Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. Economics & Philosophy
  4. Volume 36
Journal Home
Refine listing

Refine listing

Access:
Publication date:

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×
< Back to all issues

Volume 36 - March 2020

Contents

Page 2 of 3

Article

  • Countable additivity, idealization, and conceptual realism

  • Yang Liu
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    28 February 2019, pp. 127-147
    • Article
      • You have access
      • Open access
    • PDF
    • HTML
    • Export citation

  • This paper addresses the issue of finite versus countable additivity in Bayesian probability and decision theory – in particular, Savage’s theory of subjective expected utility and personal probability. I show that Savage’s reason for not requiring countable additivity in his theory is inconclusive. The assessment leads to an analysis of various highly idealized assumptions commonly adopted in Bayesian theory, where I argue that a healthy dose of, what I call, conceptual realism is often helpful in understanding the interpretational value of sophisticated mathematical structures employed in applied sciences like decision theory. In the last part, I introduce countable additivity into Savage’s theory and explore some technical properties in relation to other axioms of the system.

Book Review

Article

  • A unificationist defence of revealed preferences

  • Kate Vredenburgh
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    22 February 2019, pp. 149-169

  • Revealed preference approaches to modelling agents’ choices face two seemingly devastating explanatory objections. The no self-explanation objection imputes a problematic explanatory circularity to revealed preference approaches, while the causal explanation objection argues that, all things equal, a scientific theory should provide causal explanations, but revealed preference approaches decidedly do not. Both objections assume a view of explanation, the constraint-based view, that the revealed preference theorist ought to reject. Instead, the revealed preference theorist should adopt a unificationist account of explanation, allowing her to escape the two explanatory problems discussed in this paper.

Book Review

Front Cover (OFC, IFC) and matter

  • EAP volume 36 issue 2 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    22 June 2020, pp. f1-f2
    • Article
      • You have access
    • PDF
    • Export citation

Book Review

Back Cover (IBC, OBC) and matter

  • EAP volume 36 issue 2 Cover and Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    22 June 2020, pp. b1-b7
    • Article
      • You have access
    • PDF
    • Export citation

Front Cover (OFC, IFC) and matter

  • EAP volume 36 issue 1 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    13 February 2020, pp. f1-f3
    • Article
      • You have access
    • PDF
    • Export citation

Book Review

Back Cover (IBC, OBC) and matter

  • EAP volume 36 issue 1 Cover and Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    13 February 2020, pp. b1-b3
    • Article
      • You have access
    • PDF
    • Export citation

Front Cover (OFC, IFC) and matter

  • EAP volume 36 issue 3 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    09 October 2020, pp. f1-f2
    • Article
      • You have access
    • PDF
    • Export citation

Page 2 of 3