¹ Merelman, Richard M., “Learning and Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review, 09 1966 (Vol. 60, No. 3), pp. 548–561Google Scholar.

² See Easton, David, A Systems Analysis of Political life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965) for a general discussion of legitimacy and for the distinction between authorities and regimesGoogle Scholar.

³ Especially Easton, pp. 484–488.

⁴ Haas, Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950–1957 (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1958)Google Scholar and Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1964)Google Scholar; Claude, Inis L. Jr, “Collective Legitimisation as a Political Function of the United Nations,” International Organization, Summer 1966 (Vol. 20, No. 3), pp. 367–379Google Scholar, and The Changing United Nations (New York: Random House, 1967)Google Scholar.

⁵ Claude, , The Changing United Nations, p. 83Google Scholar.

⁶ This statement is admittedly only an impression that the author is unprepared to substantiate by citation of concrete evidence, the gathering of which might require surveying an enormous range of the literature on international organization. Had the refutation of the alleged assumption been central to this article, the task would clearly be necessary. However, our major concern here is the far more limited one of pointing to some of the costs of the “collective legitimisation” function revealed by the actions of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the Dominican Republic.

⁷ The following analyses are mostly drawn from the author's book, The OAS and United States Foreign Policy (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967) although some new material is includedGoogle Scholar.

⁸ Whitaker, Arthur P., The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1954)Google Scholar.

₉ The sense of political community may be described as a we-feeling among a group of people, not that they are just a group but that they are a political entity that works together and will likely share a common political fate and destiny. (Easton, p. 332.)

¹⁰ See O'Lcary's, Michael essay, “The Nature of the Inter-American System,” in Gregg, Robert (ed.), International Organization in the Western Hemisphere (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 1968), pp. 157–177, for a sophisticated analysis of the Western Hemisphere Idea stressing its continued operational significanceGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ “Support” is used here in Easton's sense, i.e., approval given for expediendal reasons (the production of approved outputs) as well as because of the perceived legitimacy of the organization. As Easton notes, however, if the organization persistently meets its constituents' demands, eventually it acquires generalized legitimacy as well. That is, specific support stemming from self-interest spills over into diffuse support and to attachment to the system for its own sake. (Easton, pp. 343–344.)

¹² For OAS activities in the Dominican Republic in 1960–1963 see the author's article “The United States, the Organization of American States, and the Dominican Republic, 1961–1963,” International Organization, Spring 1964 (Vol. 18, No. 2), pp. 268–291Google Scholar; for the post–1965 period see below.

¹³ Although exceptions are made, as noted above.

¹⁴ See below for a discussion of the evidence for this assertion.

¹⁵ Cf. also the continuing popularity in Latin America of AréValo's, Juan JoséThe Shark, and the Sardines (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1961)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ For evidence see Chapter 4 of Slater, The OAS and United States Foreign Policy, as well as the discussion of the Dominican crisis below.

¹⁷ Cf. The New York Times of July 3, 1965, in which it was reported that El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras were critical of the United States for being too weak in its efforts to contain the Dominican revolution.

¹⁸ “First Report of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States” (OAS Document OEA/Ser.F/II.10 [Doc.47]), May 8, 1965.

¹⁹ “Acta de la Cuarta Sesion Plenaria” (OAS Document OEA/SerJF/II.io [Doc.42]), May 7–8, 1965, p. 15. (Author's translation.)

²⁰ E.g., President Raúl Leoni of Venezuela sent the following message to President Lyndon B. Johnson:

I was deeply disturbed at the news that… the armed forces of your country had landed on the territory of that sister Republic, in inexplicable disregard of the principles of the inter American system.…

See “Note No. OEA-00303, of April 29, 1965, Addressed to the Chairman of the Council of the Organization by the Representative of Venezuela, Presenting the Text of the Message Sent by the President of Venezuela to the President of the United States of America” (OAS Document OEA/Ser.G/V [C-d-1308]).

²¹ “Acta de la Cuarta Sesion de la Commission General” (OAS Document OEA/Ser.F/II.io [Doc.32]), May 3, 1965, p. 12. (Author's translation.)

²² The debates on the establishment of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) made it clear that a number of its supporters, particularly Costa Rica and Venezuela, expected it would be used positively to facilitate the return of democracy as well as negatively to prevent a Communist takeover in the Dominican Republic.

²³ “Acta de la Cuarta Sesion de la Commission General,” p. 12. (Author's translation.) Others taking roughly similar positions included the delegates of Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru.

²⁴ Time could hardly have been the crucial factor, for United States officials had been intensively considering the possibility of intervention from the first day of the revolution and yet had made no move to sound out the OAS; moreover, in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, where the Latin Americans were genuinely convinced of the need for strong action, approval of the United States blockade was forthcoming on the same day it was requested.

²⁵ Geyelin, Philip, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 254, quoting JohnsonGoogle Scholar.

