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Two aspects of propositional unity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Gary Ostertag
Gary Ostertag*
Affiliation:
The Saul Kripke Center, The Graduate Center, CUNY, and Nassau Community College, New York, USA
*
*Email: GOstertag@gc.cuny.edu
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Abstract

The paper builds upon familiar arguments against identifying the proposition that Brutus stabbed Caesar with a given sequence containing Brutus, Caesar, and the stabs relation. It identifies a further problem, one that affects not only traditional Russellian accounts of propositions, but also the recent act-theoretic approach championed by Scott Soames and Peter Hanks. The problem is that there is no clear content to the idea that the pair  < Brutus, Caesar> instantiates the stabs relation. It is argued that this further problem presents a decisive objection to the act-theoretic approach to propositions.

Keywords

Benacerraf problemcognitive actpredicationBertrand RussellScott Soamesunity of the proposition
Type
On Act- and Language-Based Conceptions of Propositions
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 5-6: Special issue: Essays on the Nature of Propositions , December 2013 , pp. 518 - 533
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2013

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