The concepts of time, space and the self are intimately involved and though this is not often recognised, directly influence our understanding of diverse abnormal experiences not regarded as related.

In this paper I shall argue that Kant's description of time as a theoretical rather than an empirical concept relying on experience is a fruitful one for psychopathology to adopt. In other words, that our experience of coexistence and succession, and indeed of duration, pre-eminent time constructs, depends on a prior concept of time. The same is true of our concept of space. And, finally, the self, our unity of consciousness and bodily integrity require an intuitive notion of time and space.

The aim is to draw attention to the fact that this intimate interaction between time, space and the self has implications for the definition and classification of abnormalities of time experience.

The method will be by conceptual analysis.

I will conclude by arguing that identity, memory, actions, will, music, language, narrative structure, attitude to the future and mood, all implicitly have a time signature that determines how they are experienced and how they ought to be described and defined. I will use examples of memory impairment, impairment of language use in thought disorder, and abnormalities of attitude to the future in mood disorders to underline my case.