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Concerting Policies in the North Atlantic Community

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

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Extract

In the evolution of post-war international organization no problem, it can be argued, has moved with greater persistence into the foreground than that which focuses on the effort to devise common policies in the North Atlantic Community. Pressures to this end are both internal and external to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the one hand, the close military integration achieved by members impels them towards closer political integration. On the other hand, it is increasingly evident that NATO faces a threat which presents itself not only militarily but also politically through institutions and action programs reflecting a single political will. The effort to concert NATO policies is a reflection of the desirability and, in the opinion of many, the necessity of developing greater unity within the North Atlantic Community.

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Articles
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Copyright © The IO Foundation 1958

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References

1 NATO Letter, January I, 1957, Special Supplement (Vol. 5, Spec. Supp. to No. 1), p. 3.

2 Ibid., July 1957 (Vol. 5, No. 7), p. 4.

3 NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, Third Annual Conference, Resolutions and Reports of the Third Annual Conference of NATO Parliamentarians, 1957, p. 4.

4 NATO Letter, December 1957 (Vol. 5, No. 12), p. 5.

5 NATO Lettter, January 1, 1957, Special Supplement (Vol. 5, Spec. Supp. to No. 1), p. 7.

6 [United States] Department of State, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Meeting of Heads of Governments, Paris, December, 1957, Publication 6606, 1958, P. 33.

7 For review of the mood of the United States and Canadian governments, in particular, at the time the North Atlantic Treaty was concluded, see Padelford, Norman J., “Political Cooperation in the North Atlantic Community,” International Organization, 08 1955 (Vol. 9, No. 3), especially p. 356358CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 For chart of Council committee structure before this development, see Annex, B to Ismay's, Lord Report to the Ministerial Meeting of the Council, May 1957, NATO Letter, 06 1957, Special Supplement (Vol. 5, Spec. Supp. to No. 6)Google Scholar.

9 A chart of the organization of the Staff/Secretariat at this time is appended as Annex D to Lord Ismay's final report, loc, cit.

10 Ismay, Lord, NATO—The first Five Years, 1949–1954, 1954, p. 48Google Scholar.

11 Second Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO Countries, Verbatim Report, First Sitting. November 19, 1956, p. 32–35.

12 Consultation in the sense of voluntary discussion of common problems is inherent in the nature of NATO as an international organization and in the fact that the threat it faces is political as well as military. Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, on the other hand, makes consultation of signatories obligatory on the initiative of one whenever there is a threat to the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of a signatory.

13 See, for example, the opening sentence of the communiqué issued following the summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December 1957. [United States] Department of State, op. cit., p. 105.

14 Resolution 2, adopted at the ministerial meeting of the Council, December 15–17, 1952. For text see Ismay, Lord, op. cit., p. 194Google Scholar.

15 Recommendation II. Assembly of Western European Union, Proceedings, Third Session, First Part, May 1957. Vol. III, p. 36.

16 Recommendation 150. Council of Europe, Directorate of Information, Council of Europe News, Special Issue, November 1957, p. 5–6.

17 NATO Letter, 01 1, 1957, Special Supplement (Vol. 5, Spec. Supp. to No. 1), p. 5Google Scholar.

18 Ibid., p. 7.

19 Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, in writing perceptively of the nature of SHAPE as an integrated and international headquarters, has pointed out that it does not function like a committee composed of national delegates but that it is a “…single unified organization in which all officers, regardless of nationality,… [work] for the common mission.…” See his article, The Development of SHAPE: 1950–1953,” International Organization, 05 1955 (Vol. 9, No. 2), p. 258Google Scholar.

20 For an analysis of the increasingly political role of the Secretary-General of the UN, see Jackson, Elmore, “The Developing Role of the Secretary-General,” International Organization, Summer 1957 (Vol. 11, No. 3), p. 431 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 A resolution calling on the President to use his best efforts in cooperation with other governments to implement this recommendation was introduced jointly into the Senate and House of Representatives on February 13, 1958. The Senate resolution was sponsored by Senators Green, Javits, Jackson, Kefauver, and Salton-stall, all delegates to the 1957 Parliamentarians' Conference. In the House the resolution was introduced by Representative Wayne Hays, who served as president of the 1957 Conference.