¹ For an exploration of the role of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations in this issue area, see Miles, Edward, “Transnationalism in Space: Inner and Outer,” International Organization 25 (Summer 1971): 602–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Innis, Harold A., The Cod Fisheries (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1940).Google Scholar

² For a discussion of the international options, see Christy, Francis T. Jr., and Scott, Anthony, The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965 and 1972).Google Scholar

³ A good example of the conflict that can occur due to the almost instant flow of foreign information and the influence of the media is the recent controversy over automobile emission standards. On 22 March 1973 the Globe and Mail (Toronto) reported that the Canadian “Government has not announced its own recent decision [about auto emissions] because of the latest uncertainty in the United States about whether the planned 1975 air emission standards will in fact be adopted” (p. 2, col. 6). On 6 June 1973 the New York Times reported that the Environmental Protection Agency in the US had declared that “the 90% reduction of nitrogen oxides in auto emissions … is now unnecessary” (p. 23, col. 1). On 14 June the Toronto Star reported that “a mechanical engineering professor at the University of Toronto has stated that auto exhaust pollution presents no health hazard in Canada” (p. 14, col. 1). On 15 June the Globe and Mail (Toronto) reported that the Canadian “Environment Minister … now believes that, while Canada should follow the U.S. lead to toughen automobile emission standards for 1975, it is not necessary to adopt the even more stringent 1976 [nitrogen oxide] auto emissions standards planned by the U.S.” (p. 1, col. 2). While the Canadian research establishment is well manned with zoologists and biologists, it has apparently been short of physicians concerned with air pollution and its effects.

⁴ However, while some environmentalists may be radical, most Canadian radicals are not interested in the environment. Even the New Democratic party has not, since 1969, made much of the pollution question in the resolutions of its national conventions, instead laying greatest stress on employment and development issues on the one hand and on nationalism (coupled with socialism) in resource exports on the other. Neither the NDP's Waffle nor its trade union components are closely associated with environmental groups. Thomas Burton, in an interesting chapter on the three parties, also finds the federal Conservatives confining their platform to aspects of nationalism and continentalism. Of course, at the provincial level, where most pollution policy is in fact implemented, all three parties have acted almost indistinguishably. See Burton, Thomas L., Natural Resource Policy in Canada: Issues and Perspectives (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972).Google Scholar Burton's brief chronicle of the early days of the conservation movement in Canada can be supplemented by Scott, Anthony, Natural Resources: The Economics of Conservation, rev. ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973),Google Scholar chapter 3 and appendix.

⁵ One can only suppose that the strongly entrenched position, since 1917, of the Migratory Birds Protection Act in Canadian law is a consequence of its support not only by Canadian but also by American sportsmen, working through both national governments. (This act is believed by Indians to discriminate against their native rights, and has been the source of much friction.)

⁶ Of course, because multinational corporations are in a position to pick their foreign locations, they may influence local regulations by choosing or threatening to choose the jurisdiction with the softest standards. See Greenwood's contribution to this volume for remarks on oil refinery location. In general, see Wells, Louis T. Jr., “The Multinational Business Enterprise: What Kind of International Organization?,” International Organization 25 (Summer 1971): 447–64,CrossRefGoogle Scholar for the view that because centralized multinationals can transfer resources across national boundaries they constitute a serious threat to the freedom of action of local jurisdictions.

⁷ For a discussion and bibliography, see Maass, Arthur, “Conservation,” Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), vol. 3, pp. 271–79.Google Scholar

⁸ See Lower, Arthur Reginald M., The North American Assault on the Canadian Forest (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1938);Google Scholar and Innis, Harold A., “The Economics of Conservation,” Geographical Review 28 (1938): 137.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ There are almost no general discussions of the political aspects of agreements. Christy and Scott, The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries, and Crutchfield, James A. and Pontecorvo, Giulio, The Pacific Salmon Fisheries,(Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969),Google Scholar chapter 8, are both helpful. Johnson, Eleanor Barbara has completed a University of Washington Ph.D. dissertation, “The Regulation of International Fisheries” (1973),Google Scholar stressing the political role of scientificelites in international fishery organizations. There is an extensive legal literature on fisheries, including fisheries treaties.

¹⁰ The variety of jurisdiction situations is illustrated by west coast fisheries agreements. In the United States, the states of Oregon, Washington, and Alaska administer rules for fisheries, but in Canada the federal government has jurisdiction. Conversely, jurisdiction over levels and flows and over pollution around the Great Lakes is exercised more by the central government in the United States than in Canada.

¹¹ See Crutchfield and Pontecorvo. The banning of traps illustrates the point in the text, but these authors are, on economic grounds, critical of abandoning this efficient gear.