²⁶ Evans, Rowland and Novak, Robert, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power (New York: New American Library, 1966), p. 517Google Scholar.

²⁷ See the resolution creating the IAPF in “Acta de la Sexta Sesion de la Comision General” (OAS Document OEA/Ser.F/II.io [Doc.40 Corr.]), May 5–6, 1965, pp. 2–4.

²⁸ Personal interviews. All interviews were on a not-for-attribution basis.

²⁹ Figueres, José, “Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Santo Domingo,” in Dominican Republic: a study in the new imperialism (New York: Institute for International Labor Research, 1965), pp. 43–56Google Scholar;personal interviews.

³⁰ Personal interviews.

³¹ For the resolution establishing the Special Committee see OAS Document OEA/Ser.F/II.10 Doc.11). The full title of the Committee is the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States. The markedly rightist nature of the Special Committee appeared to stem from the reluctance of more progressive states to become involved in the whole affair as well as the fact that the majority of Latin American governments in the OAS are conservative. There are some indications that the United States tried to get the neutral or even pro constitutionalist governments of Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, and Chile to serve on this or subsequent OAS bodies, but the author has no evidence on how hard Washington pressed the issue.

³² In the general literature on international organization peace observer and peacekeeping missions there seems to be an implicit assumption that whatever the environmental difficulties may be, such missions may be expected to be at least competent and impartial. The activities of the Special Committee would seem to demonstrate that such a presumption is not always warranted.

³³ Another reason for the Special Committee's resignation, however, may have been the traditional Latin American reluctance to become involved on the side of the United States against another Latin nation. There is evidence that the Committee feared having to take a decision which would place Latin American contingents of the IAPF on the firing line, risking a situation in which they might be forced to join with United States troops in shooting Dominicans.

³⁴ A nice indication of the general irrelevance of the Special Committee to the unfolding events in the Dominican Republic was provided when on May 2 the State Department told the United States embassy in Santo Domingo to ask the Special Committee, which had been charged with maintaining a cease-fire and, by implication, the military status quo, for “permission” to extend United States lines across the entire city of Santo Domingo. The Department's instructions added, however, that if the Special Committee refused, the action (which was highly significant since it had the intended effect of bottling up the constitutionalists with their backs to the sea) was to be taken anyway The Committee, however, agreed to the United States action, despite its mandate.

³⁵ The surprisingly large vote—only Chile opposed—stemmed from the feeling in the Organization that a failure to reestablish an OAS presence in the Dominican Republic would be an utter abdication of responsibility. Moreover, the Mora mission was generally understood to be only a temporary stopgap until agreement could be reached on a new nation-state commission. See OAS Document OEA/Ser.- F/II.10 (Doc.87), May 20–21, 1965.

³⁶ A right-wing junta under the leadership of General Imbert had been set up in early May by United States officials, acting, incidentally, completely independently of the Special Committee.

³⁷ OAS Document OEA/Ser.F/II.10 (Doc.109), May 30, 1965, p. 6. (Author's translation.)

³⁸ Ironically, Imbert soon joined the constitutionalists in attacking Mora, an indicator, perhaps, of the success of the Secretary General's effort to act impartially.

³⁹ In Mora's own eyes his role was of crucial importance not merely in salvaging the prestige of the OAS as a whole but in providing an opportunity to expand and make more useful the powers of the Secretary General, as Dag Hammarskjöld had done in UN peacekeeping crises.

⁴⁰ This body was formally known as the Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States.

⁴¹ In the course of his research the author was given access to a number of private papers, documents, and memoirs which unfortunately cannot be specifically cited. With that single exception no strings whatever were attached to the use of those materials, and this article has not been submitted for prior clearance to any government official. Hereinafter, whenever an un attributed statement derived from access to these materials is made, normally introduced with the phrase “there is evidence that…,” there will be no footnote. This procedure will not be followed unless the source is unquestionably accurate and reliable.

⁴² Other factors such as the UN presence and the skeptical reporting of the major United States newspapers undoubtedly also helped modify Washington's policies. Although it is very difficult to know what weight to assign each factor, the author's talks with United States officials have left him with the impression that the involvement of the OAS was probably the most important element over the entire duration of the crisis.

⁴³ Martin, John Bardow, Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1966), pp. 658–660Google Scholar; personal interviews.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 661–662.

⁴⁵ The author says “apparently” because he has no systematic data on the attitudes of the general Dominican public toward the OAS. Among the more articulate and therefore more relevant sectors, however, anti-OAS statements were widespread, frequent, and vehement.

⁴⁶ By contrast, the relatively unimportant UN observation team was very popular in the constitutionalist zone, frequently being greeted with cries of “UN si, OEA no.”

⁴⁷ Jottin Cury, foreign minister of the constitutionalist government: “Since that moment [the creation of the IAPF] it has not been possible to distinguish between the interventionists and the OAS.” (OAS Document OEA/Ser.F/lI.10 [Doc.100.], p. 3. Author's translation.)

