Despite their multiplication over the last 15 years, studies on the support for assemblies composed of citizens selected by lot are rare and the few that exist analyse citizens’ attitudes towards such mini-publics as consultative bodies associated with traditional representative institutions. In this article, we examine support for citizens selected by lot as new policymakers who take the most important political decisions instead of political representatives. We contrast support for this radical democratic innovation with support for two other reforms that increase citizen participation: generic support for a greater involvement of citizens in policymaking, and specific support for citizen-initiated referendums. The goal is to understand whether the drivers of support for citizens selected by lot overlap or differ from the drivers of support for other forms of citizen participation. We rely upon data from the 2017 French Election Study.

Pedro P. Kuczynski (Peru 2018) and Evo Morales (Bolivia 2019) are the most recent cases in a long list of Latin American presidents who have been forced out of office. We seek to contribute to understanding why some presidents fail to fulfil their terms by analysing the role of an actor overlooked by the extant literature on presidential failures: political parties. We hypothesize a non-linear relation between party institutionalization and the risk of presidential failure. That is, when parties are weakly or highly institutionalized, the hazard of presidential failure is lower than when parties are moderately institutionalized. We test this and other hypotheses with a survival analysis of 157 Latin American administrations (1979–2018). We also qualitatively explore how the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of certain events affects the risk of failure in three countries with different levels of party institutionalization. We find that party institutionalization – as well as legislative support, anti-government demonstrations, presidential scandals and economic growth – significantly affects the risk of presidential failure.

During the eurozone crisis, technocratic governments were appointed in several eurozone countries, becoming in the eyes of many the embodiment of the EU's democratic deficit. In spite of the central place that these technocratic governments occupy in the scholarly debate, however, we have remarkably little evidence on Europeans’ attitudes towards technocracy, and technocratic governments are under-studied from an empirical standpoint. We contribute to the very limited empirical literature on this topic by using a novel natural experiment design, in the context of the 2011 Italian crisis that led to the appointment of the Monti technocratic cabinet. We hypothesize that the effect of technocratic appointments on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy is a priori uncertain, and it depends on the balance of a trade-off between reduced input participation and increased output effectiveness. Overall, the results point to citizens’ attitudes towards technocracy being more complex than often assumed in the debate.

While the growing body of research on non-violent political movements centres on the idea that choosing non-violence tends to produce more favourable outcomes for dissidents, the question of why some non-violent campaigns still fail has not been sufficiently empirically investigated. Building on the extant research on the effects of group dynamics and certain external actors, we examine the role of the natural resource wealth of target states on the outcomes of non-violent campaigns. We hypothesize that the probability that a non-violent movement will fail increases as the target state's natural resource wealth increases. This natural resource wealth could serve to neutralize the potential for support from both domestic and external actors, thereby increasing the risk of failure. The results of our statistical analyses support our hypothesis and suggest that non-violent campaigns are more likely to fail in states with higher natural resource wealth, particularly that which stems from oil.

The majority view within political science is that populism is best understood as a (thin) ideology. We problematize the ideational approach by broadening the scope of analysis, linking populism to the rise of long-term generalized anti-political sentiments, against interpretations that tend to tie the populist wave to conjunctural factors related to recent crises. We argue that the essence of populism lies at the intersection of the ‘material constitution’ of advanced industrial democracies (that is, how macroeconomic governance relates to democratic decision-making) and the feelings of societal alienation that are at the heart of anti-political sentiments. We show the peculiar coexistence of economic turbulence, heralded by the crisis of the cartel party and of the neoliberal economic consensus, and an appeal to a post-democratic ‘virtual politics’ of performed but ineffectual popular sovereignty. The policies of the populist coalition governing Italy in 2018–19 provide a key case to test the relevance of our arguments.

While there is widespread agreement in the ministerial promotion and resignation literature that experience matters, experience has typically been defined as the length of time a legislator has worked in politics or served in a legislature. This approach fails to account for the different kinds of experience legislators accumulate as they progress through their political careers prior to appointment to cabinet. We demonstrate how researchers can use sequence and cluster analysis to obtain a more complete understanding of ministerial appointment. We identify four data-driven archetypes of political careers in Canada for the period 1968–2015. We find that MPs with diverse political careers are more likely to be appointed to cabinet, while MPs with opposition experience are more successful than MPs with government experience. We also find that parliamentary secretary is not necessarily a stepping stone to a full cabinet position, calling into question traditional conceptions of parliamentary politics as a ‘ladder’.

