Taking a law-and-governance approach, this article addresses legal certainty in international human rights law as it applies to artificial intelligence (AI). After introducing key issues concerning legal certainty, a comparative analysis of AI law-and-governance initiatives at the international, regional and national levels is undertaken. The article argues that many initiatives contribute to increased legal certainty and can partially compensate for some of the shortcomings of the international human rights law framework, but that further clarification is badly needed. This is especially true for the responsibilities of private businesses which are developing AI and the corpus of human rights beyond privacy and data protection.

This article explores the role of international law in relation to the extension of arbitration agreements contained in contracts concluded by States (or State entities) with non-signatory State entities (or States). As contract-based arbitrations involving States or State entities are on the rise, identifying the legal framework governing which parties are covered by the relevant arbitration agreements is of practical importance. The analysis demonstrates that international law forms part of the relevant law, alongside other applicable laws including law of contract, law of the seat and transnational law, concerning the extension of arbitration agreements concluded by States or State entities to non-signatories. Previous analyses have neglected the role of international law by not distinguishing contract-based arbitrations involving private parties from contract-based arbitrations involving States or State entities. Public international law recognises that arbitration agreements can be extended to non-signatories on the basis of implied consent, or abuse of separate legal personality and estoppel. Therefore, foreign investors can rely on international law to extend arbitration agreements to non-signatories in arbitrations conducted under investment contracts concluded by States or State entities, even if the relevant domestic law is agnostic or hostile to this. This has significant legal, and practical, importance.

Cyberspace is now acknowledged not only as the newest domain of warfare, but also as a space vital to economic, educational and cultural development for all States. This thin consensus ignores the fundamental fact that the backbone of cyber infrastructure—submarine telecommunication cables—is not (for the large part) located within sovereign territorial jurisdiction. The radically increased reliance of States upon submarine data cables emphasises their vulnerability to damage by malicious acts, accidents, or natural phenomena. Faced with these problems, legal analysis has tended to identify gaps or deficiencies in the law, and propose the creation of new legal instruments. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it expands the frame of analysis to include deliberate damage to cables not only in peacetime but under the law of armed conflict. Second, rather than treating the legal framework as inherently deficient, it considers the extent to which existing rules and principles can be progressively developed, interpreted, or creatively applied to close perceived gaps. This article surveys the existing law specific to the protection of submarine cables and assesses how general principles of the law of the sea, State responsibility, the law on the use of force, and the law of armed conflict apply to this problem. It thus considers in turn the applicable ‘law of peace’, the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.

The article tests the claim of feminist scholars that concerns about gender have been marginalised in refugee law, by exploring the interpretation given to the concept of a ‘Particular Social Group’ set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention. It is argued that recent practice at the supranational level in the European Union has contributed to the deterioration of refugee protection standards for women seeking asylum from gender-based violence. However, the article demonstrates that a human rights-based approach to the interpretation of ‘Particular Social Group’, which is supported by extensive examples of good practice in individual Member States, has the potential to redress this.

General Comment 36 of the Human Rights Committee, adopted in 2018, asserts that ‘States parties engaged in acts of aggression as defined in international law, resulting in deprivation of life, violate ipso facto article 6 of the Covenant.’ One question about this claim is whether it reduces incentives for compliance with international humanitarian law for States and their agents—incentives provided through the principles of belligerent equality and combatant immunity. It is argued that it does not do so—such a worry about incentives is not a reason to reject the claim in General Comment 36. In the process, it can also be shown that, if accepted, this claim is interesting in another way: it entails, in effect, a duty on States to prosecute acts of aggression insofar as they entail killing, as they often will. This itself is doctrinally innovative. As to who is to be prosecuted, it is the political and military leadership of the State. It is their decision to wage war unlawfully that renders the killings arbitrary.

This article analyses what is widely known as the police powers exemption found in modern international investment agreements, with a focus on mega-regional trade and investment agreements. It explores its legal nature and requirements, the burden of proof and issues of compensation. In an attempt to curb (indirect) expropriation claims, the exemption carves out non-discriminatory regulatory measures from the scope of indirect expropriation and in such situations no compensation needs to be paid. It follows that, as a rule, foreign investors are not protected against the adverse economic effects of regulatory measures. The key question addressed is whether host States can increase the level of protection given to public welfare objectives through the use of this exemption without having to compensate investors for the measures taken. The article argues that, under the proportionality test embodied in the exemption, States can provide the level of protection that they desire without incurring a risk of liability as regards expropriation claims.

This article consists of a comparative study of the basic principles underlying the rules of jurisdiction in private international law in commercial cases in the law of the European Union, the United States and England. It considers the objectives which these rules seek to achieve (protection of the rights of the parties and respect for the interests of foreign States) and the extent to which these objectives are attained. It takes tort claims, especially in the field of products-liability, as an example and considers which system has the most exorbitant rules. It suggests explanations for the differences found.

This article makes a case for an international convention on expert determination (ED) and Dispute Boards (DBs) that would require its Contracting States to recognise agreements on ED/DBs and enforce ED/DB decisions. Whilst strong, the case for the convention may not be compelling as there are arguments against it. But at least the time has come for the international legal community to start thinking about and debating the need for such an international regime. This article takes the first step towards imagining this international regime by evaluating a number of key issues relating to its scope of application.

