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Poverty, property rights and collective action: understanding the distributive aspects of common property resource management

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2005

BHIM ADHIKARI
Affiliation:
Environment Department, The University of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD, United Kingdom. E-mail: bpa100@york.ac.uk

Abstract

This study examines, in a developing-country context, the contribution of community forestry to household income with particular emphasis on group heterogeneity and equity in benefit distribution. The economic analysis of household-level benefits reveals that poorer households are currently benefiting less in absolute terms from community forestry than less poor households. In terms of the contribution of forests to total household income, the study results suggest that the poor are actually less dependent on forests than the rich, a finding that is somewhat contradictory to results from other similar studies. The average ‘poor’ household obtains Nepalese rupees (Nrs) 7,756 gross income from community forest annually, while the more ‘rich’ households obtain on average Nrs 24,466 per year. In terms of the contribution of forests to net household income, the study results seem to suggest an inverted U-shaped relationship – as income increases dependency on forest resources may decline. Econometric analysis suggests that income from the community forests is related to socio-economic attributes and private endowments of households. Households with land and livestock assets and upper caste households gain more from the commons, while better-educated households depend less on forest resources. Female-headed households benefit less from community forests, further aggravating the inequity in distribution of benefits. The study makes a number of recommendations to improve community forestry in Nepal.

Type
Research Articles
Copyright
© 2005 Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

This paper has highly benefited from three research workshops on property rights structures and environmental resource management organized by Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics in Egypt, South Africa and Italy. Thanks are due to Jon Lovett, Priya Shyamsunder, Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay, Herath Gunatilake, Kenneth Arrow, Charles Perrings, Karl-Goran Maler, Randy Bluffstone, Jean-Phillippe Platteau, Partha Dasgupta, Rabindra Nath Chakraborty, E. Somathanan, and Rimjhim Aggarawal for their comments and suggestions to improve this manuscript. The earlier version of this paper was presented at the second world congress of environmental and resource economists, June 24–27, 2002 California, USA. The research received generous financial support from the South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics (SANDEE).