The goal of ‘learning’ from peace processes is widely expressed in conflict resolution scholarship and practice but inadequately understood. This article investigates what kinds of knowledge can be learned from a peace process, the theoretical and methodological bases of such learning, and what impact it may have. The article begins with an interdisciplinary discussion of reasons to learn, the kinds of lessons proposed in the peace process literature and how theories of learning may be applied to a peace process. Following this is a case study of the sharing of the Northern Ireland peacemaking experience with other conflict-affected societies, especially through facilitated dialogues between decision-makers. This contributes to a comprehensive ideal model of learning from peace processes – something which, it is argued, may result in ‘transformative learning’ and a ‘policy paradigm shift’ towards de-escalatory conflict management. A definition of a peace process ‘lesson’ is offered to guide future research.

Previous studies show that in multiparty systems the formation of minority governments can be a rational choice. To ensure survival and policy implementation, minority governments make concessions to non-cabinet parties. In this study, we empirically analyse the pay-offs given to support parties under minority governments. We argue that the content of support agreements is conditioned by support party type. Results are based on a two-stage empirical investigation: a text analysis of 10 explicit support arrangements for minority governments in Romania and a within-case comparison of two Romanian minority cabinets with different support arrangements. We employ an original data set of support agreements and elite interviews with former minority cabinet members. We empirically confirm that ethno-regional parties are mostly policy-seeking and target benefits for their specific groups. In contrast, mainstream parties make stronger claims for office distribution. The analysis challenges the widespread understanding that all support parties are mostly policy-seeking.

How does support for opposition parties grow in dominant party systems? Most scholarship on the rise of competitive elections in dominant party regimes focuses on elite defections from the ruling party and coordination by opposition parties as key explanations, but there is less focus on how politics at the local level contributes to opposition victories. This article argues that effective service delivery in local government helps opposition parties grow support in local elections. Examining the case of the Democratic Alliance (DA) in South Africa, this article provides a systematic analysis of local elections and opposition party performance. Using an original data set of electoral, census and spatial data at the lowest electoral unit in South Africa (the ward), this article shows that in the areas where it is the incumbent party, support for the DA grows as the delivery of basic services to non-white households improves, and when DA-run wards outperform the neighbouring ones run by the ruling African National Congress party, support for the DA increases in neighbouring wards. Overall, this study contributes to our understanding of how local politics erode dominant party rule.

This study examines whether the sex of the selector matters for advancing women's inclusion in politics and how the political context shapes selectors’ preferences and behaviour. It focuses on an under-researched area – the political appointments ministers make in their ministerial departments – and thus sheds light on the conditions under which women access appointed office. It analyses six governments in Spain between 1996 and 2018, using a mixed methods approach that includes statistical analyses of political appointments and interviews with former ministers. It finds that women ministers, as individuals, did not appoint more women than men ministers did at any time. However, women's presence is highly relevant. In more gender-balanced political contexts, men and women ministers appointed more women. Moreover, the context changed, in part because critical political actors pushed for it. This imbued a new political sphere, subcabinet-appointed offices, with representational significance.

Some of the world's most notable economic miracles were accompanied by corruption, rent-seeking and clientelism, which is puzzling given the wide agreement on the importance of good institutions for growth. This article builds on the experiences of the US, Japan, Italy, South Korea and China to argue that these institutional maladies can be the natural outcomes of governance structures that facilitate growth. The theoretical argument revolves around the nature and strategies of dominant political organizations. Party machines can sometimes broker compensatory transfers that allow entrenched interests to profit from economic change, rather than be hurt by it, by the logic of the political Coase theorem. Transfers which are inefficient in most settings can therefore, if properly rationed and targeted, alleviate some of the key strategic impediments to growth identified by the political economy literature.

Governments around the world have crafted new laws to threaten, arrest, prosecute and incarcerate online political activists. While the primary effect of online repression is to silence criticism and forestall collective action, a secondary effect is to induce self-censorship among the masses. Yet scant research examines how self-censorship works, nor discusses its implications for entrenching authoritarianism and encouraging democratic backsliding. This article proposes a simple expected utility model of self-censorship, arguing that citizens will more likely self-censor when the expected costs of online political expression outweigh its benefits. Analysing the fourth wave of the Asian Barometer survey of 10,216 respondents across eight Southeast Asian countries, I find that higher income politically engaged social media users are indeed less likely to express their political opinions. Additionally, this correlation holds in states where online repression is most severe, but is non-existent in countries where online repression is moderate or low.

