I received helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay from Roger Hansen and Robert Rothstein. I alone, of course, am responsible for facts and interpretations.

¹ For example, a dominant effort of strategic analysis in the 1950s, it will be recalled, was to break out of the constraints of the no war/nuclear war dilemma and to develop additional options at the conventional, tactical, and limited strategic levels.

² The word approach is being used here advisedly to refer to something less than theory but more than typology. It conforms quite closely to Charles Pentland's definition of approach as a conceptual scheme that organizes the assumptions, data and language of research on a particular problem. See his International Theory and European Integration (New York: The Free Press, 1973), pp. 16–17. I will still refer to integration theory since this usage has become shorthand in the literature.Google Scholar

³ See Lindberg, Leon and Scheingold, Stuart (eds.), “Regional Integration: Theory and Research,” International Organization 24 (Autumn 1970); published under the same title by Harvard University Press, 1971.Google Scholar

⁴ Disintegrative outcomes could be incremental or step-level. Lindberg and Scheingold referred to the former as spill-back and the latter as output-failure. See Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A., Europe's Would-Be Polity (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 135–137. The declining utility of the integration approach is perhaps best marked by this attempt to account for disintegration. An approach that tries to account for both thesis and anti-thesis is likely to account for neither.Google Scholar

⁵ See his book reviewed in this essay, p. 86.Google Scholar

⁶ In an assessment of these events in early 1973, for example, Roger Hansen concluded that European integration has been “moving again” since the Hague Summit. But the pace has been halting, the direction ambiguous and the motives of at least one major actor—President Pompidou—ambivalent…. And nothing about the progress since 1969 would seem to conflict with the Lindberg-Scheingold judgment about the prospects for the European Community during the 1970s [namely a general tendency toward equilibrium well short of political amalgamation, legitimacy transfer or the degree of supranationalism originally expected].

See his review essay, “European Integration: Forward March, Parade Rest, or Dismissed,” International Organization 27 (Spring 1973): 225–254. Quote is from p. 247.Google Scholar

⁷ See his book reviewed in this essay, p. 7.

⁸ The books and this essay deal exclusively with integration and its sequel in Western Europe. Haas makes references to integration studies and experiences in developing regions but illustrates his new arguments in the context of the European Community (Chapter III). Moreover, none of the books deals with the enlargement issue, namely the negotiation and effects of British membership or the prospects of new members; accordingly, this issue is not covered in the above discussion.

⁹ While, in the case of industrial and energy policies, Haas and the Wallace volume appear to be treating the same issues, it is clear that Haas has something more novel in mind than the industrial and energy issues that might have been foreseen at the time the Rome Treaty was negotiated. See later discussion.

¹⁰ For an earlier thoughtful comparison of integration and interdependence perspectives, see Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. Jr, “International Interdependence and Integration,” in Fred I. Greenstein, and Polsby, Nelson W. (eds.), International Politics, Handbook of Political Science, Vol. I (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 363–415. Keohane and Nye emphasize the continuity between integration and interdependence perspectives. My discussion in this essay emphasizes the differences.Google Scholar

¹¹ Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 134Google Scholar. Her case studies reveal, for example, 1) the considerable influence of bureaucrats in Directorate General I (External Affairs), known as “preferentialists,” on the Community decision to adopt the generalized scheme of preferences vis-à-vis developing countries, 2) the strong role of Sicco Mansholt, Vice-President of the EEC Commission, in the Council's decision in 1971 to approve the new guidelines of the common agricultural policy, and 3) the behind-the-scenes influence of the monetary experts on the Werner Committee in gaining Council approval of monetary and economic union in February 1971.

¹² See, inter alia, Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, especially pp. 128–133.Google Scholar

¹³ She did interview national officials in the permanent delegations in Brussels but these officials frequently have different, usually more Community-oriented views than officials in the home capitals.

¹⁴ Tsoukalis, , op. cit., p. 110.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Haas, , op. cit., p. 6.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 22–23.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁹ The Commission did learn from its initial efforts and later, encouraged by the Paris and Copenhagen Summits (1972 and 1973), sought to present more “holistic” packages. The latter, however, were quickly unpackaged by the national governments. See ibid., pp. 60–62.

²⁰ See, for example, the classic rebuff to integration theory by Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus 95 (Summer 1966): 882–916.Google Scholar

²¹ Philippe Schmitter develops this idea of externalization in greatest detail. Since a customs union is inherently discriminatory toward non-member states, he argues that the latter will eventually resist integration compelling community members, regardless of their original intentions, to formulate common policies toward the outside. See his “Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International Integration,” International Organization 23 (Winter 1969): 161–166.Google Scholar

²² The decision to grant generalized preferences to developing countries in June 1971 represented an even earlier departure from this norm.

²³ Haas, , op. cit., p. 11.Google Scholar

²⁴ Ibid., p. 63.

