Background: We describe the hospital system response to the Interstate 35W bridge collapse in Minneapolis into the Mississippi River on August 1, 2007, which resulted in 13 deaths and 127 injuries. Comparative analysis of response activities at the 3 hospitals that received critical or serious casualties is provided.

Methods: First-hand experiences of hospital physicians, issues identified in after-action reports, injury severity scores, and other relevant patient data were collected from the 3 hospitals that received seriously injured patients, including the closest hospitals to the collapse on each side of the river.

Results/Discussion: Injuries were consistent with major acceleration/deceleration force injuries. The most critical patients arrived first at each hospital, suggesting appropriate prehospital triage. Capacity of the health care system was not overwhelmed and the involved hospitals generally reported an overresponse by staff. Communication and patient tracking problems occurred at all of the hospitals. Situational awareness was limited due to the scope of structural collapse and incomplete information from the scene.

Conclusions: Hospitals were generally satisfied with their surge capacity and incident management plan activation. Issues such as communications, patient tracking, and staff overreporting that have been identified in past incidents also were problematic in this event. Hospitals will need to address deficiencies and build on successful actions to cope with future, potentially larger incidents. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2(Suppl 1):S11–S16)

Objectives: This article describes how the frequency of exposure to a flood is associated with the probability of seeking help from agencies (eg, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Red Cross) that provide disaster-related services. The article also describes the population characteristics for the people who are most likely to seek help for disaster services.

Methods: Prospective cohort data from 1735 respondents of the Iowa Health Poll were used. Multivariate logistic regression was used to model the odds of seeking help from any agency for flood-related problems.

Results: Overall, most people, regardless of flood exposure, did not seek help from disaster service agencies. Disaster services were sought by 23% of respondents who experienced 1 flood, 31% who have experienced 2 floods, and 26% who have experienced 3 or more floods. Multivariate adjusted odds of seeking help were associated with number of flood experiences (odds ratio [OR] 1.58), white race (OR 0.24), economic hardship (OR 1.43), urban residence (OR 0.43), and social support (OR 0.55).

Conclusions: On average, the probability of seeking disaster relief services increases with the number of flood experiences. Racial/ethnic minorities, rural residents, economically challenged individuals, and people with low levels of perceived social support may be more likely than people without these characteristics to seek services. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:139–141)

Objective: Hurricane Katrina struck the US Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, causing unprecedented damage to numerous communities in Louisiana and Mississippi. Our objectives were to verify, document, and characterize Katrina-related mortality in Louisiana and help identify strategies to reduce mortality in future disasters.

Methods: We assessed Hurricane Katrina mortality data sources received in 2007, including Louisiana and out-of-state death certificates for deaths occurring from August 27 to October 31, 2005, and the Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team's confirmed victims' database. We calculated age-, race-, and sex-specific mortality rates for Orleans, St Bernard, and Jefferson Parishes, where 95% of Katrina victims resided and conducted stratified analyses by parish of residence to compare differences between observed proportions of victim demographic characteristics and expected values based on 2000 US Census data, using Pearson chi square and Fisher exact tests.

Results: We identified 971 Katrina-related deaths in Louisiana and 15 deaths among Katrina evacuees in other states. Drowning (40%), injury and trauma (25%), and heart conditions (11%) were the major causes of death among Louisiana victims. Forty-nine percent of victims were people 75 years old and older. Fifty-three percent of victims were men; 51% were black; and 42% were white. In Orleans Parish, the mortality rate among blacks was 1.7 to 4 times higher than that among whites for all people 18 years old and older. People 75 years old and older were significantly more likely to be storm victims (P < .0001).

Conclusions: Hurricane Katrina was the deadliest hurricane to strike the US Gulf Coast since 1928. Drowning was the major cause of death and people 75 years old and older were the most affected population cohort. Future disaster preparedness efforts must focus on evacuating and caring for vulnerable populations, including those in hospitals, long-term care facilities, and personal residences. Improving mortality reporting timeliness will enable response teams to provide appropriate interventions to these populations and to prepare and implement preventive measures before the next disaster. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:215–223)

Background: Catastrophic disasters often are associated with massive structural, economic, and population devastation; less understood are the long-term mental health consequences. This study measures the prevalence and predictors of mental health distress and disability of hurricane survivors over an extended period of recovery in a postdisaster setting.

