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The Political Significance of Hegel's Concept of Recognition in the Phenomenology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 June 2015

David Duquette
David Duquette*
Affiliation:
St Norbert College
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Abstract

There has been much debate regarding interpretation of the concept of recognition (Anerkennung) in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Among the issues discussed in various commentaries, two that I find particularly interesting and important are: a) the question of the social and historical vs psychological significance of the concept of recognition which appears in Chapter 4 of Hegel's Phenomenology and b) the status of the dialectic of lordship and bondage for understanding the nature of the reconciliation of self-consciousness in the realm of objective spirit. Both of these topics have been widely discussed and I could not pretend to do justice to them in the space of this paper. My particular interest here is to discuss the political significance of Hegel's concept of recognition, specifically by exploring its connection to Hegel's overtly political works, especially the Philosophy of Right with its articulation of the Idea of the state. However, before proceeding directly to that task, I would like to begin with some comments on the two issues I just mentioned, as they are relevant to my topic.

In an essay entitled “Notes on Hegel's ‘Lordship and Bondage’” George Amstrong Kelly cautions the reader of the Phenomenology against oversimplifying Hegel's concept of recognition. There are two oversimplifications in particular that he worries about: (1) reducing the significance of Anerkennung to a social and political reading, and (2) (in Kelly's words) “the master- slave relationship is made an unqualified device for clarifying the progress of human history”, (p 191) The first mistake is avoided by seeing, in addition to the social “angle”, the “pattern of psychological domination and servitude within the individual ego”, (p 195) According to Kelly, “The problem of lordship and bondage is essentially Platonic in foundation, because the primal cleavage in both the history of society and the history of the ego is at stake. The two primordial egos in the struggle that will lead to mastery and slavery are also locked within themselves”, (p 199) The internal aspects of lordship and bondage are found in the struggle for self-awareness between self and other within the Ego, eg., in terms of appetition vs spiritual self-regard, opposed faculties in the ego that once awakened must be brought into harmony. As Kelly puts it in his book Idealism, Politics and History, “man remits the tensions of his being upon the world of fellow beings and is himself changed in the process. This relationship furnishes the bridge between psychology and history”, (p 334)

Type
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
Information
Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain , Volume 15 , Issue 1: number 29 , Spring/Summer 1994 , pp. 38 - 54
Copyright
Copyright © The Hegel Society of Great Britain 1994

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References

1 Kelly, G A, “Notes on Hegel's ‘Lordship and Bondage’” in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed McIntyre, Alaisdair (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), pp 189–217 Google Scholar.

2 Kelly, G A, Idealism, Politics, and History: Sources of Hegelian Thought (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p 334 Google Scholar.

3 Kojeve, Alexander, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, trans Nichols, James H (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), p 9 Google Scholar.

4 Williams, Robert, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1991), p 144.Google Scholar

5 Hegel, G W F, Phenomenology of Mind, trans Baillie, J B (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1967), pp 234–240 Google Scholar.

6 Shklar, Judith N, Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp 60–61.Google Scholar

7 The Phenomenology of Mind, p 242.

8 Norman, Richard, Hegel's Phenomenology: A Philosophical Introduction. (London: Sussex University Press, 1976), p 54 Google Scholar.

9 Hegel, G W F, Natural Law, trans by Knox, T M (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975), p 88 Google Scholar.

10 The distinction between uniting opposed determinations positively and uniting them negatively can be seen in the continuation of the passage just quoted. “Or, since the cancelling can itself be grasped and expressed positively by reflection, the cancellation of both sides of the determination appears accordingly as the completely equal positing of the determined on both sides. Applied to punishment, for example, this means that retribution alone is rational in it; for by retribution the crime is subjugated. A state of affairs +A brought aabout by the crime is complemented by the bringing about of -A, and so both are annihilated. Or, looked at positively, with the state of affairs +A there is linked for the criminal the opposite side -A, and both are brought about equally, while the crime had brought about one only. Thus the punishment is the restoration of freedom, and the criminal has remained, or rather been made, free, just as the punisher has acted rationally and freely. In this, its specific character, punishment is thus something in itself truly infinite and absolute, revered and feared on its own account”, (pp 91- 92). See also the Philosophy of Right where Hegel argues that punishment is the ‘right’ of the criminal (pp 68-73).

11 Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction, trans Nisbet, H B (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p 94 Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as LPWH.

12 For Hegel's discussion of the dialectic of universality and particularity with reference to the state in his Logic see paragraph 198 of the 1830 edition of the Encyclopedia. In the 1978 printing of the Wallace translation see pp 264-65.

13 Hegel, , Philosophy of Right, trans Knox, T M (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p 21 Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as PhR.

14 Hegel, G W F, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, trans Mueller, G E (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), p 216 (paragraph 335/333)Google Scholar.

15 Reason in History, trans Hartmann, R S (New York: Bobbs- Merrill Inc., 1953), p 60 Google Scholar.

16 Hegel here also notes that “The first determination of all within the state is the distinction between rulers and ruled”, (p 116)

17 See also pp 216, 234, 279, 297, and LPWH pp 92, 124.

18 See also LWPH, pp 103-111.