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Practical reasoning and practical knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Rowland Stout
Rowland Stout*
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy, University College Dublin, Dublin, Republic of Ireland
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Abstract

The judgement that provides the content of intention and coincides with the conclusion of practical reasoning is a normative judgement about what to do, and not, as Anscombe and McDowell argue, a factual judgement about what one is doing. Treating the conclusion of practical reasoning as expressing a recommendation rather than a verdict undermines McDowell’s argument; the special nature of practical reasoning does not preclude its conclusions being normative. Anscombe’s and McDowell’s claim that practical self-knowledge is productive of action may be accommodated by identifying the content of practical knowledge not with the conclusion but with a premise of practical reasoning – a kind of practical reasoning that occurs within rather than before action.

Keywords

Practical reasoningpractical knowledgeintention in actionAnscombeMcDowell
Type
Critical Notice
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 4 , June 2019 , pp. 564 - 579
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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