The thirteen papers in Morality, Reason and Truth address various dimensions of the complex relationship between morality and rationality. Most of the papers are new and they are generally at the cutting edge of current research. The collection is a substantial and important contribution to metaethics. The following are the views I found most challenging. Although they do not exhaust the book's contents, they are a good sample of its unity, range, and instructive power.

Although it is acknowledged that Hume's matters of fact are established by inductive reasoning, it is not always clear which inferences may be called reasonable. In deductive reasoning, it is only reasonable to admit true conclusions of valid arguments. However, in an argument which uses probability as Hume's inductive arguments do, the criterion for reasonableness is not as clear.

The study of philosophy has no leading edge. Scholars may fruitfully explore past eras and superceded theories, revise their views of historic figures, modify inadequate theories, defend successful yet overlooked ideas, salvage the wheat from the chaff. A novel defense of previously discredited arguments could lead to new insights, and this is so even if that defense proved ultimately unsuccessful. But, I believe, one can profitably defend some perhaps too hastily condemned view only if one meanwhile keeps a watchful eye on contemporary problems and theorizing. Fred Wilson's monograph, Explanation, Causation and Deduction, attempts just such a defense, while steadfastly ignoring much of contemporary theory. The lack of a sympathetic ear to recent critics of empiricism is the largest single failing of this attempt, and it is this failing which has prevented Prof. Wilson from seeing the poverty of his position.

Understanding Wittgenstein consists of twenty-seven short, self-contained chapters, each concentrating narrowly on a small segment of text, mostly from The Philosophical Investigations. Hunter's own words are apt. “The volume is therefore not comprehensive; but on the topics of which it treats I hope it will be found to have the merit of getting down to the fine detail of Wittgenstein's work, and of often showing, rather than merely saying, what can be made of it” (xii).

It is quite difficult to respond briefly and effectively to such a devastating charge as that the only merit your book has is that it is honest. My strategy will be, by showing that a few of Resnick's criticisms are ill-taken, to generate the presumption that the same could be said of a lot more of them. I will first discuss some minor points, and then two larger issues.