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2. Zambia: A Country Study, American University Foreign Area Studies (Washington D.C., 1979), p. 189.Google Scholar

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4. Radetski, Marian, Mineral Processing in Developing Countries (New York: U.N. Industrial Development Organization, 1980), pp. 23–24.Google Scholar

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7. See, for example, Zaire: A Country Study, American University Foreign Area Studies (Washington, D.C., 1979), p. 187.Google Scholar

8. World Bank figures, for instance, indicate that between 1961 and 1976–78 (average) the percentage share of total exports accounted for by Zaire's top three exports (all minerals, topped by copper) increased from 52.0% to 91.1%. In Zambia, the increase was from 93.9% to 96.2%. World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (Washington, D.C., 1981), p. 156.Google Scholar

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11. This is not to suggest that the mining companies fulfilled these functions for reasons of charity. Indeed, in many ways the insulation provided was quite incidental to the corporations' interests. The issue here, however, is one of consequences.

12. World Bank, Accelerated Development, p. 9.Google Scholar

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15. For an excellent study of the “obsolescing bargain” in Chile, see Moran, Theodore, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).Google Scholar

16. Government holdings increased to 60% in 1978.

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25. Glusche, et al. , The Next Fifteen, p. xxixGoogle Scholar. Emphasis in original.

26. Tilton, , Future, p. 44.Google Scholar

27. Glusche, et al. , The Next Fifteen, p. xxvi.Google Scholar

28. Mezger, , Copper, pp. 216–17.Google Scholar

29. World Bank, Accelerated Development, p. 21Google Scholar. These figures clearly understate the size of the decline in Zaire's and Zambia's market share since they include South African-Namibian production, which increased rapidly throughout this period. Still, such figures are obviously open to alternative explanations, the simplest of which is that due to mismanagement, underinvestment, and deterioration of facilities, Zambian and Zairian mines were simply unable to maintain, let alone expand, production.

30. Vernon, Raymond, “State-owned Enterprises in Latin American Exports,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Business 21 (Summer 1981), p. 106.Google Scholar

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38. Tilton, , Future, p. 45Google Scholar. See, too, Bergsten, , “OPIC Authorization,” pp. 14–15Google Scholar; OECD, Interfutures (Brussels: OECD, 1979), pp. 153–57Google Scholar; and Jordan, Amos and Kilmarx, Robert, Strategic Mineral Dependence, Washington Papers 7:70 (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1979), pp. 30–31.Google Scholar

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42. Obidegwu, and Nziramasanga, , Copper and Zambia, p. 18.Google Scholar

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49. Markakis, and Curry, , “Budgetary Politics,” p. 403.Google Scholar

50. In fact, between 1966 and 1973 public sector employment accounted for 55% of all new employment in Zambia and by 1976 constituted fully 71% of all formal employment in the country, or 14.2% of the working age population: World Bank, Accelerated Development, pp. 17, 40–41Google Scholar. Thus, recurrent expenditure rose 39% from 405.8 million Kwacha in 1974 to 564.4 million Kwacha in 1977: Zambia: A Country Study, p. 263.

51. Cited in Gould, David, Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third World: The Case of Zaire (New York: Pergamon, 1980), pp. 32–33.Google Scholar

52. Cited in Ibid., p. xiii. This is Mobutu's own personal version of Proverbs 28:20: “He that maketh haste to be rich shall not be innocent.”

53. Even during the copper price boom years of 1970–74, public capital investment fared badly against competitors. While overall public spending during the period maintained an average level of 34% of GDP, public capital outlays declined steadily from 11% of GDP in 1970 to just 5.6% in 1974. Recurrent expenditures figures show the opposite trend: Markakis, and Curry, , “Budgetary Politics,” p. 411.Google Scholar

54. Mezger, , Copper, p. 232.Google Scholar

55. Zambia: A Country Study, p. 190.

56. U.S. House, Sub-Saharan Africa, pp. 11–12.Google Scholar

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58. Gertzel, Cherry, “Labour and the State: The Case of Zambia's Mineworkers' Union,” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 13 (11 1975), p. 293.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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60. Ibid., pp. 122–23 and Gertzel, , “Labour and the State,” p. 293.Google Scholar

61. Daniel, Philip, Africanization, Nationalization, and Inequality: Mining Labor and the Copperbelt in Zambian Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 94.Google Scholar

62. Ibid., p. 167.

63. Ibid. A similar pattern can be observed in the case of Zairianization. Ilunga Ilunkamba reports, for instance, that “‘Zairianization’ of the staff following nationalization dealt with administrative functions, without leading to any appreciable reduction in the total number of technicals. Thus the total complement of employees was increased, without regard to the efficiency of the operation.” “Copper, Technology and Dependence in Zaire: Towards the Demystification of the New White Magic,” Natural Resources Forum 4 (April 1980), p. 149.Google Scholar

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65. Ibid., p. 116.

66. In just 29 months, between August 1972 and January 1975, the Gini coefficient for wage distribution among copper industry workers (excluding senior staff) increased from 0.222 to 0.246. Ibid., p. 160.

67. Markakis and Curry note that “localization will undoubtably resolve some issues. But it may also reinforce the constraint posed by the Zambian middle class, which is the primary beneficiary of this process.” Expatriates have been replaced by Zambians with political clout who have been able to demand the continuation of many of the perquisites once used to induce expatriates to stay, such as near-free luxury housing, cars, insurance and pension plans, loans, personal servants, and even a “scarcity allowance.” “Budgetary Politics,” pp. 419–20.

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