Methods: A representative sample of 1077 displaced or greatly affected households was drawn in 2006 using a stratified cluster sampling of federally subsidized emergency housing settings in Louisiana and Mississippi, and of Mississippi census tracts designated as having experienced major damage from Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Two rounds of data collection were conducted: a baseline face-to-face interview at 6 to 12 months post-Katrina, and a telephone follow-up at 20 to 23 months after the disaster. Mental health disability was measured using the Medical Outcome Study Short Form 12, version 2 mental component summary score. Bivariate and multivariate analyses were conducted examining socioeconomic, demographic, situational, and attitudinal factors associated with mental health distress and disability.

Results: More than half of the cohort at both baseline and follow-up reported significant mental health distress. Self-reported poor health and safety concerns were persistently associated with poorer mental health. Nearly 2 years after the disaster, the greatest predictors of poor mental health included situational characteristics such as greater numbers of children in a household and attitudinal characteristics such as fatalistic sentiments and poor self-efficacy. Informal social support networks were associated significantly with better mental health status. Housing and economic circumstances were not independently associated with poorer mental health.

Conclusions: Mental health distress and disability are pervasive issues among the US Gulf Coast adults and children who experienced long-term displacement or other serious effects as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. As time progresses postdisaster, social and psychological factors may play greater roles in accelerating or impeding recovery among affected populations. Efforts to expand disaster recovery and preparedness policies to include long-term social re-engagement efforts postdisaster should be considered as a means of reducing mental health sequelae. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:77–86)

Background: The Interstate 35W Bridge in Minneapolis collapsed into the Mississippi River on August 1, 2007, killing 13 people and injuring 127.

Methods: This article describes the emergency medical services response to this incident.

Results/Discussion: Complexities of the event included difficult patient access, multiple sectors of operation, and multiple mutual-aid agencies. Patient evacuation and transportation was rapid, with the collapse zone cleared of victims 95 minutes after the initial 9-1-1 call. A common regional emergency medical service incident management plan that was exercised was critical to the success of the response.

Conclusions: Communication and patient tracking difficulties could be improved in future responses. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2(Suppl 1):S17–S24)

Background: Recognition of bioterrorism-related infections by hospital and emergency department clinicians may be the first line of defense in a bioterrorist attack.

Methods: We identified unexplained infectious deaths consistent with the clinical presentation of anthrax, tularemia, smallpox, and botulism using Connecticut death certificates and hospital chart information. Minimum work-up criteria were established to assess the completeness of diagnostic testing.

Results: Of 4558 unexplained infectious deaths, 133 were consistent with anthrax (2.9%) and 6 (0.13%) with tularemia. None were consistent with smallpox or botulism. No deaths had anthrax or tularemia listed in the differential diagnosis or had disease-specific serology performed. Minimum work-up criteria were met for only 53% of cases.

Conclusions: Except for anthrax, few unexplained deaths in Connecticut could possibly be the result of the bioterrorism agents studied. In 47% of deaths from illnesses that could be anthrax, the diagnosis would likely have been missed. As of 2004, Connecticut physicians were not well prepared to intentionally or incidentally diagnose initial cases of anthrax or tularemia. More effective clinician education and surveillance strategies are needed to minimize the potential to miss initial cases in a bioterrorism attack. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:87–94)

Background: Despite increased government and public awareness of the threat of a radiological emergency resulting from a terrorist attack or industrial accident, limited emphasis has been placed on preparing the US health care workforce for such an event. The purpose of this study was to develop and apply a rapid survey to evaluate hospital-based nurses' baseline knowledge, self-assessed clinical competence, perception of personal safety, and willingness to respond in the event of a radiological emergency.

Methods: The study was conducted in 2 phases, the first targeting nursing units likely to respond in the event of a radiological emergency and the second focusing more generally on members of the New York State Emergency Nurses Association currently employed as hospital-based nurses.

Results: Among the 668 nurses surveyed, baseline knowledge was found to be inadequate. Although baseline knowledge, clinical competence, and perception of personal safety were all positively associated with willingness to respond, perception of safety appeared to be the primary determinant. Furthermore, baseline knowledge did not appear to be strongly associated with perception of personal safety.

Conclusions: Based on these results, the investigators recommend further clinical training to enhance preparedness and a more detailed exploration of the determinants of perceived personal safety. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:224–229)

Objective: Participatory action research (PAR) methodology is an effective tool in identifying and implementing risk-reduction interventions. It has been used extensively in occupational health research, but not, to our knowledge, in disaster research. A PAR framework was incorporated into the World Trade Center evacuation study, which was designed to identify the individual, organizational, and structural (environmental) factors that affected evacuation from the World Trade Center Towers 1 and 2 on September 11, 2001. PAR teams—comprising World Trade Center evacuees, study investigators, and expert consultants—worked collaboratively to develop a set of recommendations designed to facilitate evacuation from high-rise office buildings and reduce risk of injury among evacuees.