²⁵ See pp. 66 and 65 respectively. Haas is drawing here self-consciously from Puchala's concordance system and Taylor's notion of the confederal phase of Community politics. See Puchala, Donald J., “Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration,” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. X (1971–1972): 267–287CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Paul, Taylor, “The Politics of the European Communities: the Confederal Phase,” World Politics XXVII (04 1975): 336–361.Google Scholar

²⁶ Tsoukalis, , op. cit., p. 14.Google Scholar

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 62–63.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 84.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 82–83.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 124.

³¹ Ibid., p. 125.

³² Ibid., p. 169.

³³ Ibid., p. 110.

³⁴ Wallace, , op. cit., p. 303.Google Scholar

³⁵ Ibid., p. 46.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 46–47.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 46.

³⁸ For example, as Tsoukalis explains (p. 62), the link between CAP and EMU was perceived by some as follows:Google Scholar

… the system of common agricultural prices would not survive for long if governments continued to resort to parity changes in order to correct external balances. Here was a typical example of the spill-over effect on which the whole neo-functionalist strategy so much relied. The adoption of a CAP would not only lead to common agricultural prices, but also to fixed intra-EEC exchange rates. This would enforce a closer coordination of economic policies on national governments and would ultimately lead to a complete monetary union.

What was not usually mentioned, as Tsoukalis points out, was the other alternative, namely col- lapse of the system of fixed exchange rates, or, as actually happened, the introduction and ad hoc adjustment of multiple exchange rates (the green dollar).

³⁹ Wallace, , op. cit., p. 310.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 85.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 267.

⁴² Ibid., p. 315. Haas is unsure about this point. He concludes that “evidence concerning the evolution of a collective stance vis-à-vis the outside world shows ambivalence and lack of consistency.” p. 67.Google Scholar

⁴³ Wallace, op. cit., p. 321.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Taylor, , “The Politics of the European Communities,” pp. 343 and 358–360.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Wallace, , op. cit., p. 18.Google ScholarPuchala gives perhaps the most vivid description (pp. 255–256) of this image in his case study of the implementation of a Community value added tax (VAT):Google Scholar

… the course and pace of the policy-making process on VAT were more directly affected by internal developments in the member states than by points of difference among them. That is, the delays occurred not so much at the intergovernmental as at the intragovernmental, or at least so it would seem.

⁴⁶ Wallace, op. cit., p. 309.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 24.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 316.

⁴⁹ Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 135.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Tsoukalis, , op. cit., p. 11.Google ScholarSee also his tentative conclusion on p. 175.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Haas, , op. cit., p. 18.Google Scholar

⁵² The explanation of system transformation (integration of several states into one) was, it will be recalled, the primary purpose of neofunctionalism and the principal corrective it applied to functionalism, which never dealt with the link between the technical (international organization) and the political (nation-state).

⁵³ Haas, op. cit., pp. 78–79.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 87–88.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 88.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 80.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 88–89.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 89. For a table and discussion of the range of institutionalized responses, see pp. 76–78.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 89.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 90.

⁶¹ Tsoukalis, , op. cit., pp. 28–30.Google Scholar

⁶² It is possible, of course, to define international organization in terms of centralized values or processes rather than institutions. The communications school of regional integration did the former, and the Wallace and Rosenthal studies reviewed here talk principally about processes. But one conies away from these studies knowing little that is unique about international organization or certainly wondering what the boundaries are between this subject and international politics.

⁶³ I do this despite the dangers of lumping together all integration analysts in one group and all interdependence analysts in another, and despite the fact that there is no opportunity in this essay to consider the range of literature necessary to support such generalizations. In fact, of course, there are many different variants of integration and interdependence approaches and there has been a gradual transition in analysis and analysts of these two approaches over the past two decades. Moreover, some current models of interdependence (e.g., Puchala's Concordance System) bear strong resemblance to earlier non-institutionally oriented models of integration, such as Deutsch's pluralistic security community. Despite all these difficulties, however, an overview is essential if we are to understand where we have come from and where we are going in the theoretical understanding of international organizations in world politics. Such an overview seeks to preserve, combine, and extend the best of both integration, especially early integration, and interdependence approaches.

⁶⁴ This is also the type of leadership being emphasized by Rosenthal with her focus primarily on Community officials.

