The aim of this essay is to re-examine the government of the southwest of England in the 1530s in the light of Dr M. Robertson's essay in The Historical Journal (December 1989). Drawing on her research on Thomas Cromwell's political affinity, Dr Robertson argued that Cromwell ‘managed’ southwestern government very effectively through a system of patronage of leading local officeholders. In this essay, this thesis is challenged in two ways using research into southwestern government from a provincial perspective. Firstly, by identifying the officeholding elite of the province, examining its recruitment and tracing its activities, the practical limitations on Cromwell's power and freedom to manoeuvre in his dealings with local government are highlighted. The conclusion follows that it was, in practice, beyond Cromwell's competence to ‘manage’ southwestern government. Secondly, it is argued that ‘management’ from the centre was, in any case, potentially at least, inimical to good governance in this period because it denied local governors the scope for pragmatism and flexibility of action which were essential to effective local policing. Thus, the essay also takes issue with Professor Elton's thesis that Cromwell's revolutionary handling of local government was the key to the successful enforcement of the Reformation in the 1530s.

Leon Trotsky's contributions to the journal Bor'ba, published in St Petersburg between February and July 1914, have been overlooked in scholarly accounts of his biography. This paper has two aims. First, to provide an exposition of Trotsky's contributions to this journal; and, second, to explain why they have been forgotten. Three explanations are offered. First, Trotsky biographers look to Deutscher's trilogy for the main events in Trotsky's life, and he does not mention Bor'ba. Second, Trotsky himself did not refer to his work for the journal in his autobiography My Life. Finally, Stalin did not use Lenin's critique of Trotsky's participation in Bor'ba as further ammunition against Trotsky in the power struggle after Lenin's death.

The ex-officer problem in Britain following the Great War derived its special meaning from the difficulties associated with finding a satisfactory relationship between wartime rank and postwar status. Images of social decline competed for public attention with those of social elevation. Behind these images lay a series of dilemmas about how to reconcile the social and economic effects of military promotion with the claims of democracy. The shifting usage of the term ‘temporary gentleman’ during the war reflected the changing background of those being granted commissions, and the possibilities of upward mobility produced tensions which were to persist and grow after demobilization. Government policies for ex-officers, in seeking to assist talent without perpetuating the distinctions of rank, were directly affected by such tensions. Ultimately, expectations of higher social status faded in the light of experiences which conveyed a sense of loss and decline, and ex-officers became a symbol for those who saw their pre-war social position being threatened in a less secure world. However, the ex-officer problem existed in its own right as the result of the uniquely awkward adjustments associated with being ‘de-officered’ at the same time as being demobilized.

Professor Ives has demonstrated the weakness of some of the grounds for thinking that Henry VIII's will was tampered with after 30 December 1546. But he has not mentioned Paget's later testimony suggesting that the ‘unfulfilled gifts clause’ was inserted in the will after 12 January 1547. Even if it was part of the will by 30 December, the gifts implemented by its authority resulted from later skilful and ruthless manipulation of the king. Henry's ‘unwritten will’ greatly strengthened Edward Seymour and his allies and gave William Paget, who was largely responsible for its final shape, the means of buying off potential objectors to Seymour's elevation to the protectorship.

It is almost forty years since the Geneva conference of April–July 1954 ended the French war in Indo-China. The ‘success’ of the conference was seen as a triumph for the efforts of British diplomacy, and for Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in particular, a judgement which has altered little with the passage of time. The following article questions this view on the grounds that, ironically, British support for Geneva had little or nothing to do with the situation in Indo-China. On the contrary, it arose in the wider context of policy towards the European Defence Community. It was also a product of Eden's unhappiness at Britain's junior status in the so-called Anglo-American ‘special relationship’. The British attitude to Geneva only became more positive in March-April 1954 when French fortunes reached their nadir and the alternative to a negotiated solution in Viet-Nam seemed to be American, or American-led, military intervention. Faced with this potentially catastrophic prospect, the previously ‘unwanted’ conference assumed a new relevance for Eden and British diplomacy.

Dr Houlbrooke's overall acceptance of the genuineness of Henry VIII's will is welcomed but his hypothesis about the protectorate is qualified, (i) Paget's testimony is shown not to indicate that the ‘gifts clause’ was added to the will after 12 January 1547. (ii) Corrections to the paper which underlies Paget's statement suggest that the distribution of honours under the clause related to Henry's wish to establish the Seymour faction, not to support for the protectorate. (iii) Moves towards the latter were only implemented when Henry's death was imminent, (iv) There is a plausible case to suspect jobbery then and (v) at the stage of the second protectorate, (vi) It is argued that in interpreting Henry's will, we must see (a) faction as intrinsic to court politics and (b) Henry VIII's religious policy as inherently and-traditional.

The general election of 1945 is described as ‘the Waterloo of the Conservative party’. Yet, in 1951 the Conservatives returned to power and were to remain in office for thirteen years. The purpose of this article is to examine this transformation in electoral fortunes. Labour's defeat in 1951 is usually explained in terms of government fatigue, redistribution, and Liberal disintegration. It is argued here that the Conservative party was not just a passive beneficiary of these developments. Rather, the 1951 result was the outcome of a sustained effort since 1946 to regain the initiative and political power. The Conservatives were actively engaged in forging an anti-socialist coalition focused on disaffection with austerity, rationing and controls on which the party's recovery after 1945 is based.

The discussion is divided into four sections. The first outlines the extent of shortages, establishes the significance of this issue in political debate, and identifies the social groups most affected. Part two traces the swing to the right from 1947 onwards and the third section explores Conservative propaganda in opposition to rationing, austerity and controls. The final part examines the party's assessment of the electoral task, its monitoring of public opinion, and the range of techniques employed to rally support.

One of the most challenging historical debates in early modern German history of recent years has been the ‘communalism thesis’ propounded by Peter Blickle, a German historian now teaching in Bern. The term ‘communalism’ was coined to designate attempts to achieve autonomous self-government in town and country during the Reformation period, and draws on an older historiographical tradition which stressed an inherent dualism at all levels of constitutional development between a corporate principle and one based on domination (Herrschaft). The former was founded on the equality of all members sharing common rights and obligations in a form of collective association. In late-medieval Germany the basic form of association in both town and country was the commune (Gemeinde), which possessed, or sought to possess, autochthonous rights to regulate its own affairs. This included the administration of justice, maintenance of peace within the community, economic functions such as distribution of common land or grazing, administration of church finances and church fabric, and in some places communal appointment of pastors. All these communal functions were justified by an appeal to the ideal of the ‘common good’ (gemein nutz), to which all individual self-interest (eigen nutz) was to be strictly subordinate. Thus, the commune appeared to be a fundamental building block of premodern German society.