States hold international human rights obligations to protect rights-holders from infringements by third parties and to fulfil access to rights. States also increasingly rely on businesses to provide essential human rights resources, including for housing, food, and healthcare. How these obligations apply where States rely on businesses has not been adequately conceptualised, particularly regarding the scope of business infringements in this context, and how the obligation to fulfil relates to market regulation. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has not directly addressed these questions, but recent General Comments develop ambitious regulatory obligations in this area. However, their methodology is questionable, often collapsing the distinction between obligations to protect and to fulfil. This article reconstructs the obligations to provide distinct content under each. It delineates State duties to protect from profiteering and to fulfil human rights through market regulation. It concludes by arguing that this reconstruction may challenge central aspects of globalised capitalism based on the human rights harm inherent therein.

The recent Representative Actions Directive 2020/1828/EC is a welcome advance in developing collective redress in Europe. However, this article contends that whilst the Directive is a positive development, shortfalls in its design restrict its potentially transformative impact for consumers. Critical examination is made of the Directive's rules on scope, standing, remedies, alternative dispute resolution (ADR), cross-border claims, funding, awareness and the provision of information. The article further considers whether the Directive will serve to improve co-ordination in civil procedure in this area which has traditionally been very diverse at a Member State level.

The UN Human Rights Committee's finding in Teitiota v New Zealand has garnered widespread global attention for its recognition that the effects of climate change may put people's lives at risk or expose them to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, thus triggering States’ non-refoulement obligations. However, a secondary—and highly problematic—consequence of the decision has been its confusing and misplaced focus on ‘imminence’ of harm. This reflects a concerning, albeit uneven, trend in human rights cases generally (and cases concerning climate change and human rights, in particular) to recognize violations only where rights are immediately threatened. This short article reflects on the assumptions that Teitiota has triggered about the place of imminence in international protection claims, identifies the source of confusion, and suggests a more appropriate framework to guide a category of case that is likely to become the subject of intense litigation in the future.

FS Cairo (Nile Plaza) LLC v Brownlie (Brownlie II) is arguably the United Kingdom's highest appellate court's most significant decision this century on a private international law question. The judgment has ended nearly two decades of debate about the meaning of ‘damage’ sustained in England for the purpose of paragraph 3.1(9)(a) of Practice Direction 6B of the Civil Procedure Rules. In a four-to-one majority ruling, the Supreme Court decided that the provision was to be interpreted widely, such that, in a personal injury claim, any significant harm of any kind suffered by a claimant in England could provide a basis for the service of proceedings on a foreign-based defendant. The article is critical of the majority's decision, as it is liable to create both immediate and long-term problems in the context of the service-out jurisdiction in England. It also examines the court's pronouncements on the other question before it concerning proof of foreign law.

The two-step methodology for the identification of general principles of law deriving from domestic legal systems, consisting of a comparative analysis followed by a transposability test, seems accepted as the undisputed methodology in the current work of the International Law Commission on the topic. This article examines whether this two-step approach finds reflection in the practice of and before the PCIJ/ICJ and in international legal scholarship. The analysis finds that judicial practice does not entirely follow these two steps, but the method is widely upheld in doctrinal writing. The article argues that the decision to codify this two-step methodology can be viewed as progressive development by the Commission, and may signify the crystallization of this method of identification of general principles of law.

In September 2021, the French Cour de Cassation reversed the annulment that the Paris Cour d'appel earlier had granted in regard to an arbitral award in Alexander Brothers v Alstom on grounds of corruption. This brought French courts in line with their English counterparts, at least in that one case, the latter having accepted the Alexander Brothers award as enforceable. Noteworthy beyond the welcome consistency that the recent French judgment imparts in one case, that and other recent judgments cast light on several issues in international arbitration, including the arbitrability of allegations of fraud or corruption, the relevance of evidence of corruption ‘downstream’ from a contract, and the legal effects (if any) on third parties of internal compliance regimes that enterprises adopt in response to national regulatory and enforcement actions in respect of corruption.

Under the International Health Regulations (IHR), States must consider decision-making criteria in applying travel restrictions during a public health emergency of international concern. Interpretation on the legal parameters of such restrictions varies widely. This article considers whether and how the permissibility of travel restrictions under the IHR may have changed given recent developments, including evolving scientific evidence about their efficacy and shifting World Health Organization (WHO) advice. It is argued that such determinations must conform to the principles of necessity and proportionality as articulated by the IHR, and must also be accompanied by the correlative IHR duties of collaboration and assistance rooted substantively in global solidarity.

With the constant flow of data across jurisdictions, issues regarding conflicting laws and the protection of rights arise. This article considers the EU–US data transfer relationship in the aftermath of the decision in Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland and Maximillian Schrems where the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) invalidated an EU–US data transfer agreement for the second time in just five years. This judgment continues the line of cases emphasising the high value the Court places on securing EU personal data in accordance with EU data protection standards and fundamental rights. This article assesses the implications of the ruling for the vulnerable EU–US data transfer relationship.