The Chinese Communists, on coming to power, were confronted with a set of strategic problems totally new to them. No longer a mobile force operating from the countryside, they were after 1949 in control of cities, and were rapidly developing a vested interest in industrial complexes, communication centres, and transportation facilities. Although the Korean War awakened them to the importance of modernised, regular forces, the problem of decision-making in the field of military affairs was exacerbated and complicated by the revolution in weaponry and strategic thinking that had occurred outside China in the very period during which the Chinese Communists were gaining and consolidating their power.

In the first part of this article I argued that the “Maoist” thesis is a “Maoist” legend. It is so because it is based on a false concept of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. And it is so also for two other reasons. Contrary to “Maoist” assertions, Mao in his Hunan Report did not outline a concept for a Communist-led peasant-supported revolution; and he did not, in 1940, present himself as an original top-ranking Marxist-Leninist theoretician.

The following remarks (which I hope will be my last on Prof. Wittfogel's “The Legend of ‘Maoism’”) will hardly bear the appearance of a coherent essay. They are simply a collection of fragmentary replies to his own fragmentary points of attack. For some years now Prof. Wittfogel has been obsessed with the view that Fairbank, Schwartz and Brandt (an indivisible entity) have committed an “error” (not an accidental error!) which has led to incalculably evil results in our struggle with world Communism.

The comparison of the revolutionary movements, the seizure of power by the Communists, and the establishment and evolution of totalitarian régimes in Russia and China is a vast field of study in which little work has yet been achieved. The obvious obstacle is of course the scarcity of scholars in the non-Communist world who are familiar with the language, culture and history of both Russia and China. A truly formidable intellectual equipment is required. Dr. Karl Wittfogel and Dr. Benjamin Schwarz are outstanding among the few who possess it. One hopes that among the rising generations of the western nations the necessary combination of knowledge will become more frequent. Meanwhile those of us who have specialised in the Russian or East European field must learn what we can of China from secondary works and from those original documents which are available in translation. Well aware of the inadequacy of our understanding of Chinese affairs, we can only put to our Sinological colleagues problems which have arisen in the history of the Soviet or European Communist movements or regimes, and ask their opinions on the relevance of these problems, or on the reasons why they are not relevant, to China. It is in this spirit that the following observations are offered, as a contribution not to knowledge but to discussion. The points which I wish to raise are mainly concerned with the relationship of the Communist movement to social classes during its rise to nower.

The countries of Asia and Africa have seen the rise of numerous and powerful socio-political movements during the past few decades, movements which have shaken existing orders and have launched these nations on the road of modernisation. Although these movements have almost always been nationalist in character during the early phases of revolution, subsequently leftist radical movements have arisen; most of these have been Communist.

The very size of China has imposed on all who would rule it the twin problems of unification and control. Indeed the very first Chinese Emperor, as opposed to Kings among Kings, Ch'in Shih-huang (d. 210 b.c.) achieved the hegemony and his right to this title by being the first to solve these problems. Their continuing intractability in China, despite the mould of history and the unifying cement of the Chinese script, is reflected in Sun Yat-sen's description of the Chinese people more than 2,000 years later as “loose sand.” Ch'in Shih-huang had the stern admonitions of the Legalists as his aid to unification and Sun Yat-sen revolutionary fervour as his. There is no doubt that both or, for that matter, any other would-be ruler in between these two ends of the time scale in China, would have seized on radio as an additional aid, had its potentialities been available to them. Given this basic Chinese problem of unification and control, the failure of the Kuomintang to exploit radio on any effective scale is therefore surprising. China's latest rulers, faced not only with this old problem but also with a new ideology to spread and a new orthodoxy to engender, have naturally sought to exploit it to the full.

During the period from 1949 to 1957, which was the year prior to the big leap forward, our country had only ten motion picture studios (six of which were for feature films), and 19 shooting sheds. Now, there are 33 studios (11 of which produce feature films) and 27 shooting sheds. As to projection units, in 1949 there were only some 600 motion picture theatres and not even one mobile projection team in the whole country; by the end of 1957, the number of projection units had risen to 9,965; and preliminary statistics showed that there were about 14,500 units by the end of 1959. As a result of the development of this projection network, the people have more and more chances to see movies; movie audience jumped from 1,750 million man/times in 1957 to 4,050 million man/times in 1959.… During the eight years between 1949 and 1957 we had produced a total of 171 artistic films; but during the past two years since the beginning of the big leap forward, the number of artistic films we have produced is estimated to have reached some 180.… Formerly a feature film needed at least four or five months to shoot, and in some cases it needed a whole year or an even longer time. This time has been greatly shortened since the beginning of the big leap forward. Take, for example, the 18 artistic pictures produced last year as a token to celebrate the National Day; most of them were shot within four or five months, and several were completed within three months. With respect to cost, it drops greatly with the increase in the quantity of production and the shortening of the time for shooting.… With respect to quality which is a question of capital importance, all the 36 films of various kinds produced in celebration of National Day last year were markedly better ideologically, artistically and technically than films made earlier. Of course, strictly speaking, even these relatively better films still have shortcomings in certain respects and various degrees.…