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Volume 35 - November 2019

Contents

Page 2 of 2

Book Review

Article

  • Which values should be built into economic measures?

  • S. Andrew Schroeder
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    28 February 2019, pp. 521-536

  • Many economic measures are structured to reflect ethical values. I describe three attitudes towards this: maximalism, according to which we should aim to build all relevant values into measures; minimalism, according to which we should aim to keep values out of measures; and an intermediate view. I argue the intermediate view is likely correct, but existing versions are inadequate. In particular, economists have strong reason to structure measures to reflect fixed, as opposed to user-assessable, values. This implies that, despite disagreement about precisely how to do so, economists should standardly adjust QALYs and DALYs to reflect egalitarian values.

Book Review

Article

  • Similarity and the trustworthiness of distributive judgements

  • Alex Voorhoeve, Arnaldur Stefánsson, Brian Wallace
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    27 December 2018, pp. 537-561

  • When people must either save a greater number of people from a smaller harm or a smaller number from a greater harm, do their choices reflect a reasonable moral outlook? We pursue this question with the help of an experiment. In our experiment, two-fifths of subjects employ a similarity heuristic. When alternatives appear dissimilar in terms of the number saved but similar in terms of the magnitude of harm prevented, this heuristic mandates saving the greater number. In our experiment, this leads to choices that are inconsistent with all standard theories of justice. We argue that this demonstrates the untrustworthiness of distributive judgements in cases that elicit similarity-based choice.

Book Review

Front Cover (OFC, IFC) and matter

  • EAP volume 35 issue 2 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    29 April 2019, pp. f1-f3
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Book Review

Front Cover (OFC, IFC) and matter

  • EAP volume 35 issue 1 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    22 January 2019, pp. f1-f3
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Back Cover (IBC, OBC) and matter

  • EAP volume 35 issue 2 Cover and Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    29 April 2019, pp. b1-b2
    • Article
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  • EAP volume 35 issue 1 Cover and Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    22 January 2019, pp. b1-b4
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Book Review

Front Cover (OFC, IFC) and matter

  • EAP volume 35 issue 3 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 October 2019, pp. f1-f3
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Back Cover (IBC, OBC) and matter

  • EAP volume 35 issue 3 Cover and Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 October 2019, pp. b1-b2
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Page 2 of 2