Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-wg55d Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-06T06:11:00.276Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Propositions and higher-order attitude attributions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Kirk Ludwig
Kirk Ludwig*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Indiana University, 026 Sycamore Hall, Bloomington, IN47405-7005
*
*Email: ludwig@indiana.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An important objection to sententialist theories of attitude reports is that they cannot accommodate the principle that one cannot know that someone believes that p without knowing what it is that he believes. This paper argues that a parallel problem arises for propositionalist accounts that has gone largely unnoticed, and that, furthermore, the usual resources for the propositionalist do not afford an adequate solution. While non-standard solutions are available for the propositionalist, it turns out that there are parallel solutions that are available for the sententialist. Since the difficulties raised seem to show that the mechanism by which sentential complements serve to inform us about attitudes and about sentence meaning does not depend on their referring to propositions, this casts doubt on whether talk of propositions should retain a significant theoretical role in the enterprise of understanding thought, language and communication.

Keywords

propositionssententialismpropositional attitude reportssemanticsmodes of presentation
Type
Theoretical Alternatives to Propositions
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 5-6: Special issue: Essays on the Nature of Propositions , December 2013 , pp. 741 - 765
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2013

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Burge, Tyler. 1978. “Self-Reference and Translation.” In Meaning and Translation, edited by Guenthner, and Guenthner-Reutter, , 137–156. London: Duckworth.Google Scholar
Burge, Tyler. 2007. “Postscript to ‘Belief De Re’.” In Foundations of Mind: Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Church, Alonzo. 1950. “On Carnap’s Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief.” Analysis 10: 97–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hanks, Peter. 2011. “Structured Propositions as Types.” Mind 120: 11–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Higginbotham, James. 1991. “Belief and Logical Form.” Mind and Language 6 (4): 344–369.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Higginbotham, James. 2006. “Sententialism: The Thesis that Complement Clauses Refer to Themselves.” Philosophical Issues: Philosophy of Language 16: 101–119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jubien, Michael. 2001. “Propositions and the Objects of Thought.” Philosophical Studies 104 (1): 47–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaplan, David. 1989. “Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives.” In Themes From Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
King, Jeffrey C. 2007. The Nature and Structure of Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, Saul A. 2011. “Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes.” In Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lepore, E., and Ludwig, K.. 2006. “Ontology in the theory of meaning.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3): 325–335.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lepore, Ernest, and Ludwig, Kirk. 2005. Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lepore, Ernest, and Ludwig, Kirk. 2007. Donald Davidson: Truth-theoretic Semantics. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lepore, Ernest, and Ludwig, Kirk. 2011. “Truth and Meaning Redux.” Philosophical Studies 154: 251–277.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ludwig, Kirk. 2002. “What is the Role of a Truth Theory in a Meaning Theory?” In Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics, edited by Shier, D., Campbell, J. K. and O’Rourke, M.. New York: Seven Bridges Press.Google Scholar
Ludwig, Kirk. 2010. “Adverbs of Action.” In Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Action, edited by O’Connor, T. and Sandis, C.. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
Ludwig, Kirk, and Ray, Greg. 1998. “Semantics for Opaque Contexts.” In Philosophical Perspectives: Language, Mind, and Ontology, edited by Tomberlin, J.. Cambridge: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Peacocke, Christopher. 2008. Truly Understood. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schein, Barry. 2012. “Event Semantics.” In The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, edited by Graff Fara, Delia and Russell, Gillian, 280–294. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Schiffer, Stephen. 1987. Remnants of Meaning. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Schiffer, Stephen R. 2003. The Things We Mean. Oxford: Clarendon.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Seymour, Michel. 1992. “A Sentential Theory of Propositional Attitudes.” Journal of Philosophy 89 (4): 181–201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Soames, Scott. 2010. What Is Meaning? Princeton, N.J.Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar