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A Feminist Interpretation of Hume on Testimony

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2020

Abstract

Hume is usually taken to have an evidentialist account of testimonial belief: one is justified in believing what someone says if one has empirical evidence that they have been reliable in the past. This account is impartialist: such evidence is required no matter who the person is, or what relations she may have to you. I, however, argue that Hume has another account of testimony, one grounded in sympathy. This account is partialist, in that empirical evidence is not required in order for one to be justified in believing some of the assertions of one's friends.

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Copyright © 2010 by Hypatia, Inc.

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