The decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Slovak Republic v Achmea dealt a major blow to the predictability of the legal regime for the protection of foreign investments, whilst failing to offer a realistic, clear and sustainable solution for the protection of investments within the European single market. Commentators have mainly considered its implications from the perspective of the European Union or International Investment Law, and the potential conflict of regimes. This article offers a different approach, arguing that a reading of Achmea based on a moderate version of legal pluralism could adequately respond to the legitimate concerns about the case from both international and European legal perspectives. It is argued that the imprecision of the decision is in fact constructive ambiguity, allowing a sufficient margin of appreciation for all stakeholders and avoiding direct confrontation between the European and international legal orders. Recent developments, such as the innovative EU agreement for the termination of intra-EU BITs, point to new opportunities for ordering pluralism in the Achmea saga.

The relationship between EU citizenship and nationality is still defined by ‘linkage’ and ‘derivation’: national citizenship enjoys primacy over and conditions access to EU citizenship. However, because naturalisation decisions have a European dimension as well as a cross-border dimension, various commentators have questioned whether this primacy is desirable. This article examines alternative models of EU citizenship and argues that the answer is not to reconsider the criteria of ‘linkage’ and ‘derivation’, but to create some common EU rules on ‘access’ to national and EU citizenship. A particularly attractive solution is for rules on the grant of nationality to be guided by the idea of a ‘genuine link’. Reflecting on the Commission's recent report on investment citizenship within the EU and the debate it provoked, this article questions whether such shared rules can currently be adopted.

The Brussels I Recast Regulation entitles business actors to agree on which court(s) will have jurisdiction but restricts the effectiveness of such jurisdiction agreements to disputes ‘which have arisen, or which may arise, in connection with a particular legal relationship’. This article fills a gap in the academic literature by examining the content and implications of this necessary connection (proximity) between the claim and the legal relationship between the parties. First, it characterises claim proximity as a question of party autonomy by distinguishing it from the subject matter of the jurisdiction agreement, which is an issue of contract interpretation. Second, it scrutinises the foreseeability test which has been frequently used by the CJEU in order to determine claim proximity, highlighting its main operational aspects. Building on both theoretical considerations and some cases where the foreseeability test has been used by domestic courts, this article provides clarifications about the scope, the proper functioning and the limits of such a test in order to raise awareness regarding the difficulties that may arise in its use in court to determine claim proximity and therefore assess jurisdiction.

This article offers a critical assessment of the role of international human rights law in the regulation of genome editing. Given the rapid scientific developments in the field of genetics, it is important to explore the implications of the human rights framework for the research into and the clinical application of genome editing. The broader normative question is whether the existing human rights standards are sufficient to address the challenges posed by this new technology. It will be argued that while international human rights law does not prohibit genome editing, it imposes important restrictions upon it. However, existing human rights are arguably insufficient to regulate germline genome editing as there are significant loopholes in the protection of embryos. Nor do they fully address the wide-ranging implications of the new technology for society and humankind. It will be suggested that new standards are needed, ideally set out in a new international instrument and supported by an institutional framework, which address the specific challenges posed by this new technology.

This article examines the compatibility of the extraterritorial application of unilateral legislation with the project of international law. Focusing on two instruments, the Dodd-Frank Act passed by the United States Congress and intended to regulate the activities of US listed companies operating in the Congo and the EU conflict minerals legislation, the article challenges their underlying premises that revenues from natural resources perpetuate conflict and resulting human rights abuses. In so far as these instruments make no provision for meaningful participation by the foreign populations which are the objects of legislation, it is argued that there is a tension between these unilateral instruments and the basic premises of law-making in international law as a democratic enterprise centred around governmental representation. By exclusively directing sanctions and other disciplinary measures at rebels, both legislative instruments have the problematic effect of strengthening the exploitation of natural resources by kleptocratic regimes and undermining the right of populations in conflict zones to civil disobedience as an inescapable component of their right of self-determination.

In its Chagos Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the UK's detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from the colony of Mauritius on the eve of independence constituted a violation of customary international law (CIL). This article analyses the Court's approach to establishing the emergence and content of the right to self-determination in this frustrated case of decolonisation. It goes on to examine the argument that self-determination's peremptory character has decisive consequences in this specific context—a contention which found favour with several judges in their Separate Opinions. The article explores the extent to which the claims and counterclaims, made during the advisory proceedings, turned on countervailing readings of not only the key sources of custom but also of the principle of inter-temporal law. The final sections consider the significance of the Chagos Opinion for the Chagossians, both in relation to the Archipelago's resettlement and for their outstanding appeal in the UK courts (where the European Convention on Human Rights performs a pivotal role).

In many conflicts, aid organisations have to navigate the international humanitarian law requirement that parties to the conflict must consent to assistance. In non-international armed conflicts this often frustrates efforts to provide relief, as States refuse to grant consent in order to uphold their claims to sovereignty. Looking at the Syrian Civil War, this article suggests that the law of agency can offer a fresh perspective on the challenges posed by the requirement of consent to humanitarian assistance. It suggests that agency law can provide a legal explanation of seemingly political decisions and a de lege ferenda justification for assistance in instances where consent is either absent or provided by a non-State armed group.

International anticorruption treaties create an almost universal requirement that States sanction legal persons for the crime of foreign bribery. However, the vast majority of corporate foreign bribery cases are ‘settled’ between governments and firms. Analysing key anticorruption instruments and treaty body reports, it appears there is a dearth of express rules on settlements in international law but a qualified implicit endorsement of domestic settlement laws and practices. The international regime is investigated in terms of its move towards common standards for the use of settlements, and whether recommendations are consistent with stated objectives. The analysis discloses an irony: States and international organisations fail to clearly articulate their expectations on settlements, while calling for transparent, effective and predictable domestic settlement rules.