Methods: Two PAR teams worked first separately and then collectively to identify data-driven strategies for improvement of high-rise building evacuation.

Results: The teams identified interventions targeting individual, organizational, and structural (environmental) barriers to safe and rapid evacuation.

Conclusions: PAR teams were effective in identifying numerous feasible and cost-effective strategies for improvement of high-rise emergency preparedness and evacuation. This approach may have utility in other workplace disaster prevention planning and response programs. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:142–149)

Background: Historically, cash interventions, as opposed to material or in-kind aid, have been relatively uncommon in the humanitarian response to emergencies. The widespread implementation of cash-based programs following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami provided an opportunity to examine cash distributions following disasters. The Mercy Corps cash grant program in Aceh, Indonesia, was a short-term intervention intended to assist in recompensing losses from the December 2004 tsunami.

Methods: An evaluation of the Mercy Corps cash grant program was conducted for the 12-month period following the tsunami using program monitoring data and a systematic survey of cash grant beneficiaries.

Results: in 2005, the cash grant program disbursed more than US$3.3 million to more than 53,000 beneficiaries; the average cash grant award was US$6390, which was shared by an average of 108 beneficiaries. In a beneficiary survey, more than 95% of respondents reported the grant allocation processes were fair and transparent and that grant funds were received.

Conclusions: The Mercy Corps experience with cash programs suggests that cash interventions in the emergency context, when properly administered, can have an immediate impact and serve as an efficient mechanism for providing assistance. Organizations involved in humanitarian relief, particularly donors and nongovernmental organizations, should consider incorporating cash-based interventions as an element of their response in future emergencies. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:95–103)

People wounded during bombings or other events resulting in mass casualties or in conjunction with the resulting emergency response may be exposed to blood, body fluids, or tissue from other injured people and thus be at risk for bloodborne infections such as hepatitis B virus, hepatitis C virus, human immunodeficiency virus, or tetanus. This report adapts existing general recommendations on the use of immunization and postexposure prophylaxis for tetanus and for occupational and nonoccupational exposures to bloodborne pathogens to the specific situation of a mass casualty event. Decisions regarding the implementation of prophylaxis are complex, and drawing parallels from existing guidelines is difficult. For any prophylactic intervention to be implemented effectively, guidance must be simple, straightforward, and logistically undemanding. Critical review during development of this guidance was provided by representatives of the National Association of County and City Health Officials, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, and representatives of the acute injury care, trauma, and emergency response medical communities participating in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Terrorism Injuries: Information, Dissemination and Exchange project. The recommendations contained in this report represent the consensus of US federal public health officials and reflect the experience and input of public health officials at all levels of government and the acute injury response community. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:150–165)

Background: A recent Department of Defense instruction mandates country-specific assessments, identification of interventions, and development of guidance for Department of Defense to plan, train, and prepare for the provision of humanitarian assistance in stability operations. It also directs the use of outcome-based measures of effectiveness and the establishment of processes facilitating transparency of information. Whereas this would align military-led projects closer to the standards of the international aid community, how this process will be developed and implemented within the military has not yet been determined.

Methods: To begin developing an evidence-based program for military-led humanitarian aid, we conducted a qualitative gap analysis comparing information from a Web search of Department of Defense medical after-action reports, lessons learned, and expert interviews with the internationally accepted standards in humanitarian assistance impact assessment.

Results: There is a major gap in the ability of the Department of Defense to assess the impact of humanitarian assistance in stability operations compared with international development standards. Of the 1000 Department of Defense after-action reports and lessons learned reviewed, only 7 (0.7%) reports refer to, but do not discuss, impact assessment or outcome-based measures of effectiveness.

