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International organization and the theory of property rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

John A. C. Conybeare
John A. C. Conybeare
Affiliation:
Lecturer in Public Policy at the Australian Graduate School of Management, University of New South Wales.
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Extract

A specter haunts the world's bureaucrats: the specter of small government. Skepticism about the expanding role of government in most industrial nations has encouraged political economists to go back to some fundamental questions about what we really need government to do for us, whether it be for reasons of efficiency or equity. The aim of this paper is to suggest that some of the theories attacking “big” government are equally applicable in the realm of international organization (IO).

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , Summer 1980 , pp. 307 - 334
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1980

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References

I would like to thank Robert Keohane and five anonymous reviewers for helpful advice leading to the revision of this paper.

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