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International debt and linkage strategies: some foreign-policy implications for the United States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Benjamin J. Cohen
Benjamin J. Cohen
Affiliation:
William L. Clayton Professor of International Economic Affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts.
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Abstract

The global debt problem influences the foreign-policy capabilities of the United States through its impact on the government's “linkage strategies” in foreign affairs. In some circumstances policy makers are forced to make connections between different policy instruments or issues that might not otherwise have been felt necessary; in others, opportunities for connections are created that might not otherwise have been felt possible. The Polish debt crisis of 1981–82, the Latin American debt crisis of 1982–83, and the IMF quota increase in 1983 are suggestive in this regard. Linkage strategies bred by the debt issue are more apt to be successful when the interest shared by the United States with other countries in avoiding default is reinforced by other shared economic or political interests. They will also be more successful to the extent that the government can supplement its own power resources by relating bank decisions to foreign-policy considerations. Power in such situations, however, is a wasting asset, even when employed indirectly through the intermediation of the IMF.

Type
Global Debt and National Policy
Information
International Organization , Volume 39 , Issue 4 , Autumn 1985 , pp. 699 - 727
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1985

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