⁶⁵ See Cox, Robert W., “The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organizations,” in International Organization: Politics and Process, Goodrich, Leland M. and Kay, David A. (eds.) (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), pp. 155–180. Quote is from p. 163.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See Lindberg, and Scheingold, , Europe's Would-BePolity, pp. 128–133.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ On the importance of intra-organizational variables in neofunctional perspectives, see Haas, Ernst B., Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1964).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ For discussions of leadership from an interdependence perspective, see Keohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), pp. 229–236Google Scholar and their article, “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” World Politics XXXVII (11 1974): 39–63.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ For example, Lindberg and Scheingold phrase the central question of their analysis as follows: “Once an enterprise like the European Community is launched, what accounts for its subsequent growth, stabilization, or decline?” See Europe's Would-Be Polity, p. v.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Only one article comes immediately to mind. See Walter, Yondorf, “Monnet and the Action Committee: The Formative Period of the European Communities,” International Organization XIX (1965): 885–912Google Scholar. In the category of memoirs, see “What Jean Monnet Wrought,” Foreign Affairs (04 1977): 630–635Google Scholar, a preview of Monnet's memoirs published in English in 1977 by Doubleday. for a more general effort to understand institutional origins, change and outcomes, including a piece by the writer of this essay on R&D institutions in Europe from 1955 to 1958, see Ruggie, John Gerard and Haas, Ernst B. (eds.), “International Responses to Technology,” International Organization 29 (Summer 1975).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷¹ An article on the International Energy Agency appears in this issue.

⁷² Hass, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, p. 33.Google Scholar

⁷³ For a suggestion along these lines, see Warnecke, Steven J., “The Study of the European Community: A Critical Appraisal,” in Research Resources: The European Community, monograph published by the Council for European Studies, New York, 09 1977.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Joseph Nye reminds us of this fact in another context. Countering the argument that the goal of non-proliferation is hopeless because the nuclear horse is out of the stable, that is, the knowledge is already available or will be quickly obtained, he notes that one can still affect the number of horses, which horses, and when these horses leave the barn. See Joseph Nye, , “Non-proliferation: A Long-Term Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 56 (04 1978): 602.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, p. 84.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ For this criticism, see Bernard, Mennis and Sauvant, Karl P., Emerging Forms of Transnational Community (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ The Wallace volume argues this point.

⁷⁸ For example, European integration studies treated at length the various transgovernmental and transnational actors (subsequently emphasized by interdependence studies), but did so in terms of horizontal interactions related vertically to policymaking in Brussels. See Ernst Haas, , The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1958).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Here I agree with Haas that integration theory remains relevant precisely where its institutional and ideological biases are appropriate rather than where it is shorn of these orientations. See text and footnote of his monograph, pp. 86–87.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See Morse, Edward L., “The Politics of Interdependence,” International Organization 23 (Spring 1969): 311–326.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Richard, Rosecrance et al. , “Wither Interdependence,” International Organization 31 (Summer 1977): 425–471.Google Scholar

⁸² A good example is contemporary U.S. capabilities in the energy area. The resources and ostensibly, a concerted policy effort are present but fundamental characteristics of U.S. institutions and politics seem to inhibit mobilization without either a superhuman leadership undertaking or a pressing external emergency.

⁸³ There is no intention here to lay this criticism on all interdependence studies indiscriminately. I am clearly encountering one of the risks of my oversimplified dichotomy between integration and interdependence studies (see note 63). But my purpose is not to review the interdependence literature but to assess the relationship of that literature to integration studies. For a more discriminatory review of recent interdependence literature, particularly the Keohane and Nye book, Power and Interdependence, see Holsti, Kal J., “A new international politics? Diplomacy in complex interdependence,” International Organization 32 (Spring 1978): 513–530.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸⁴ For a debate on the usefulness of global designs, see Tom, Farer, “The Greening of the Globe: A Preliminary Appraisal of the World Order Models Project (WOMP),” International Organization 31 (Winter 1977): 129–148Google Scholar; and Richard, Falk, “The World Order Models Project and its Critics: A Reply,” International Organization 32 (Spring 1978): 531–545.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Tsoukalis, op. cit., Table 2, p. 43. For additional data confirming these patterns for all nine of the common market countries, see Monthly External Trade Bulletin, Special Issue 1958–1976, published by the Statistical Office of the European Communities, 07 1977.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ See Katzenstein, Peter J., “International interdependence: Some long-term trends and recent changes,” International Organization 29 (Autumn 1975): 1033.Google Scholar The developing countries, of course, may be more insulated without being less vulnerable, which is a question of composition of trade and foreign and domestic alternatives to specific trade relationships.

⁸⁷ Richard, Rosecrance and Arthur, Stein, “Interdependence: Myth or Reality?,” World Politics XXVI (10 1973): 11.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Krasner, Stephen D., “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics XXVIII (04 1976): 330.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Haas, , The Obsolesence of Regional Integration Theory, p. 8.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Something more may be possible than simply counting new areas (scope) and new expansions (level) of institutional authority, such as was done in the case of Community institutions. See Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Policy, chap. 3. These variables for one set of institutions might be compared to similar variables for another set.

⁹¹ An excellent start in this direction is made by Katzenstein, Peter J., editor, “Between Power and Plenty: Foreign economic policies of advanced industrial states,” International Organization 31 (Autumn 1977).Google Scholar