Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-xtgtn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-19T15:33:25.658Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A Comment on ‘Rewarding Impatience’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 April 2006

Ben Goodrich
Ben Goodrich
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., goodrich@fas.harvard.edu
Get access

Extract

In Lisa Blaydes's article, “Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC,” (International Organization, Spring 2004), the oil production of members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) depends on the extent to which they discount future gains. This comment discusses computer-related errors in the original article and determines how the results change when the errors are rectified. I then add country fixed effects and some additional control variables to the corrected models.I would like to thank Lisa Blaydes for data and helpful discussions and to thank Jim Alt and Mike Kellerman for comments on previous drafts. All remaining errors are my own.

Type
Comment and Response
Information
International Organization , Volume 60 , Issue 2 , April 2006 , pp. 499 - 513
Copyright
© 2006 The IO Foundation and Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Alt, James E., Randall L. Calvert, and Brian D. Humes. 1988. Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis. American Political Science Review 82 (4):445–66.Google Scholar
Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathon N. Katz. 1995. What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series–Cross-Section Data. American Political Science Review 89 (3):634–47.Google Scholar
Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathon N. Katz. 1996. Nuisance vs. Substance: Specifying and Estimating Time-Series–Cross-Section Models. Political Analysis 6 (3):1–36.Google Scholar
Blaydes, Lisa. 2004. Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC. International Organization 58 (2):213–37.Google Scholar
Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder. 2006. Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses. Political Analysis 14 (1):63–82.Google Scholar
Braumoeller, Bear F. 2004. Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms. International Organization 58 (4):807–20.Google Scholar
Cheibub, Jose, and Jennifer Gandi. 2004. Classifying Political Regimes: A Sixfold Classification of Democracies and Dictatorships. Paper presented at the 100th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September. Available at 〈http://pantheon.yale.edu/∼jac236/〉. Accessed 22 December 2005.
Fearon, James D. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. International Organization 52 (2):269–305.Google Scholar
Franzese, Robert J., and Cindy Kam. 2005. Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analysis: A Brief Refresher and Some Practical Advice. Unpublished book manuscript, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Available at 〈http://www-personal.umich.edu/∼franzese/KamFranzese.Interactions.UMP.final.pdf〉. Accessed 22 December 2005.
Friedrich, Robert J. 1982. In Defense of Multiplicative Terms in Multiple Regression Equations. American Journal of Political Science 26 (4):797–833.Google Scholar
Goodrich, Ben. 2005. Problems with and Solutions for Two-Dimensional Models of Continuous Dependent Variables. Unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. Available at 〈http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/∼goodrich/Research/Methods/TSCS/〉. Accessed 22 December 2005.
Green, Donald P., Soo Yeon H. Kim, and David Yoon. 2001. Dirty Pool. International Organization 55 (2):441–68.Google Scholar
Kennedy, Peter. 1998. A Guide to Econometrics. 4th ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Kristensen, Ida Pagter, and Gregory Wawro. 2003. Lagging the Dog? The Robustness of Panel Corrected Standard Errors in the Presence of Serial Correlation and Observation Specific Effects. Paper presented at the 20th Annual Meeting of the Society for Political Methodology, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, July. Available at 〈http://polmeth.wustl.edu/retrieve.php?id=54〉. Accessed 22 December 2005.
Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.