 1967), pp. 91–99Google Scholar.

21. See Hillman, “The Feeling Function”; Willeford, “Toward a Dynamic Concept”; Mogar, “Toward a Psychological Theory”; and Davies, Skills, Outlooks and Passions. All of these writers distinguish between affect and passion, on the one hand, and the ability to make complex feeling judgments, on the other. See also Hillman, Emotion.

22. Kinder, and Weiss, , “In Lieu of Rationality,” p. 723Google Scholar; Betts, Richard K., “Analysis, War, and Decision,” World Politics 31 (10 1978), p. 69CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jervis, , Perception and Misperception, p. 3Google Scholar.

23. Kinder, and Weiss, , “In Lieu of Rationality,” p. 725Google Scholar.

24. Cybernetic Theory, p. 18.

25. The same might be said of the decision makers that Etheredge, in A World of Men, studied. On the basis of a questionnaire study of 229 mid-level Foreign Service Officers, military officers, and domestic-policy specialists, he concludes that intuitive responses to ambiguous and uncertain decision situations are important sources of decisional error, and prescribes an increased commitment to rationality and hard facts. At the end of his study, however, Etheredge steps back from this narrowly rationalistic conception of intuition and asserts that the important question is “how to free a decision maker to bring all of his potential capabilities to bear on an issue, how to make empathy and intuition flexible rather than, as at present, locking in a man and restricting his processes of judgment and intuition” (p. 107).

26. Cybernetic Theory, p. 340; Jervis, , Perception and Misperception, pp. 217–87Google Scholar.

27. On the basis of problem-solving tasks presented to eleven different samples of collegeage subjects, Westcott found that individuals could be differentiated along two independent dimensions: the amount of information they required before attempting solutions to problems, and the success they had in solving the problems. Four extreme kinds of problem solvers were identifiable-the intuitive thinkers, who reached accurate conclusions on the basis of significantly less information than others required; the wild guessers, those who required very little information exposure before attempting to reach conclusions but who were singularly inaccurate in their conclusions; the careful, successful problem solvers, those who demanded a great deal of information and were highly successful in using it; and the cautious, careful failures, those who demanded excessive information but failed to use it adequately. Westcott concludedthat intuitive thinking (the ability to make maximum use of minimum information) is a valuable asset in situations in which adequate explicit information is just not available. See Westcott, , Psychology of Intuition1, pp. 100–148Google Scholar.

28. Betts, , “Analysis, War, and Decision,” p. 69Google Scholar.

29. Perception and Misperception, p. 181.

30. Ibid., p. 113; Kinder and Weiss, “In Lieu of Rationality,” p. 725.

31. Perception and Misperception, p. 178.

32. Ibid., pp. 178–79.

33. Ibid., p. 181.

34. Ibid., p. 415.

35. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge.

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38. Ibid., p. 409.

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51. Ibid., p. 166.

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