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Communist China and Nuclear Warfare

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Extract

The Chinese Communists, on coming to power, were confronted with a set of strategic problems totally new to them. No longer a mobile force operating from the countryside, they were after 1949 in control of cities, and were rapidly developing a vested interest in industrial complexes, communication centres, and transportation facilities. Although the Korean War awakened them to the importance of modernised, regular forces, the problem of decision-making in the field of military affairs was exacerbated and complicated by the revolution in weaponry and strategic thinking that had occurred outside China in the very period during which the Chinese Communists were gaining and consolidating their power.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1960

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References

1 This article was prepared on the basis of research undertaken as a staff member of the RAND Corporation. I wish to express my appreciation for the many helpful suggestions received from A. M. Halpern and H. S. Dinerstein.

2 See Dinerstein, H. S., War and the Soviet Union (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959).Google Scholar

3 Liu Po-ch'eng, speech delivered to the second session of the First National People's Congress, July 21, 1955, in Current Background, No. 347, 08 23, 1955.Google Scholar Hereafter, publications of the U.S. Consulate General, Hongkong, will be cited as CB (Current Background) and SCMP (Survey of the China Mainland Press).

4 Yeh Chien-ying, speech delivered to the second session of the First National People's Congress, July 27, 1955, in CB, No. 347, August 23, 1955.

5 P'eng Teh-huai, speech delivered to the second session of the First National People's Congress, July 16, 1955, in CB, No. 337, July 20, 1955.

6 Yeh Chien-ying had not hesitated to complain about people who “consider that it is now only necessary to concentrate all forces for socialist economic construction, and there is no need for attaching such great importance to national defence construction. They do not realise that while it is true that national defence construction must rely on the industrialisation of the state, simultaneously with the promotion of socialist economic construction we must maintain a sufficient national defence force or we shall be placed in a weak position.”

7 Teh, Chu, “People's Army, People's War,” NCNA, Peking, 07 31, 1958, in CB, No. 514, 08 6, 1958.Google Scholar

8 Chieh-fang Chün Poo (Liberation Army Newspaper), 07 1, 1958Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 1881, October 24, 1958.

9 August 1, 1958, in SCMP, No. 1881, October 24, 1958.

10 NCNA, Peking, July 31, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1584, August 6, 1957.

11 Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), 08 1, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1596, August 22, 1957.Google Scholar

12 On August 26, 1957, TASS announced that the Soviet Union had successfully tested “an inter-continental multi-stage ballistic rocket.” On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first earth satellite. Significantly, the Chinese emphasized the military aspects of these developments.

13 Ya-Iou, Liu, “Seriously Study Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking,” Chieh-fang Chün Pao (Liberation Army Newspaper), 05 23, 1958, in SCMP, No. 1900, 11 24, 1958.Google Scholar

14 Under a directive of the Army's Political Department, published September 20, 1958, all officers had to serve a month in the ranks.

15 In his Red China's Fighting Hordes (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing House, 1951), p. 30, Lt.-Col. Robert B. Rigg raised the possibility that while Lin Piao was in the Soviet Union from 1938 to 1942 for medical treatment, he also did some military training. He also believes that Lin was not casually selected in 1945 for his assignment in Soviet-occupied Manchuria, adding that Lin's “strong point has been considered to be his liaison and orientation.”

16 NCNA, Peking, September 29, 1959, in CB No. 596, October 7, 1959. See documentation below.