A key element of the right to self-determination is territorial integrity. This has usually been considered solely in relation to the territorial integrity of an existing State seeking to resist claims by peoples for the right to self-determination. Yet the Chagos Opinion by the International Court of Justice examines a different type of territorial integrity—that of the colonial territory itself. This article explores the consequence of the Court's view that the territorial integrity of the colonial territory is a matter of customary international law, and that any division, integration or other disruption of that colonial territory after December 1960 is unlawful, without the free and genuine consent of the people of the colonial territory. In particular this article seeks to explore what the Chagos Opinion means in terms of the territorial integrity of a colonial territory. It also examines the required conditions for ascertaining a free and genuine consent of the people of that territory, and the legal effects of not complying with them. There is also consideration of the implications for other situations from the clarification of customary international law in the Chagos Opinion, with a special focus on West Papua.

The ongoing development of diverse maritime autonomous vehicles for varied ocean activities—ranging from scientific research, security surveillance, transportation of goods, military purposes and commission of crimes—is prompting greater consideration of how existing legal frameworks accommodate these vehicles. This article brings together the core legal issues, as well as current developments in relation to commercial shipping, the law of naval warfare, and maritime security. This article captures how these issues are now being addressed and what other legal questions will likely emerge as the newest technology impacts on one of the oldest bodies of international law.

Once the ‘popular plaything of Realpolitiker’ the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus post the 1969 VCLT is often described as an objective rule by which, on grounds of equity and justice, a fundamental change of circumstances may be invoked as a ground for termination of a treaty. Yet recent practice from some States suggests that it is returning with a new livery. They point to an understanding that is premised on vital State interests––a view popular among scholars such as Erich Kaufmann at the beginning of the last century.

This article considers recent CJEU case law on the Brussels I Regulation. Two aspects of Article 7(1) (which applies to matters relating to a contract) are considered: the first is whether the contract must be between the parties to the case; the second is whether membership of an association should be regarded as constituting implied consent to be bound by decisions of the association so that jurisdiction to enforce them may be taken under Article 7(1). The article also discusses recent case law on who counts as a ‘consumer’ in terms of Article 17.

This article argues that the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) account of the customary law of environmental impact assessment (EIA) is incomplete. While acknowledging the role of the harm prevention principle in formulating the customary obligation to conduct EIAs, the ICJ has ignored the duty to cooperate, notwithstanding the latter duty's equally strong standing in international environmental law. Ignoring the duty to cooperate pushes the court towards a formal and sequential understanding of EIA, which undervalues the centrality of notice and consultation in EIA. In effect, viewed through the harm prevention lens alone, EIA is largely understood in instrumental and technical terms; whereas, if the duty to cooperate is brought back in, EIA's deliberative and ‘other-regarding’ nature is more clearly seen. This, in turn, recognises the normative and political role of EIA in structuring State interactions respecting environmental disputes.

In its August 2019 decision in Portillo Cáceres v Paraguay, the Human Rights Committee recognised, for the first time, the existence of a connection between environmental protection and the right to life with dignity. This is not only a landmark decision for the Committee but also represents the consolidation of a body of case law and practice from the three regional human rights courts and other UN human rights bodies which has developed over the last quarter of a century. It also shows the potential of two important and widely debated paragraphs in the newly adopted General Comment No. 36 on the Right to Life, which describe environmental degradation as both an enabler of threats and a direct threat to the right to life. Such potential has been confirmed in another landmark decision of the HRC—Teitiota v New Zealand, relating to climate change as threat to life. This article draws on Portillo Cáceres v Paraguay and Teitiota v New Zealand to analyse this wider field of practice in order to clarify the connection between the right to life and environmental protection, as recognised by the Committee, and considers its potential impact on future litigation.

Although fair trial guarantees have always been recognised as constituting an integral aspect of international arbitral proceedings, this has largely been viewed through the lens of civil procedure rather than as a matter of public law and human rights. This state of affairs has further been compounded by the confidential nature of arbitration and the relative scarcity of set aside (annulment) proceedings before the courts of the seat of arbitration on the grounds of unequal treatment, and before human rights bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights. Moreover, it has always been difficult to reconcile contractual freedom and the advantages offered by arbitration with equal treatment and fair trial claims. This article demonstrates the existence of a set of general principles concerning the meaning and content of equal treatment, which are consistent with its commercial (and civil procedure) and human rights dimensions. The basis of this conclusion is Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, as consistently interpreted and adapted by local laws and judgments, arbitral statutes and determinations by the European Court of Human Rights.

The treatment of third-country nationals (TCNs) under EU law falls far short of the EU's commitments to eliminate gender inequality and to ‘combat all kinds of domestic violence’. Not only does Article 13(2)(c) of the EU Citizens’ Directive, as interpreted by the CJEU in Secretary of State for the Home Department v NA, fail to ‘safeguard’ the rights of TCNs, it may also enable domestic violence. When presented with an opportunity to remedy its disadvantageous treatment of TCNs by fully ratifying the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (the Istanbul Convention), the Council of the EU chose instead to pursue a selective and partial ratification which leaves TCN victims without recourse to the very provisions designed to assist them. The European Parliament stated that it ‘regrets’ this approach, recommending instead ‘a broad EU accession … without any limitations’. This article's analysis of the EU Citizens’ Directive and Istanbul Convention supports this recommendation.