Conclusions: This investigation shows that the Department of Defense humanitarian assistance operations are, historically, recorded without documentation using quantifiable health data identifying which aid activities contributed directly to desired outcomes or favorable public opinion, and rarely are analyzed for effectiveness. As humanitarian assistance operations assume an ever greater role in US military strategy, it is imperative that we investigate useful impact assessment models to meet mission directives and, more important, to maximize coordination in a necessarily integrated and cooperative development environment. These findings provide baseline knowledge for the implementation of an evidence-based impact assessment process to validate future Department of Defense humanitarian assistance operations. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:230–236)

Mass casualty triage is a critical skill. Although many systems exist to guide providers in making triage decisions, there is little scientific evidence available to demonstrate that any of the available systems have been validated. Furthermore, in the United States there is little consistency from one jurisdiction to the next in the application of mass casualty triage methodology. There are no nationally agreed upon categories or color designations. This review reports on a consensus committee process used to evaluate and compare commonly used triage systems, and to develop a proposed national mass casualty triage guideline. The proposed guideline, entitled SALT (sort, assess, life-saving interventions, treatment and/or transport) triage, was developed based on the best available science and consensus opinion. It incorporates aspects from all of the existing triage systems to create a single overarching guide for unifying the mass casualty triage process across the United States. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2(Suppl 1):S25–S34)

The Department of Defense does not implement health-sector humanitarian assistance impact assessments to complement those of the international humanitarian aid community. This oversight fails to meet the recent Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 mandate calling for the application of measures of effectiveness. The decision by the Department of Defense to incorporate humanitarian assistance in stability operations should be supported by evidence-based impact assessments. This article proposes implementation of an impact assessment model in Department of Defense humanitarian assistance operations. The use of an impact assessment model will refocus previously identified information gaps from traditional military input-output management toward a greater emphasis on outcomes. This will help answer which humanitarian activities are successful, which are not, and why. Over time, the use of an impact assessment model will ensure that the Department of Defense and its operational units are learning as an organization while applying evidence-based lessons learned to future stability operations. Most important, the use of this model will both provide better understanding of the role that the Department of Defense has in humanitarian activities and help interpret and transfer these activities to the host nation and international aid community in a timely and efficient manner. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:237–244)

The post-September 11 era has prompted unprecedented attention to medical preparations for national special security events (NSSE), requiring extraordinary planning and coordination among federal, state, and local agencies. For an NSSE, the US Secret Service (USSS) serves as the lead agency for all security operations and coordinates with relevant partners to provide for the safety and welfare of participants. For the 2004 Democratic National Convention (DNC), designated an NSSE, the USSS tasked the Boston Emergency Medical Services (BEMS) of the Boston Public Health Commission with the design and implementation of health services related to the Convention. In this article, we describe the planning and development of BEMS’ robust 2004 DNC Medical Consequence Management Plan, addressing the following activities: public health surveillance, on-site medical care, surge capacity in the event of a mass casualty incident, and management of federal response assets. Lessons learned from enhanced medical planning for the 2004 DNC may serve as an effective model for future mass gathering events. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:166–173)

Background: When not managed properly, a hazardous material event can quickly extend beyond the boundaries of the initial release, creating the potential for secondary contamination of medical personnel, equipment, and facilities. Secondary contamination generally occurs when primary victims are not decontaminated or are inadequately decontaminated before receiving medical attention. This article examines the secondary contamination events reported to the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) and offers suggestions for preventing such events.

Methods: Data from the ATSDR Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance system were used to conduct a retrospective analysis of hazardous material events occurring in 17 states during 2003 through 2006 involving secondary contamination of medical personnel, equipment, and facilities.

Results: Fifteen (0.05%) Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance events were identified in which secondary contamination occurred. At least 17 medical personnel were injured as a result of secondary contamination while they were treating contaminated victims. Of the medical personnel injured, 12 were emergency medical technicians and 5 were hospital personnel. Respiratory irritation was the most common injury sustained.

Conclusions: Adequate preplanning and drills, proper decontamination procedures, good field-to-hospital communication, appropriate use of personal protective equipment, and effective training can help prevent injuries of medical personnel and contamination of transport vehicles and medical facilities. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:104–113)

Large-scale catastrophic events typically result in a scarcity of essential medical resources and accordingly necessitate the implementation of triage management policies to minimize preventable morbidity and mortality. Accomplishing this goal requires a reconceptualization of triage as a population-based systemic process that integrates care at all points of interaction between patients and the health care system. This system identifies at minimum 4 orders of contact: first order, the community; second order, prehospital; third order, facility; and fourth order, regional level. Adopting this approach will ensure that disaster response activities will occur in a comprehensive fashion that minimizes the patient care burden at each subsequent order of intervention and reduces the overall need to ration care. The seamless integration of all orders of intervention within this systems-based model of disaster-specific triage, coordinated through health emergency operations centers, can ensure that disaster response measures are undertaken in a manner that is effective, just, and equitable. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2(Suppl 1):S35–S39)