This article discusses the London & North Western Railway’s (LNWR) marketing activities before 1914. It extends our understanding of British railway marketing by examining how the company forged links with stakeholders in North Wales, particularly the resort authorities, in support of its development of the tourist trade there. While the company remained the dominant force in promoting the region, cooperative working facilitated the sharing of market intelligence, exchange of best practice, coordination of advertising efforts, coordination of services, and the harmonizing of a promotional message that appealed to middle-class discretionary travelers that North Wales was a place for health and pleasure. The article also shows how the LNWR deployed a system of integrated marketing communications, providing one of the earliest known examples within British business of such practice. The sum result was positive impacts on the development of the North Welsh tourist trade in the years before the World War I.

This article explores how “bank-wreckers, defaulters, and embezzlers” were popularly perceived during Gilded Age and Progressive Era America, and how they contributed to a broader concern over the safety of deposits and helped drive efforts to achieve greater financial security. Their actions, often described as “wrecking,” referred to instances in which a banking institution was damaged or destroyed due to the embezzlement or general misappropriation of depositor funds by bank officials or employees. Wrecking occurred inside and outside of the era’s major banking panics, and attracted popular and critical attention over this period, especially between the 1880s and the early 1910s. It is argued that this phenomenon resonated within the popular imagination, which was reflected, reinforced, and even instilled through the media, and that this helped sustain doubts on the reliability of the nation’s banks and bankers. This article shows how notions of class, character, and gender influenced how people thought about the problem: wrecking demonstrated that respectability could be illusory and that men of the era could be tempted to “get rich quick” through dubious means. Some of the major attempts to resolve the problem are also discussed to highlight how efforts to prevent wrecking relate to the period’s general push to bolster economic stability. Ultimately, the article shows how seemingly disparate events can aggregate into a larger problem, which can in turn motivate solutions and reforms.

From its beginning, the American pottery industry had to contend with the presence of imports. At first, manufacturers coped by promoting their own products and striving to improve design and quality. However, when Japan began importing china in greater quantities, American potters faced a challenge unlike any before. Initial attempts to attack imports outright through boycotts met with limited success through World War II. Following the peace, Cold War economic policy designed to reintroduce Japan to the global market led to another round of increasing importation. U.S. potters decried the poor quality and low wages connected to Japanese china, yet could not agree on a strategy to overcome the growing number of imports. Some filed lawsuits over copied designs while others hoped to contract with the Japanese to import on their own terms. The failure of these manufacturers to unify in response to Japan proved one of the most damaging blows to this small industry.

This text is the author’s reply to reactions to “Managing Communist Enterprises” from three colleagues, Lee Vinsel, Natalya Vinokurova, and Pál Germuska. It includes reflections on his work process in researching capitalist and noncapitalist firms and sectors and the practical and theoretical bases for that work. In the course of replying to particular suggestions and critiques, the rejoinder also offers some considerations about the current and future course of business history as a discipline.

This article examines the financialization of the U.S. economy in the late twentieth century, with a focus on the role of industrial firms in the transition. This article explores how American industrial leaders’ reactions to the economic shocks of the 1970s influenced the rise of finance in the United States. Specifically, this article analyzes how the restrictive postwar financial regime gave way to a new liberal one, often represented by two vital shifts in the 1970s: the resurgence of global finance and the turn to austerity. It also demonstrates how leading industrialists’ preferences toward particular financial policies gave rise to different coalitions that affected policy orientation. It contributes to the financialization literature by clarifying the distinctive role of industrialists in American financialization. Furthermore, by situating financialization in the broader socioeconomic context, this article highlights the intersections of two important changes in the history of U.S. capitalism: financialization and the disintegration of the New Deal regime.