⁴⁸ The chairman of the Special Committee reportedly personally favored military action against the constitutionalists, which perhaps accounts for the remarkable failure of the Special Committee to even call upon the Imbert junta to adhere to the cease-fire that the OAS itself had negotiated.

⁴⁹ The author's own research, however, indicates that IAPF reactions were probably not intended to have political side effects although it was recognized by United States officials that they did.

⁵⁰ In the ensuing section the United States component is included in references to the role of “the OAS,” whereas earlier, in the analysis of the impact of the OAS, only the distinctly Latin American input was dealt with.

⁵¹ Imbert government note to the OAS, contained in OAS Document OEA/Ser.F/II.io (Doc.202), June 26, 1965, p. 2.

⁵² On a number of occasions constitutionalist officials told the United States embassy that no matter what they said publicly, they wanted the IAPF to remain in the country for an extended period.

⁵³ The Human Rights Commission, though an OAS body, was very popular in the Dominican Republic, perhaps in part because the Commission took pains to distinguish itself from other OAS institutions by, for example, not flying the OAS flag.

⁵⁴ See the various reports of the Commission to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers; and Schreiber, Anna P. and Schreiber, Philippe S. E., “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Dominican Crisis,” International Organization, Spring 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 2), pp. 508–528Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ OAS Document OEA/Ser.F/II.io (Doc.278), August 6, 1965.

⁵⁶ Although there was probably some military intimidation in the countryside, a great number of independent observers, most of them pro-Bosch in their sympathies, certified that the elections were remarkably free and fair and that the surprising Balaguer victory was genuine.

⁵⁷ Despite Bosch's bitterly anti–American campaign and his repeated demands for the immediate withdrawal of the IAPF he privately let it be known that if he won the elections he would want the Force to remain in the Dominican Republic for at least eighteen months.

⁵⁸ As Joseph Nye of Harvard University has suggested to this writer, United States officials may also seek multilateral endorsements to convince themselves or the general public of the legitimacy of their policies. The author has no systematic data on United States decisionmaker or public perceptions on the role of the OAS in the Dominican crisis, but it seems that a good many officials and much American writing took the same generally jaundiced view of the OAS as did the Dominicans and the Latin Americans. In any event, as argued earlier, the low saliency of inter-American affairs for the United States general public ensures that it is attitudes in, first of all, the host country of the operation and, secondly, Latin America as a whole, that are the main targets for collective legitimisation efforts.

⁵⁹ See OAS Document OEA/Ser.E/XIII (Doc.83), November 22, 1967, p. 7 (Second Special Inter American Conference).

⁶⁰ Quoted in the Dominican newspaper, Listin Diario, 07 4, 1968Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Alba, Victor, Los Sumergidos (Mexico City: B. Costa-Amic, 1965), p. 79Google Scholar. Also, for whatever anecdotes are worth, at a recent conference in the Caribbean a paper emphasizing United States hegemony in Latin America and the uselessness of the OAS was enthusiastically praised by most Latin Americans present. Sample:

The presence of a hegemonies power… dominated the political, social and economic lives of its weak neighbours, which are… completely integrated into the United States sphere of influence. This factor transcends into the area's regional organizations which tend to become no more than a formalization of the United States sphere of influence and… a vehicle for the endorsement and legalization of United States actions in the hemisphere.

(Unpublished paper by Pillar Caldron, presented at a conference at die University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica.)

⁶² Even before the Dominican crisis, however, there was a growing Latin American tendency to turn to the UN as a counterweight to the OAS. See Yalem, Ronald, Regionalism and World Order (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965)Google Scholar; Wood, Bryce and Minerva, Morales M “Latin America and the United Nations,” in Padelford, Norman J. and Goodrich, Leland M. (ed.), The United Nations in the Balance: Accomplishments and Prospects (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 350–363Google Scholar.

⁶³ Security Council Official Records (20th year), 1221st meeting, 06 7, 1965, pp. 8–9Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ For another analysis see Dreier, John C., “New Wine and Old Bottles: The Changing Inter-American System,” International Organization, Spring 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 2), pp. 477–493Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ For a discussion of the resolution quoted in the text see Slater, , The OAS and United States Foreign Policy, Chapter 5, especially pp. 186–189Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ Also, there are indications that the willingness of Galo Plaza to accept the position of Secretary General of the OAS reflects his assessment that the office need not be invariably confined to administrative matters.

⁶⁷ For a similar thought see O'Leary. This notion, of course, is subject to the same criticisms as the general functionalist argument from which it is drawn; hence the cautious wording.

⁶⁸ Cf. Merelman, p. 554.

When policy-makers choose to attach symbols of legitimacy to policies they wish learned, accepted and implemented, they make a major investment. If die policy fails, it is likely diet the legitimacy symbol will also become less useful.