Urbanization is challenging traditional politics. Forces attempting to stop the growth of the power of the metropolis must abandon the idea. New types of problems, their urgency, new élites, an urbanized citizenry, and a new balance of power are calling for a new type of political society. Historically dated nation-states may disappear.

The first systematic correlation of socio-demographic factors and party preference in Canadian federal elections was made by Escott Reid in 1933. No expansion or even replication followed until the mid-1950s when John Meisel, using data obtained by sample survey of individuals, continued the enquiry begun by Reid on the basis of aggregate statistics. Since then – especially after 1960 – many data have been collected and some studies made on the links between party preference and factors such as religion, language, region, social class, and age. But these studies, even for the variables that have received most attention – religion, region, and class, for example – give us findings which remain scattered over time and space, like building materials on different construction sites. We need an overall view of the relationship between socio-demographic factors and party preference – if only to facilitate the interpretation of more refined but narrowly focussed studies; and we need such a view to extend over more than one or two elections.

It can be said that in the Liberal back bench there are 20 members, or 16.4 per cent of the total doing 36.8 per cent of the committee work. Similarly, 27.1 per cent of the members are doing 52.8 per cent of the committee work. One of the major complaints of government members is the extremely heavy work load which has been aggravated by the recent changes in the rules and procedures of the House. Indeed, if one is listening to the complaints of a member who is in this 27.1 per cent group, his complaints are justified and real. One must conclude that the remaining 53.2 per cent who are responsible for only 25.4 per cent of the committee work must be the victims of work from another source.

The principle of redistribution in all the provinces is not one man, one vote. But how far from equal population or equal number of voters for all constituencies do the provinces deviate?

If redistribution were based only on the population in the provinces, one would need a measure which would indicate the degree of inequality. There are several measures available. Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce N. Russett, after comparing different measures of inequality, concluded that the Gini index was an attractive way of summarizing the important parts of an accurate cumulative distribution and that it was sensitive to inequalities present in all parts of a value distribution. Because of these findings, it was decided that the Gini index would be used as a measure of inequality for provincial representation.

Modestly impressive by its lack of mention both in a recent examination of the political leadership of the prime minister and the more traditional texts of the Canadian political process, is serious notice of environmental limitations on the prime ministerial prerogative in dissolving the Legislative Assembly and announcing a general election.

When I read Professor Franks' article, “The Dilemma of the Standing Committees of the Canadian House of Commons,” I was most disappointed at his perfunctory dismissal in less than half a sentence of the research services provided by the Library of Parliament. The sentence concerned, which is to be found on page 469, begins as follows: “The library, which prepares bibliographies and other background material, suffers from being ‘so anxious to be neutral that they are often bland.’”

I am grateful to Professor Wand for devoting so much space to my “conceptual apparatus.” I should have been more grateful if he had got it more nearly right. His criticism of my concepts, particularly of the central concept of powers, is so wide of the mark that one wonders about his concept of criticism. The puzzle is how he can pronounce with such assurance his “grave charges” that my thought is confused and misleading. The answer I shall suggest is partly (a) that he has not paid attention to my definitions, and partly (b) that he has tried to fit my argument into a conceptual framework – his own – which he assumes has some absolute validity. Perhaps (b) accounts for (a): he was perhaps unable to read what I wrote because it does not fit his conceptual scheme. Let me take in reverse order his criticisms of the three concepts he deals with.

Apart from the rather engaging phrasing of its title, Macpherson's reply to my criticisms of him must be judged a disappointment. For it either misses or entirely avoids their point.

I must remind Macpherson that it is he, not I, who conceives the task of political theory as one which deduces political obligation from the nature of man, or derives obligation from fact. Consequently, it is incumbent upon him to show how this is to be done. He now claims that it can be done and that it is not necessary to do it. In the former case it is a problem requiring resolution; in the latter a pseudo-problem which can be ignored.