This article examines the role of human resources in the business strategy of Ocean Steam Ship Company (later Ocean Transport & Trading), one of the United Kingdom’s leading shipping firms. The time under review is the 1970s, a period of rapid and disruptive change for the shipping industry and of considerable difficulties for the UK economy. As a result of uncertainty over the development of the shipping industry in general, and Ocean’s business in particular, managing staff numbers and career opportunities became key elements of the company’s overall business strategy during these years. The article also examines the changing objectives of that strategy, the means by which these objectives were pursued, and the external constraints under which these objectives had to take place. It argues that Ocean found itself privileging the requirements of running a “people business” over other strategic concerns and that external constraints prevented the firm from pursuing theoretically more appropriate strategies, such as increased use of outsourcing and extricating itself from its UK-based, human resource intensive business.

The 1930s transformed American capitalism. This article interrogates the political economy of two business magazines created at the start of the Great Depression. I argue that Business Week’s and Fortune’s signature approaches to reporting articulated an ideal conception of the manager. The early century conception saw the manager as engineer of operational efficiency. The new ideal viewed the manager as a political economist coordinating firms with their external environment, notably an interventionist and scrutinizing state, volatile markets, and a critical public opinion.

This article examines how a German firm in the Malay Peninsula—Behn, Meyer & Co.—capitalized on its knowledge management to overcome political risks during the period from 1840 until 1959. During the two world wars, all assets and properties of the Behn Meyer firm were systematically expropriated because of the introduction of the Alien Enemies (Winding Up) Act of 1914 and the subsequent imposition of a ten-year ban by the British colonial administration in the Malay Peninsula. However, Behn Meyer’s resilience and flexible outlook, as demonstrated by its management of political risks during these tumultuous periods, enabled it to rebuild its business interests and reestablish a foothold in postcolonial Malaysia and the region. This article argues that Behn Meyer displayed an exemplary business strategy, utilized its understanding of the geopolitics of the area, and leveraged its local and international networks to ensure its survival and longevity in the most tumultuous period in the history of the world.

This article documents the emergence, evolution, and acceptance of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) by bond investors in the United States between 1968 and 1987. Drawing on an analysis of trade publications, securities prospectuses, and business press, I argue that MBS issuers’ eventual success at convincing bond investors to accept their products is especially remarkable given that bond investors had rejected most types of MBS issued between 1970 and 1983. My analysis suggests that the acceptance of MBS as bonds was an outcome of two approaches employed by the MBS issuers: (1) changing the attributes of their products to make them more bond-like, and (2) changing the meaning of the bond category by opening its boundaries to products that incorporated mortgage features. These two approaches to changing investors’ beliefs to promote innovation acceptance may undergird the diffusion processes for other financial innovations. Understanding the process of innovation acceptance may be especially important because market participants have short memories. Forgetting the assumptions made during innovation–acceptance processes can bring unanticipated consequences of innovation adoption, such as financial crises.

This article examines conceptions of social justice and economic fairness with regard to employment. It does so through an analysis of the management of deindustrialization in the Scottish coalfields between the 1940s and 1980s. Emphasis is placed on the historical roots and social and political constitutions of labor market practices. The analysis is grounded within Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation; industrial relations within coal mining are conceived through an ongoing conflict between commodifying, liberalizing market forces and a “counter-movement” of worker and community resistance and state regulation, which works to embed markets within social and political priorities. E. P. Thompson’s moral economy provides the basis for an understanding of the formulation of communal expectations and employment practices that acted to mitigate the disruption caused by pit closures. The analysis grounds the historical roots of the moral economy within Poalnyi’s counter-movement and illuminates the operation of specific practices of a Thompsonian character within the nationalized industry, which maintained individual and collective employment stability. This is constructed utilizing interviews with former mineworkers and members of mining families. These are supplemented by archival sources that include the minutes of Colliery Consultative Committee meetings, which took place before pit closures. They reveal the moral economy was fundamentally centered on the control of resources, collieries, and the employment they provided rather than simply elements of financial compensation for those suffering from labor market instability. Resultantly procedure centering on collective consultation was fundamental in legitimating colliery closures.

This article examines the evolution of cryptology as a business trait and a distinct state-controlled and -regulated profession in sixteenth-century Venice. It begins by briefly discussing the systematic development of cryptology in the Renaissance. Following an examination of the amateur use of codes and ciphers by members of the Venetian merchant and ruling classes, and subsequently by members of all layers of Venetian society, the article moves on to discuss the professionalization of cryptology in sixteenth-century Venice. This was premised on specialist skills formation, a shared professional identity, and an emerging professional ethos. The article explores a potential link between the amateur use of cryptology, especially as it had been instigated by merchants in the form of merchant-style codes, and its professional use by the Venetian authorities. It also adds the profession of the cifrista—the professional cipher secretary—to the list of more “conventional” early modern professions.

Monsanto’s transformation from a chemical firm to a biotechnology business in the 1980s and 1990s reveals that an increasingly small corporate cartel gained dominion over petroleum refining byproducts and that this concentration of ownership had profound implications for the future solvency of Monsanto. As the price of petrochemical feedstocks rose, Monsanto, a company that made 80 percent of its products from fossil fuels, began to pursue an alternative path to profits. In short, concentrated corporate ownership of critical natural resources forced some companies in the chemical commodity production business to pursue radically new ways of generating cash flow. This was especially true for scavenger capitalists such as Monsanto, firms that had historically made their money by scavenging raw material stockpiles produced by booming commercial industries. For firms invested heavily in commodity production but lacking proprietary claims to critical natural resources, the key was finding new ways to make money without depending on fossil fuels. For Monsanto, biotechnology offered a way out.

By the mid-twentieth century in the United Kingdom, musical instrument manufacturing had become an increasingly mechanized activity. Craft skills had been displaced in many areas, yet remained a vital source of competitive advantage in local and international markets and were particularly valued by professional musicians. This article examines the contrasting experiences of two British musical instrument manufacturers, tracing the unfolding relationship between their pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities and capability development. Boosey & Hawkes, a large, well-established manufacturing and publishing company, was an early pioneer, while Paxman Bros., a small musical retailer, transformed itself into one of the world’s most respected specialist manufacturers. The narrative probes the factors that shaped decision making in these companies as they developed a series of design innovations for one of the more complex brass instruments: the French horn. It draws on relevant theoretical insights to examine how a dynamic interaction between opportunity and capability, coupled with unanticipated contingencies, contributed to divergent outcomes for each company.

This article explores how 800-service, or toll-free long-distance (In-WATS) lines, became an institutionalized part of direct marketing in the United States between the mid-1960s and early 1980s. Introduced by AT&T in 1967, 800-service attracted immediate attention in mail-order circles, where marketers saw it as means of automating long-distance selling and catering to an increasingly decentralized and credit-dependent populace. Although early initiatives, like that of catalog giant Aldens, fell flat, 800-service gained traction by the mid-1970s as a call-center industry developed and mail-order operations began using In-WATS lines in combination with bank-issued credit cards and private delivery services. By decade’s end, this trio of networks—long-distance telephony, credit/payment, and parcel delivery—were densely interwoven, forming the infrastructural basis for a new kind of “anywhere, anytime,” upscale shopping exemplified by the newly refashioned Spiegel. Ultimately, the article helps historicize the rise of electronic retailing and the marketization of telecommunications infrastructure.

Philips Australia, the Australian subsidiary of Dutch MNE Philips Electronics, experienced difficulties during 1942–1943, when it came close to being nationalized as enemy property. In response, the company set out to improve its reputation in the local radio parts and electronics industry and in Australian markets. Its strategy of embedding itself in Australian society served the purpose of improving company performance and influencing the government policies that guided the rapid development of Australia’s postwar electronics industry. With this strategy, Philips Australia minimized the risks and maximized the commercial opportunities it faced. The firm localized senior management, maximized local procurement and local manufacturing, took a leading role in industry associations, engaged politically influential board members, and used marketing tools to build a strong brand and a positive public profile in Australia. However, the company became aware of the limitations of this strategy in 1973, when a new Labor government reduced trade protection. Increasing competition from Japanese electronics firms forced Philips Australia to restructure and downsize its production operations. Despite increasing reliance on imports from the parent company’s regional supply centers and efforts to specialize production on high-value added products, the firm saw its profitability and market share in Australia decrease.