Michael Moran's intellectual journey is a remarkable one. Starting from quite a narrow focus on industrial relations in the 1970s, he switched his main research interest to the politics of banking and to changes in financial regulation during the 1980s. In the 1990s he extended this interest in regulation to write about the emergence of the British regulatory state, which culminated in his major publication, The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-Innovation (Moran 2003). After 2008 he turned his attention to the nature of contemporary capitalism and how it might be reformed. A subsidiary but important second theme was his broad interest in British politics, which led through various publications to a major single-authored textbook, Politics and Governance in the UK (Moran 2011), as well as the very successful co-authored text Politics UK (Jones et al. 1990) and what turned out to be his valedictory work, The End of British Politics? (Moran 2017).

Over the past years, parties often described as populist, such as SYRIZA in Greece, the Five Star Movement (FSM) in Italy and Podemos in Spain have made significant electoral breakthroughs, unsettling well-established party systems. In the literature, inclusionary populism has primarily been applied to Latin America whereas the three Southern European parties have been examined individually, but not in comparative perspective. The purpose of this article is to provide a comparative analysis, based on an original electoral manifestos content analysis, aimed at unveiling the ‘inclusionary populism’ features of the ‘new’ political parties that have emerged in Southern Europe. By focusing on the 2012–16 period, the article shows that the inclusionary category can be fruitfully applied also to European political parties; it finds different degrees of inclusionary populism (namely between SYRIZA and Podemos); and it proves that the FSM falls between the two exclusionary vs. inclusionary poles.

The term ‘Westminster model’, widely used in both the academic and practitioner literatures, is a familiar one. But detailed examination finds significant confusion about its meaning. This article follows Giovanni Sartori's advice for ‘reconstructing’ a social science term whose meaning may be unclear through review of its use in the recent literature. It finds that many authors in comparative politics use the term ‘Westminster model’ without definition, while those providing definitions associate it with a large (and sometimes conflicting) set of attributes, and a set of countries often not demonstrating those attributes. Some have sought to respect this diversity by proposing variants like ‘Washminster’ or ‘Eastminster’, while others suggest that the term should be seen as a loose ‘family resemblance’ concept. But on examination it no longer meets even the – relatively weak – requirements for family resemblance. To end the muddle, and the risk of flawed inferences and false generalization, comparative scholars should drop this term, and select cases based on more precise attributes instead.

Populist radical right (PRR) parties have increasingly occupied positions of power in recent years, inspiring much scholarly interest in the mainstreaming consequences of government responsibility. This article analyses the extent and manner of mainstreaming of the Rassemblement National (RN) while in power at the local level of government in France. A municipal-level focus enables the novel inclusion of the party into the debate about the consequences of government participation for the PRR. We conduct a paired case study analysis of RN-led Hénin-Beaumont, the political base of Marine Le Pen and her ‘de-demonization’ strategy, alongside nearby Lens, which is led by a mainstream party. We analyse the policy and discourse of the administration through a qualitative content analysis of mayoral statements and data from semi-structured interviews with local politicians. The results show a partial mainstreaming due to the strategic exercise of local government power to present a more moderate and capable image, as well as the use of populist discourse to frame mainstream opposition forces and the local press as working against the interests of ‘the people’.

When a non-violent resistance campaign does not have leverage to challenge powerful opponents, third-party intervention has been shown to assist. While the role of external third-party interveners – foreign activists – has been documented, less attention has been given to intervention from members of the dominant population. Drawing from the literature on civil resistance and through the study of Israeli Jews who intervene in Palestinian resistance campaigns against the Israeli military occupation, I argue that intervention from members of the dominant population is strategically desirable. Through an analysis of three Palestinian campaigns, this article identifies that the physical presence of Israeli Jews was needed to ensure the Palestinians could maintain their resistance efforts and presence on the land, despite the repression they faced. Furthermore, the skills and knowledge of the Israelis were needed to help the Palestinians achieve some of their goals, at least in the short term.

Robert Elgie's contribution to comparative politics is considerable. His work covers a range of subfields, including the study of political institutions, French politics, political leadership, presidentialism and semi-presidentialism. He became the leading scholar of semi-presidentialism and indeed defined much of the research agenda in this subfield.