In 1991 the United Kingdom became a Party to the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, one of the purposes of which is “to improve international co-operation in the suppression of illicit traffic by sea”.1 Article 17 of that Convention has, as its central purpose, the establishment of international standards, procedures and practices designed to facilitate the obtaining of enforcement jurisdiction whereas Article 4 addresses the closely associated issue of prescriptive jurisdiction.2 The Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1999 contains a number of provisions of relevance in this latter context. These include the taking of extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain drugs offences taking place on board the vessels of other Convention parties.3

The use of force has been prohibited in international relations since at least the United Nations Charter, 1945. Article 2 (4) of the Charter states:

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the United Nations.

Meeting British lawyers and participating in a comparative reflection on our legal systems has for me a history that goes back to 1966. In 1966 I participated, in London, in the first meeting of British and French administrative lawyers. Among the participants were Nicole Questiaux and Neville Brown; there was also the late President Letourneur, who was a forerunner in the development of the relations of French Administrative lawyers with British lawyers, at a time where these relations were very far from being as extensive as they are today. If I look back to this long period, I think that important progress has been made towards a better mutual understanding of our legal systems. My concern in this paper is with the dynamics and direction of the interactions which the Conseil d'État has had with other legal systems.

In October 1998, at the height of the Monicagate scandal, the publication by the French publisher Plon of a novel which recounts the adulterous relationship in the 1960s between a politician bearing a marked resemblance to Francois Mitterrand, and a journalist, provided an interesting comparison between the attitudes of the French and of the Americans to the romantic dalliances of their respective leaders. For Jeanne Dautun's work of fiction Un ami d'autrefois is most certainly no Monica's Story, and French reactions to their President's lengthy extra-marital relationship with Anne Pingeot have been at the very least understanding, if not even compassionate. In France, the small gathering of graveside mourners amongst whom Mitterrand's mistress and illegitimate daughter Mazarine took their places shocked no-one, although many an eyebrow was raised in the United States. In truth, Mitterrand manipulated the release of information about his private life all along the line, “coming clean” only progressively with his approaching death. Although the general public knew nothing of his double life, journalists had been very much aware of the existence of this second family for a great many years, but had revealed nothing. The respect of his privacy in this relationship and the reactions of fellow French politicians to his unashamed infidelity contrast sharply with the fate reserved for Bill Clinton, the indiscretions of his private life exposed in the nation's press for all to enjoy. We may ask ourselves if French journalists are perhaps more gentlemanly, less cut-throat than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. Or are the cliches which describe latins as inveterate romantics and lovers true after all? Or are these irrational judgments supported by powerful French legislation protecting the individual's right to privacy? This article aims to examine the main texts relating to infringements of privacy in France, highlighting in particular those committed by the press against public figures and celebrities.

The recent judgment of the Corte di cassazione, Italy's highest appeal court in civil and criminal matters, in the so-called “jeans rape case” has caused much controversy and attracted much media attention both in Italy and abroad. The Corte di cassazione has been showered with criticism for purportedly establishing a “jeans alibi”, according to which a woman cannot be raped if she is wearing jeans as she must have consented to their removal. However, this judgment is of significance not merely for this statement but because it is particularly demonstrative of the difficulties faced by the Corte di cassazione in separating law from fact in an appeal on the grounds of illogicality of the reasoning given by the lower court. The Corte has been subject to academic criticism recently for exceeding its competence to review on a question of law and entering into the realm of the merits, criticism which this judgment has undoubtedly fuelled. The aim of this article is to explore the nature of the Corte di cassazione and, in providing a critical analysis of the “jeans rape” judgment, to examine the difficulties inherent within this particular ground of appeal.

