¹ Heidegger, M., Existence and Being (Chicago, 1968), 277Google Scholar, and Wittgenstein, L., Traclatux Logico-Philosophicus, trans. Pears, D.F. and McGuinnes, B.F. (New York, 1961), par. 5.6.Google Scholar

² Thorson, , Biopolilics (New York, 1970)Google Scholar and Matson, , The Broken Image (Garden City, N.Y., 1966).Google Scholar

³ Jackson, , “The Application of Method in the Construction of Political Science Theory,” this Journal, v, no. 3 (1972), 407Google Scholar. Cf. my “Method, Theory and Science in Political Science,” paper read before the Fourth Annual Meeting of Cheiron, the International Society for the History of the Behavioural and Social Sciences, Calgary-Banff, 1972, 6.

⁴ Jackson, “the Applications of Method,” 417. Cf. my “Let's not compare the social and physical sciences,” Science Forum, 29 (October 1972), 30–1.

⁵ Firestone, J., “Remarks on Concept Formation,” Philosophy of Science, xxxvill, no. 4 (1971), 570–604CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf. R. Kauffman and Jackson, “Firestone's Remarks on Concept Formation and Theory Construction in Political Science,” unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, Edmonton; or Wisdom, J.O., “Science versus the Scientific Revolution,” Philosophy of Social Science, I, no. 2 (1971), 123–44, esp., 136–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ Gurr, T.R., Politimetrics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1972), 9.Google Scholar

⁷ Kress, “On Method in Science: A Reply to Jackson,” 143 (hereafter referred to as Kress). Cf. Jackson, “The Application of Method,” 407, n29.

⁸ Jackson, “The Application of Method,” 407. See also Popper, K., Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (London, 1972)Google Scholar and Koertge, Noretta, “Theory Change in Science,” revision of a paper read at the Annual Meeting of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, 1971.Google Scholar

⁹ Jackson, “The Application of Method,” 479 and n29.

¹⁰ Kress, 145.

¹¹ Professor Kress was kind enough to offer bibliographic guidance in his first objection, Kress, 141. Here I would do the same. Contrary to Professor Kress, Duhem's position is usually referred to as contextualist and not conventionalist, hence the titles of some of the following references. See Leplin, J., “Contextual Falsification and Scientific Methodology,” Philosophy of Science, xxxix, no. 4 (1972), 476–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The best explication of Duhem's thesis is not the book Professor Kress cites, Wartofsky, Max, Conceptual Foundations of Scientific Thought (New York, 1968), 203–4Google Scholar, but rather Duhem's, own presentation in his The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (New York, 1968)Google Scholar, which originally appeared in French in 1914, esp. at 87. A typically thorough and devastating critique of the d-thesis is to be found in Grünbaum, Adolf, Philosophical Problems of Space and Time (New York, 1963), 81–105Google Scholar. Cf. Quinn, P., “The Status of the d-thesis,” Philosophy of Sciences, xxxvi, no. 4 (1969), 381–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar and G. Wedeking, “Duhem, Quine and Grunbaum on Falsification,” ibid., 375–80.

¹² Kress, 145.

¹³ Ibid., and Jackson, “The Application of Method,” 410–1. Cf. Perry, C., “The Semantics of Political Science,” American Political Science Review, XLIV, no. 2 (1950), 394–414.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴ This is a most difficult problem. Even so orthodox a philosopher of science as Popper seems careless of the distinction of meaningfulness and truthfulness. See his Logic of Scientific Discovery (London, rev. ed., 1968). On the other hand, even so radical a thinker as Wittgenstein, who compressed the distinction into a tight dialectic, did not dismiss it. See his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, trans. Anscombe, G.E.M., eds. von Wright, G.H., Rhees, R. and Anscombe, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1964), 7.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See Nagel, E., “Theory and Observation,” Observation and Theory in Science, Bromberger, Nagel S. and Grünbaum, A. (Baltimore, 1971), 15–43.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Austin, J.L., Sense and Sensibilia, ed. Warnock, G.J. (Oxford, 1962), 101.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Of especial relevance here are Feigl, H., “On the Meaning and the Limits of Justification,” Philosophical Analysis, ed. Black, M. (Ithaca, N.Y., 1950), 119–56Google Scholar and Salmon, W., The Foundations of Scientific Inference (Pittsburgh, 1966) 115–31Google Scholar. Many works are available directly on Bayesian statistics, e.g., Schmitt, S., Measuring Uncertainty (Reading, Mass., 1969)Google Scholar and H. Roberts, “Bayesian Inference,” International Encyclopedia of Social Science, II, 28–33.

¹⁸ Kress, 145.

¹⁹ See Butterfield, H., “The History of the Modern Theory of Gravitation,” The Origins of Modern Science (New York, rev. ed., 1957), 151–70.Google Scholar

²⁰ Kress, 145. Scheffler, , Science and Subjectivity (Indianapolis, 1967).Google Scholar

²¹ Kress, 145.

²² “Vision and Revolution,” Philosophy of Science, xxxix, no. 3 (1972), 372.

²³ Jackson, “The Application of Method,” 407.

²⁴ Ibid., 416.

²⁵ The Planning of Science, Society for Freedom in Sciences, Occasional Pamphlet, no. 4 (1946), 1–2.

²⁶ See, for example, Meehan, E., The Foundations of Political Analysis (Georgetown, Ontario, 1971)Google Scholar. Cf. my review of E. Meehan, The Foundation of Political Analysis, this Journal, vi, no. 3, 544–5.

²⁷ Can we not but prefer to see Wolin, for example, invest his talents in something like “The Rising Tide of Violence,” Pacifica Tape Library, A2394 (1967) more than “The Politics of the Study of Revolution,” Comparative Politics, 1, no. 3 (1973), 343–58. And do we not, as his audience, have a consumer's right to say so?