British cases used to be widely relied upon to show that courts were entitled to hear criminal proceedings against defendants brought before them without having to enquire into the process by which custody over them had been obtained: and specifically, that there was no bar to proceeding where the allegation was made that custody had been obtained in breach of international law.1 The consistency of the doctrine was breached by Mackeson2 when the English court refused to hear the case against a defendant who, it accepted, had been brought to England by a collusive process between the English and Zimbabwean authorities, which arguably breached both national laws, even if it did not involve a breach of international law. While the previous orthodoxy soon reasserted itself in Driver,3 the edifice of authority was substantially undermined in Bennett4 when the House of Lords acceded to the claim of the applicant that proceedings against him would be an abuse of process, given the circumstances in which his presence in the United Kingdom had been achieved. Outside the United Kingdom, the practice in other States continued in different directions, sometimes confirming the old position of male captus, bene detentus,5 sometimes the reverse.6

This memorandum is submitted in response to a request from the Foreign Affairs Committee in connection with its hearings on the NATO intervention in Kosovo in March 1999. The memorandum addresses the following issues of international law:

(1) Was the resort to force by NATO consistent with international law? and

(2) Were the means employed by NATO, once the decision to use force had been taken, consistent with international law?

On 27 July 1999 a UK Act was passed to “make provision for giving effect to the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of Intercountry Adoption concluded at the Hague on 29 May 1993” and “to make further provision in relation to adoptions with an international element”.1 At the time of writing, however, the UK had not ratified the Convention. By section. 18(3) the Act will be brought into force on a date appointed by statutory instrument.

Since the last note on Current Developments in this area, the Amsterdam Treaty has entered into force on 1 May 1999, leading to a number of important developments in the legal system governing EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) law. In addition, the Court of Justice has clarified several aspects of the relationship between the first and third pillars.

[In 1999, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee invited a number of international lawyers to submit papers on the legal aspects of the Kosovo crisis. Papers were submitted by Professor Ian Brownlie QC, Professor Christine Chinkin, Professor Christopher Greenwood QC, Professor Vaughan Lowe, and Mark Littman QC. The three last-named answered questions on the issue at a session of the Committee held in February 2000.

The period under review (Spring 1998—Autumn 1999) is one in which the prohibition of cartels under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty figured prominently, the Court of Justice clearing up a backlog of unfinished business relating back, in some cases, over a decade. The 1986 Polypropylene cartel decision was finally put to bed with the Court of Justice dismissing a number of appeals raised on the sole ground of the non-existence of the decision. It also dismissed an appeal involving the 1989 Welded Steel Mesh cartel decision except that, in an important development, for the first time the Court expressly applied Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides a right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time before an impartial tribunal, and reduced a Commission fine (marginally, knocking 50,000 ECUs off a 3 million ECU fine) as “reasonable satisfaction” for the excessive duration of proceedings (five-and-a-half years) before the Court of First Instance. The Court of First Instance itself upheld on review the 1994 Commission decision in the Cartonboard cartel, leaving of major cartel cases only review of the Cement decision still outstanding.

The process of constitutional reform in the United Kingdom instituted by the present Labour government has been considerable but it has proceeded on a piecemeal basis. Its aim is to reinforce accountability for the exercise of public power but, in the absence of a comprehensive scheme of reform, the achievement of this ambition has the same lack of coherence as the reform programme itself. Some matters remain untouched by the process, centrally and crucially the domination of the House of Commons and therefore effectively the legislature, by the Executive, a condition exaggerated by the massive majority enjoyed by the government.1 The justification for this arrangement, which so infringes the separation of powers, lies in the claim that it produces effective, stable and accountable government. This is not the place to assess the accuracy of these claims but to note the importance of recognising the particular relationship between executive and legislature which characterises the British Constitution when considering the likely impact of proposals for its reform.

The participation of the Freedom Party in the Austrian government has given rise to exceptional reactions both in Austria and internationally. The imposition of a freeze in bilateral diplomatic relations by Austria's European Union partners has been particularly notable, amounting to an unprecedented response to the election of a new government in another Member State. This note seeks to describe the development of events and assess the status of the 14 Member States' actions under international law, in particular in the light of any developing norms concerning non-intervention, respect for human rights and the right to democratic governance.

One of the major activities of the European Community for achieving its objectives is to establish an internal market characterised by the abolition, as between member States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital.1